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CHAPTER 1: Nuclear Weapons Literature Review

1.1 Introduction
Can a state's nuclear status influence its behavior in dyadic relationships? The
dissertation evaluates the implications of nuclear status on state behavior (hostility and
cooperation) in dyadic relationships. The study examines the role played by nuclear
weapons development programs on state behavior1 and tests whether proliferation changes
the level of hostility and cooperation in a dyadic relationship. This argument is based on
whether the proliferating state is experiencing a security problem and has a guaranteed
security commitment from a nuclear patron. The basic argument is straightforward: nuclear
status interacting with security problems and security commitments (military alliance
partnerships) will determine state behavior. In addition, the study will also control for
alternative explanations to state behavior.
According to Gartzke and Jo (2009) nuclear proliferation occurs in two stages. First,
the establishment of nuclear weapons program, and second, the possession of nuclear
weapons. For example, the USSR/Russia was in the first stage during 1943-1948 and
moved to the second stage in 1949. It should be noted that not all states make it to the
second stage of nuclear proliferation, for example, Iraq and Libya, failed to possess nuclear
weapons, and were only in the development stage, 1982-2003 and 1970-2003, respectively.
The study will focus only on the first stage of nuclear proliferation, where states are

This includes states that were successful and not successful in acquiring nuclear weapons.
Once states tested their first nuclear weapon they were dropped from the sample, for
example, France was included in the sample up until 1959, and was dropped afterwards
since it had possessed a nuclear bomb in 1960. In February 1960, Operation Gerboise Bleue
was France's first nuclear bomb test in the Algerian Sahara desert.
1
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attempting to acquire nuclear weapons.
One issue that is generally missing from the literature is the examination of the
behavior of states with nuclear weapons development programs. Thus, this dissertation
attempts to improve on previous scholarship about nuclear weapons in two ways. First, I
intend to establish a causal mechanism between nuclear weapons development programs
and state behavior in order to examine how changing nuclear status influences state
behavior in terms of hostility and cooperation in dyadic relationships. Second, the literature
has almost exclusively focused on symmetric nuclear dyads and the United States-Soviet
Union/Russia dyad, and so the dissertation will break from this pattern and examine both
symmetric and asymmetric nuclear dyads. This gap in the literature is critical in the postCold War era because major crises are no longer between two nuclear superpowers but
between nuclear states and non-nuclear states.
There are two basic components to this dissertation. The first part, represented by
chapters 1 and 2, contains the bulk of the dissertation’s literature review and theoretical
discussion, respectively. The second part of the dissertation, represented by chapters 3
through 6, subjects my theoretical argument to empirical tests. The remainder of this
chapter will examine two issues. First, I discuss the major operationalization terms utilized
in the following chapters of the dissertation. Second, I discuss the literature on nuclear
weapons with respect to deterrence, militarized disputes, and conventional wars.
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1.2 Operationalization of Key Terms
This section will discuss the dissertation's operationalization of nuclear weapons
development programs applied in the study.

Nuclear Weapons Development Program:
In order to distinguish between nuclear program for peaceful means and program
for weapons development, the following distinctions are applied. First, when a state has a
research program or has nuclear material and a research program, but only to use it for
research and energy production, than its program is acknowledged to be for peaceful
means. To further distinguish between peaceful means and weapons development, another
criterion was applied. When a state has a nuclear reactor but only has low enriched uranium
at about 3-5% of U-235, then its programs is presumed to be suited for peaceful means
(Ware, 2013). The Giafenrheinfield nuclear power plant in Germany is a clear example of
this classification. Second, when a state makes it clear that it intends to join the nuclear
club and has made efforts to acquire nuclear weapons (nuclear material and research
program), than its program is determined to be used for weapons development. In that
instance, when a state moves to have highly enriched uranium beyond the 5% level and up
to the 90% level or more, then this is a clear example of having a program for the purpose
of developing weapons (Ware, 2013).
An example, 1942 was selected as the start year for the United States nuclear weapons
development program because on January 19, 1942, President Roosevelt had authorized
the National Defense Research Committee to develop nuclear weapons (Nichols, 1987).
Second, the USSR/Russia's nuclear weapons development program start year was 1943
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because in February 1943 the State Defense Committee authorized the establishment of a
nuclear program (Holloway, 1994). Khariton and Smirnov (1993) stated that "the Soviet
Union did not keep an historical record of the Soviet atomic project" (p. 20); however, a
letter by Soviet physicist Igor V. Kruchatov, who was the scientific director of the Soviet
nuclear project, indicated that the Soviet nuclear weapons program had been initiated in
late 1942-early 1943 (Moscow: Russian Scientific Center, 1993). Igor V. Kruchatov's letter
to Lavrenti Beria, chief of the secret police, stated the following:
"In our letters to you, Comrade M.G. Pervukhin [Deputy Chairman of the Council
of People’s Commissars and a key atomic administrator] and I reported on the status
of work on the uranium problem and of the colossal development of this work
abroad. ...around this issue there has been created abroad a concentration of
scientific and engineering-technical power on a scale never been seen in the history
of world science, and which has already achieved the most priceless results. In our
country, despite major improvement in work on uranium in 1943-44, the situation
remains completely unsatisfactory..." (Wilson Digital Archive International History
Declassified, 1993).

In addition, the start year for the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons development
program is 1941 because in September 1941, Prime Minister Churchill decided to move
with the establishment of a nuclear program and later the Directorate of Tube alloys project
was begun (Goldschmidt, 1990). France's nuclear weapons development program start year
was 1954 because Prime Minister Mendes-France had given authorization to initiate the
program (Sublette, 1999). Moreover, China's start year for its nuclear weapons program
was 1956 a on January 15, 1956, Chairman Moa Zedong gave authorization for the
initiation of the country's nuclear weapons program known as '02' project (Lewis and Litai,
1988).
In the case of Israel, its nuclear weapons start year is 1955. Many have debated about
Israel's nuclear program, particularly since Israel has yet to confirm its program and
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eventual weapons acquisition; rather Israel's nuclear program had operated in secret. In that
light many have argued that Israel's nuclear weapons program either started in 1955, 1958,
or 1979; for the purpose of this study I follow the same logic applied by Gartzke and Jo
(2006) in selecting 1955 because the Research and Planning Division began to recruit
scientists and engineers for a "most secret national project" (Cohen 1998, p. 43). Next,
India, which offers an interesting case since it started its nuclear program twice: in 1964
and 1972. India's first start year for its nuclear program was 1964 because that year Prime
Minister Shastri had given authorization for the Subterranean Nuclear Explosive Project,
but in 1966 India's nuclear program was restored for peaceful purpose upon his death by
Prime Minister Gandhi (Perkovich, 1999). So India's first nuclear weapons development
program was from 1964-1965. However, in 1972, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's nuclear
policy changed from peaceful means to weapons development, and that year India's nuclear
program was restarted due to political pressures and geopolitical issue with China and
Pakistan.
Another interesting state with a nuclear weapons development program was South
Africa, where in 1961 it became the first African country to have a nuclear weapons
development program, and in 1993 it was the first state to have nuclear reversal. The South
African Atomic Energy Board began its nuclear research in 1955, where the early years of
research were mainly focused on peaceful use of nuclear technology (Stumpf, 1995/1996).
However, a shift occurred when South Africa moved from peaceful use of nuclear
technology to military use in the mid-1970s. South Africa's nuclear doctrine was based on
the fear of invasion from the Soviet Union in the 1960s and second as a means to garner
US military support, notwithstanding its apartheid system (CIA Report, 1984). Since
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establishing its first nuclear reactor in 1965, South Africa had claimed that its nuclear
program was for peaceful purpose; however, in 1977 it became apparent that it was used to
develop nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterrence (Stumpf, p. 4). Based on these
circumstances, South Africa's start year is 1964 and its end year is 1978.
In addition, Pakistan's start year is 1972 because that year Prime Minister Bhutto
supported several nuclear scientists in developing nuclear weapons and recruited several
additional nuclear scientists (Wiessman and Krosney, 1981).
South Korea's start year is 1971 because the Weapons Exploitation Committee was
instructed by President Park to find ways to develop nuclear weapons, and more
importantly, South Korea came into an agreement with France a year later to build nuclear
reprocessing center (Spector, 1984). In 1972, the United States and South Korea signed the
ROK-US Atomic Energy Agreement, where South Korea purchased a nuclear reactor from
the United States for the purpose of nuclear energy production (Sheen, 2011). However, in
1974, it became clear to the United States that South Korea aimed at developing nuclear
weapons, and so the United States began pressuring the Park government to give up on its
nuclear ambition (Wilson Center Digital Archive - South Korean Nuclear History). The
United States did not approve of South Korea's nuclear development program for two
reasons: first, South Korea's nuclear weapons program might initiate a nuclear arms race
in the region, and second, a nuclear armed South Korea will change the power balance in
the United States-South Korea alliance partnership. Despite pressure from the United States
to end its program, South Korea continued with its program, as evident with the National
Security Council repost about the potential sale of a Canadian CANDU nuclear reactor to
South Korea in 1974 (NSC Report, November 18, 1974)
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Iran, like India, had 2 start years for its nuclear weapons development program, the
first in 1974, and the second, in 1984. Like South Africa, Iran had initially sought nuclear
research and technology for peaceful purpose, such as nuclear energy. In the 1970s, Shah
Mohamed Reza Pahlavi signed several agreements with West Germany, France (supported
the spread of nuclear technology), and the United States to purchase and build nuclear
reactors strictly for the purpose of producing energy.2 The US-Iran treaty "...agreement
closely restricted Iran's ability to produce plutonium or any other nuclear weapons fuel
using US supplied material without Washington's agreement" (Burr, 2009). Despite signing
this agreement and becoming party to the NPT, the Shah's nuclear policy in 1974 shifted
towards developing weapons.
The 1979 Iranian Revolution, which ousted the Shah from power and established the
Islamic Republic of Iran, had greatly curtailed Iran's nuclear relationship with Western
powers, particularly the United States. The 1979 Revolution and subsequently the Iran-Iraq
war slowed down Iran's nuclear program. Following the revolution, the international
community was uncertain about Iran's nuclear program, however evidence showed that
Ayatollah Khomeini had revived the country's nuclear program for the purpose of
establishing nuclear weapons in 1984, after years of opposing nuclear technology
(Cordesman and Al-Rodham, 2006: p. 24).3 Iran's nuclear doctrine to proliferate, like many
of its nuclear counterparts, is driven by its security dilemma from the past (1980s, to deter
Iraqi aggression) and present (Israel and the United States conventional and nuclear

2

Iran has signed the Safeguard Agreement with the IAEA in 1974, but has been deemed
by the IAEA to be non-compliant of the agreement as it pushes forward with its nuclear
technology for the purpose of military use, not peaceful use.
3
Ayatollah Khomeini's opposition was evident in his closure of the Bushehr nuclear
reactors.
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superiority). In addition, Iran's nuclear proliferation is driven by its goal to have greater
regional and global clout in international politics. Moving forward with its nuclear
aspiration, Iran signed two cooperation agreements with Pakistan in 1987 and China in
1990 (Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar, 2005). In the 1990s, Russia had agreed to help
Iran build the Busher nuclear power plant and assist in other nuclear technology, and on
the other hand, Argentina had agreed to sell Iran enriched uranium and heavy water
production facilities. However, due to suspicion that Iran was using its nuclear technology
for military purpose and pressures from the United States, China and Argentina suspended
their support to Iran. Despite IAEA investigations, sanctions and political pressures from
the international community, Iran continues to pursue its nuclear weapons program for the
purpose of military use as well as continues to deny. Chapter 6 will provided a detailed
discussion of Iran's nuclear weapons development program.
The next nuclear candidate state from the Middle East was Iraq, from its start year for
nuclear weapons development in 1982. In 1972, Iraq agreed with to start negotiations to
buy nuclear reactors from France; despite this, Iraq's nuclear program was still at the
research stage, and did not advance until 1982 (Hamza, 2000).
Two states from South America are represented in the list of states which have had
nuclear weapons development programs; they are Argentina and Brazil. Argentina's start
year for its program was 1978 because Argentina's military junta developed plans to build
the Atucha II nuclear power plant for the purpose of weapons production. Later, it was
revealed that the military regime began to build reprocessing facilities (Reiss, 1995).
Argentina's nuclear program only lasted 11 years and later was dismantled in 1990 after
Argentina and Brazil signed the Joint Declaration of Common Nuclear Policy. Second, like
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Argentina, Brazil's start year for its program was 1978 because in 1975 Brazil signed a
nuclear accord with Germany to expand its nuclear facilities. In addition, Brazil had
established secret 'parallel programs' for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons, which
were not known by International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA, hereafter] (Reiss, 1995).
Like Argentina, Brazil also dismantled its nuclear program after signing the agreement with
Argentina.
In the case of Libya, 1970 was selected as start year for the program because Qadhafi
had taken power on September 1st 1969, and since taking power he had asserted the
country's determination to acquire nuclear weapons (Arms Control Association, 2013).
Despite ratifying the NPT agreement 1975 (signed in 1968 by the previous regime),
Qadhafi's actions illustrated his determination to develop a nuclear program. For example,
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Libya purchased lightly processed uranium and nuclear
reactors from the Soviet Union (Arms Control Association, 2013).
Like Israel, North Korea's start year for its nuclear program is debatable between 1980
and 1982. In 1982, South Koran intelligence discovered the construction of nuclear reactors
in the Yongbyun (Central Intelligence Agency, 9 July 1982). Since North Korea has been
attempting to establish its nuclear research program in the 1950s and 1960s with the
assistance of the Soviet Union and later China, the study assumes that its nuclear program
had occurred earlier and thus selected the earlier year of 1980. Chapter 5 will provided a
detailed discussion of North Korea's nuclear weapons development program.
For all states the end year for nuclear weapons development program is when they
possessed a nuclear weapon and have tested their first bomb or abandoned its program. It
should be noted that states continue to have a program after this date, but it is hypothesized
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that their behavior changes once they join the nuclear club. For this reason, states were
dropped out of the study once they possessed nuclear weapons, since the study exclusively
focuses on the behavior of states in the first stage of nuclear proliferation.4 Table 1.1
presents a complete list of the start and end date for the states of interest with nuclear
weapons development programs.
Table 1.1: Nuclear Weapons Development Program States
State

United States

Libya

1942-1944 -Dropped from sample once nuclear test is
conducted
1943-1948 -Dropped from sample once nuclear test is
conducted
1941-1951 -Dropped from sample once nuclear test is
conducted
1954-1959 -Dropped from sample once nuclear test is
conducted
1956-1963 -Dropped from sample once nuclear test is
conducted
1955-1972 -Dropped from sample once nuclear test is
conducted
1964-1966 -Abandoned program and 1967 - 1971
1972-1974 - Dropped from sample once nuclear test is
conducted in 1974
1961-1978 - Dropped from sample once nuclear test is
conducted
1972-1989 - Dropped from sample once nuclear test is
conducted
1980-2005 - Dropped from sample once nuclear test is
conducted
1970-2003 - Abandoned program

South Korea

1970-1978 - Abandoned program

Argentina

1978-1990 - Abandoned program

USSR/Russia
United
Kingdom
France
China
Israel
India

South Africa
Pakistan
North Korea

4

Nuclear Program Years

The temporal scope for the study is 1930-2002, chapter 3 will discuss the logic behind
this selection in more detail.
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Brazil

1978-1990 - Abandoned program

Iraq

1982-2002 - Abandoned program

Iran

1974-1978 - Abandoned program in 1978
1985-2015 - Program restarted in 1985

Source: Jo and Gartzke (2006)
a. The list for the states with nuclear weapons development program is similar to the one
used by Jo and Gartzke (2006)
b. The nuclear weapons programs of Germany (1941-1945) and Japan (1943-1945) were
not included in the sample. Both cases were excluded in order to avoid a bias in the
empirical findings as a result of their engagement in World War II.
c. Israel, India, and North Korea developed nuclear weapons outside of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty.
d. The following states signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: United States (1968),
USSR/Russia (1968), United Kingdom (1968),France (1992), China (1992), South Africa
(1991), North Korea (1985, withdrew in 2003), Libya (1968), South Korea (1975),
Argentina (1995), Brazil (1998), Iraq (1968), and Iran (1968). India, Israel, and Pakistan
have never signed the NPT (UNODA - Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons).

1.3 Nuclear Weapons Literature
Since 1945, the destructive power of nuclear weapons has transformed the
international environment, and particularly the features of disputes and armed conflicts
between states. Much has been written about the implications of nuclear weapons for
international security and the effect nuclear proliferation has had on militarized disputes
and conventional war (Betts, 1987; Narang, 2013; Gartzke, 2010; Geller, 1990; Jervis,
1989; Mueller, 1989; Paul, 2000; Sagan & Waltz, 1995). Largely, the literature on nuclear
proliferation has attempted to explain how nuclear weapons have some bearing on coercive
diplomacy5 (Schelling, 1966; Powell, 1989 and 1990; Snyder & Diesing, 1977; Jervis,

5

In coercive diplomacy, states use military threats and non-military threats to achieve a
certain goal. George notes that “[t]he general idea of coercive diplomacy is to back one's
demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that he will
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1989; Beardsley & Asal, 2009), militarized interstate disputes (Geller, 1990; Gartzke & Jo,
2009; Horowitz, 2009), and finally conventional wars (Asal & Beardsley, 2009;
Rauchhaus, 2003).

Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy
A great deal of the literature on deterrence attempts to explain the utility of nuclear
weapons in coercive diplomacy.6 The Cuban Missile Crisis presents a clear example of how
nuclear weapons can be a useful tool for coercive diplomacy. Snyder (1961) argues that
“one deters another party from doing something by the implicit or explicit threat of a cost,
punishment if the act is not performed” (p. 9). Classical deterrence theorists have argued
that nuclear weapons increase the cost of conflict for states if nuclear weapons were to be
introduced, thus preventing both conventional and nuclear attacks (Kahn, 1965; Schelling,
1960; Snyder, 1961).7 George and Smoke (1974) write that deterrence “[i]n its most general
form, is simply the persuasion of one’s opponent that the costs and/or risk of a given course
of action he might take outweigh its benefits” (p. 11). Proponents of classical deterrence

consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply with the demand” (1991,
p. 4).
6
It should be noted that deterrence literature developed in the post-WWII era as a
consequence of the nuclear world. Jervis (1979) saw deterrence theory as “the most
influential school of thought in the American study of international relations” (p. 289). The
notion of deterrence existed long before the development of nuclear weapons; however,
deterrence vernacular was not used directly in international relations literature. Dougherty
and Pfaltzgraff (1996), for example, argued that the notion of deterrence was evident in the
writing of early realists, such as Thucydides and Machiavelli, and also in the balance of
power theory. Most significantly, the basic assumptions of deterrence theory can be traced
to realist political thought and balance of power politics; for example, deterrence theory
assumes that states are rational actors that base their decisions on cost-benefit calculations (Khan,
2009).
7

On classical deterrence theories, see Schelling, 1960 and 1966, Snyder, 1961; on prefect
deterrence, see Zagare, 2004; and on extended deterrence see Huth, 1990, Huth and
Russett, 1988, and Geller, 1990.
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have argued that stability in the post-war era can be attributed to the existence of the bipolar
system and nuclear deterrence.8 Essentially, the destructive force of nuclear weapons
generally increases the cost of conflict, and so Schelling (1966) argues that nuclear
weapons act to convince conflicting states to back down in confrontations because of the
potential that the conflict might escalate to the nuclear level. Deterrence theories advance
the idea that nuclear states are able to deter the aggressive action of adversaries only when
a nuclear state can present a credible nuclear threat and an intention to retaliate. In order
for a threat to be credible, two conditions must exist: the nuclear state must have the
political will to threaten the use of nuclear weapons and a sufficient stockpile of nuclear
weapons to mount a retaliatory threat. According to Huth (1999), “a threat is considered
credible if the defender possesses the military capabilities to inflict substantial costs on an
attacker in an armed conflict and if the attacker believes that the defender is resolved to use
its available military force” (p. 29). It should be noted that opponents of deterrence theory
have argued that the destructive nature of nuclear weapons and the development of secondstrike capabilities have undermined the credibility of the threat posed by nuclear weapons
(Muller, 1989; Jervis, 1984; Holsti, 1972; Morgan, 1983b). In order to deal with the
credibility problem present in nuclear deterrence theory, Schelling (1966) argues that the
idea of leaving something to chance solves the credibility problem when states make a
nuclear threat. Schelling contends “a response that carries some risk of war can be
plausible, even reasonable at a time when a final, ultimate decision to have a general war
would be implausible or unreasonable” (p. 37-38). The central conclusion of deterrence
theorists was that war in a nuclearized world is irrational for state actors to undertake

8

Stability refers to the absence of war between superpowers.
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because of the overwhelming destructive force of nuclear weapons (Ellsberg, 1959; Kahn,
1962; Powell, 1989; Schelling, 1966).
Waltz (1990) argued that nuclear weapons add an uncertain element to conflicts,
which means that conflicting states are not completely certain that a nuclear state will not
introduce nuclear weapons in conventional war; this element of uncertainty deters states
from attacking nuclear states. Several scholars have argued that not only can nuclear
weapons deter nuclear attack, but that nuclear weapons can also deter conventional conflict
from developing with a nuclear state (Bueno de Mesquita & Riker, 1982; Russett, 1989;
Huth & Russett, 1993). From a different perspective, several scholars have argued that even
if an explicit threat to use nuclear weapons has not been made, the mere possession of
nuclear weapons can deter and influence the behavior of adversaries in a militarized
dispute. Betts (1987), for example, illustrates that the move by the United States to place
bombers on alert in Iraq in 1958, following a military coup, clearly influenced Soviet
behavior in the region. Thus, nuclear deterrence was achieved without the United States
making an explicit threat to use nuclear weapons.
Despite attempts to explain the coercive use of nuclear weapons through deterrence,
several scholars insist that deterrence theory is plagued with several shortcomings that
reduce the theory’s explanatory power. For example, Muller (1988) argues that nuclear
weapons are irrelevant and he further rejects the idea of credible nuclear threats proposed
by deterrence theorists. Rather, Muller notes that the destructive nature of the weapons and
the development of second-strike capabilities have limited the credible threat posed by
nuclear weapons. On the other hand, many have questioned the assumption that decision
makers for the state act rationally, which deterrence theory has relied upon extensively to
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support its claims of the credible threat. Jervis (1984) questioned deterrence theory’s
reliance on rationality in decision-making and argued that this reliance overlooks other
important factors such as the emotions and perceptions of decision makers. The Cuban
missile crisis literature also questioned deterrence theory's reliance on rationally, where the
literature showed that the effect of bureaucratic politics as well as loss of command and
control can influence decision-makers (Allison, 1972 and 1969; Krasner, 1972; Bendor,
1992)
In a conflict situation, Jervis argued that decision makers rarely have complete
information about an opponent’s goals and resolve; therefore, they may misinterpret signals
made by another actor (who assumes the message is clearly understood by the opponent).
Additionally, Holsti (1972) argues that state actors may act irrationally; therefore, they may
not be deterred from taking aggressive actions. Holsti writes that deterrence “is likely to
prove ineffective against a nation led by a trigger-happy paranoid, or by someone seeking
personal or national self-destruction or martyrdom, or by decision makers willing to play a
form of international Russian roulette” (1971, p. 8-9).
Organski and Kugler (1980) have concluded that nuclear weapons have failed to deter
the outbreak of militarized conflict between states. A handful of studies have questioned
the value of nuclear weapons in conflict involving nuclear states and non-nuclear states
(Geller, 1990; Huth, 1990; Huth & Russett, 1984; Organski & Kugler, 1980); for example,
Geller concludes that in a military confrontation, nuclear weapons have no apparent
deterrent effect on the behavior of non-nuclear states. Huth (1990) considered the
relationship between nuclear status and conventional weapons capabilities. His study
yielded two relevant conclusions: first, that nuclear deterrence has had the greatest impact
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when a nuclear state was relatively weak in conventional weapons capabilities, and second,
that nuclear deterrence mattered least when a nuclear state was relatively strong in
conventional weapons capabilities.
An alternative understanding to nuclear deterrence theory is the tradition of non-use
(Paul, 1995, 2009) and nuclear taboo theory (Tannenwald, 2005, 2007; Price &
Tannenwald, 1996). Paul (1995) maintains that the tradition of non-use has significantly
impacted the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons in terms of credible threat and the failure
to deter the aggressive actions of non-nuclear states. In terms of taboo, Paul (2009)
concludes that “the apparent boldness of non-nuclear states in initiating war against a
nuclear adversary has been partially influenced by the tradition of non-use that all nuclear
states have thus far observed” (p. 144). The tradition of non-use, put forward by Paul,
diverges from the realist perspective that nuclear weapons have not been used since
Hiroshima and Nagasaki because of nuclear deterrence, the bipolar Cold War system, as
well as states acting in terms of security interests and Realpolitik concerns. Paul’s
explanation for the tradition of non-use is based on material and reputational factors. First,
the material factor of the non-use tradition suggests that in the context of nuclear weapons,
the costs of war increase since the effects of nuclear weapons are too difficult to control,
the expectation of victory is eliminated, and finally that the destructive aftermath of the use
of nuclear weapons is too severe for states to accept (p. 22-36). Second, the reputational
factor suggests that nuclear states will be reluctant to use nuclear weapons because of
possible damage to their reputation internationally and among their allies. The reputational
factor is especially notable when nuclear action is threatened against a non-nuclear state.
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The Korean War, according to Paul (2009), was the initial instance of the non-use tradition.9
The United States refrained from using nuclear weapons in the crisis because of
international and domestic public opinion, especially after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Paul
(1995, 2009) argued that political elites in America, most notably the Secretary of State
Dean Acheson, feared that an American nuclear attack would harm the US’s international
reputation and negatively affect its relationships with its allies (p. 45-57).10 Given this, Paul
(2009) argued that a causal linkage exists between material factors, reputational factors,
and self-deterrence.
Moreover, when self-deterrence prevails over the years, it becomes a tradition among
nuclear states; as a result of this tradition, non-nuclear states will come to understand the
tradition and they themselves will not be deterred from taking aggressive actions against a
nuclear state. This is clearly illustrated in the Afghan War (1979-1989), the Falklands War
(1982), and the Gulf War (1990-1991), to name a few cases. Interestingly, Paul (2009)
comments that new nuclear states are still in the process of understanding the tradition of
non-use. For example, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were developed for a specific reason,
as a response to India’s conventional weapons superiority and nuclear status. Since
acquiring nuclear weapons, Pakistan has been challenging the tradition of non-use of
nuclear weapons indirectly by not taking all possible measures to ensure that the weapons

9

Refer to T.V. Paul (2009) The Tradition of non-use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945 for a
complete overview of the development of the tradition of non-use among nuclear states.
10
It is important to note that the use of nuclear weapons was rejected for two other reasons:
(1) the United States lacked the nuclear capability to attack large targets sufficiently; (2)
the military opposed using nuclear weapons in Korea because it would contribute to the
depreciation of the weapon, especially when faced with a much stronger enemy, and so the
military preferred to keep the war a conventional one. (Paul 2009, p. 45-57).
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are not used accidentally or without authorization.11 Arguably, this concern noted by Paul
is similar to Sagan’s concern that the military organizations of new nuclear states may be
a problem for international security. Additionally, Paul argues that Pakistani elites view
nuclear weapons as having a single function, which is to gain territory in Kashmir from
India through limited conventional wars, backed up by the threat of nuclear war in Pakistan
(2009, p. 137-141). In general, Pakistan is still in the early stages of nuclear learning and
incorporation of the tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons.
Alternatively, constructivist explanations (most notably Tannenwald) attribute the nonuse of nuclear weapons to nuclear taboo theory. Tannenwald contends that, “the nuclear
taboo refers to a powerful prohibition against the [first] use of nuclear weapons. The taboo
is not the behavior (of non-use) itself but rather the normative belief about the behavior”
(2007, p. 10); the nuclear taboo “is associated with widespread popular revulsion against
nuclear weapons and widely held inhibitions on their use” (Tannenwald, 1999, p. 435).12
Price and Tannenwald (1996) reject claims about material and reputational factors made by
Paul (1995) as well as deterrence and cost-benefit calculations made by realist theorists
(Schelling, 1960; Waltz, 1995). Rather, Tannenwald and other proponents of nuclear taboo
theory contend that the taboo originated from societal pressures to respect laws of war and
human rights, especially following the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as
political costs.

11

Frankly, Paul is not completely certain that Pakistan will break the tradition of non-use
with India, since there is no concrete evidence of this fact, and only time will tell.
12
In referring to norms this means “a criteria for right or of wrong, a prescription of a
prohibition of a behavior for a given identity” (Tannenwald, 2005, p. 8). Tannenwald does
not suggest that the taboo can explain all of the non-use of nuclear weapons in crisis
situations, or that the taboo did not exist in 1945.
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Militarized Interstate Disputes and Conventional Wars
Deterrence theory has dominated the literature on nuclear weapons in the Cold War
era; however, in the post-Cold War era, attention has shifted from understanding deterrence
to understanding militarized disputes, civil wars, and conventional war propensity.
International relations literature has attempted to explain the implications of nuclear
proliferation on militarized interstate disputes and crises. Several recent studies have
explored whether nuclear weapons influenced the escalatory behavior of conflicting states
in conventional wars or whether nuclear states are more aggressive in militarized disputes
and their non-nuclear counterparts are more tractable. For instance, Gartzke and Jo (2009)
examined whether nuclear proliferation improved a state’s political leverage in conflict
situations and the influence nuclear weapons have on dispute propensity. Interestingly,
Gartzke and Jo conclude that nuclear proliferation has no bearing on war and peace in
international relations, but in the area of diplomatic issues and bargaining, nuclear weapons
have a significant impact (2009, p. 226). By studying proliferation patterns, Gartzke and
Jo confirmed that states engaged in interstate crisis because of “security problems, greater
interest in international affairs, or significant military capabilities” (p. 221), irrespective of
nuclear status.
Other works have suggested that the possession of nuclear weapons has an important
impact on the severity of violence in militarized disputes and crises between states,
especially between nuclear states. For example, Asal and Beardsley (2007) examine the
relationship between the possession of nuclear weapons and the severity of violence in a
crisis and noted that the level of violence in a crisis was inversely related to nuclear weapon
status (p. 152). Most significantly, Asal and Beardsley’s study attempted to empirically test
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Waltz’s question: do nuclear weapons increase or decrease the chance of war? The
empirical results showed that nuclear weapons have a restraining impact on state behavior
when it comes to crisis situations; for example, crises involving nuclear states tend to end
short of full-scale war (2007, p. 148-151). Asal and Beardsley agree with Waltz at least to
the extent that nuclear weapons have a restraining effect on crisis situations; however, the
empirical results of Asal and Beardsley only demonstrate a weak causal relationship
between the number of nuclear states in a conflict and their crisis behavior. As a
consequence, Waltz’s claim that "more is better" was not fully supported by empirical
results. When the number of nuclear states increases in a militarized dispute, this does not
prevent the dispute from escalating into a full-scale war. For example, in militarized
disputes such as the Suez Crisis in 1957, the Berlin Crisis in 1961, the October Yom Kipper
War in 1973, the Iraq No-Fly Zone in 1992, and the Gulf War in 1990, only two ended
without escalating into a full-scale war. Asal and Beardsley’s results suggest that increasing
the number of nuclear states in a crisis will likely have a destabilizing effect, which
contradicts claims made by proponents of nuclear proliferation that nuclear weapons have
a stabilizing effect. The conclusions made by Asal and Beardsley are consistent with several
studies that indicate that nuclear states tend to be involved in more minor militarized
disputes than full-scale conventional wars, as opposed to their non-nuclear counterparts. In
a more recent study, Beardsley and Asal (2009) assessed the impact of nuclear weapons on
the expected costs of conflict, and how such costs influence a state’s behavior in a crisis
situation. Beardsley and Asal arrived at several interesting conclusions. First, nuclear
weapons provide leverage for nuclear states, especially in a militarized dispute with a nonnuclear state. In a conflict situation between nuclear states, for example, the challenger is
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less likely to achieve concessionary gains and a nuclear defender is less likely to force a
nuclear challenger to back down. In contrast, in a conflict situation between a nuclear state
and a non-nuclear state, the outcomes are drastically different: a nuclear state is able to
achieve significant concessionary gains and force a non-nuclear defender to back down. In
this manner, Beardsley and Asal (2009) concluded that in asymmetric dyads, nuclear
weapons have given nuclear states leverage in salient conflicts, thereby reducing the
probability of escalation. Beardsley and Asal’s conclusions about nuclear weapons in
asymmetric dyads are inconsistent with those of Rauchhaus (2009) and Geller (1990),
where the latter studies confirm that nuclear weapons increase the probability of escalation
in a crisis. Nonetheless, Beardsley and Asal’s empirical findings are consistent with
Gartzke and Jo (2009), where they find that nuclear status gives states an advantage in the
international arena, especially with the bargaining process and in crisis situations. This
outcome offers a good explanation for why states choose to go nuclear, especially when a
rival already possesses the weapons: India and Pakistan are clear examples of this.
However, Beardsley and Asal’s findings are again inconsistent with much of the past
literature on nuclear weapons and militarized disputes, where several of these studies have
confirmed that nuclear weapons offer no clear advantages in militarized disputes (George
& Smoke, 1974; Huth & Russett, 1988; Huth, 1988; Huth, Bennett, & Gelpi, 1992;
Organski & Kugler, 1980).
In a related study, Horowitz (2009) analyzes the effects of nuclear weapons on
crises and whether the length of time a state has had nuclear weapons will influence its
behavior in crisis situations. Horowitz raised this question: “Does the fact that new nuclear
states lack experience in dealing with nuclear weapons influence the way they behave and
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the way they are treated by potential adversaries?” (2009, p. 234). The study adds another
dimension in the research on nuclear weapons by taking into account nuclear experience,
and more specifically by looking at the separate behavior of old and new nuclear states.13
Horowitz concludes that new nuclear states will be more likely to reciprocate disputes
initiated by other states than their more experienced nuclear counterparts, and at the same
time will also have their challenges reciprocated by other states (p. 250-251). Horowitz
attributes the difference in crisis behavior between new and old nuclear states to nuclear
learning; he argues that states over time learn that they cannot use the “nuclear card” in
every militarized interaction—nuclear states with more experience learn to distinguish the
merit of challenges by other states and take the appropriate action. Thus, new nuclear states
tend to overuse the nuclear card in low-level militarized disputes, in turn reducing the
credibility of nuclear deterrence and exposing the bluff of a nuclear threat. According to
Horowitz, this increases the likelihood of escalation in militarized disputes where a new
nuclear state is involved. Gartzke (2010) also finds that nuclear experience plays a critical
role in international conflict by confirming that new nuclear states are more likely to be
involved in militarized conflicts than older nuclear states. The findings by Gartzke support
the ideas proposed by Horowitz that new nuclear states aggressively use the nuclear card,
which leads to the escalation of militarized disputes. Gartzke notes that “as nuclear powers
age, either they or their opponents learn to interact less conflictual, though this decay in
dispute propensity itself declines with time” (2010, p. 18). In Beardsley and Asal (2009),

13

Horowitz notes that “through interactions over time, opponents learn what the new
nuclear state is likely to do with its arsenal, and the new nuclear state learns how to most
effectively leverage its capabilities. Interactions provide information that reduce
uncertainty” (2009, p. 239).
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Gartzke and Jo (2009), Horowitz (2009), and Rauchhaus (2009), it was confirmed that
nuclear weapons have a significant impact on the intensity, duration, and timing of conflicts
between states, and especially between nuclear states. Nuclear weapons, Rauchhaus and
others have discovered, shifted crises from full-scale war to more low-level disputes among
nuclear states. Recent empirical studies confirm that nuclear weapons to a certain extent
replaced full-scale wars with low-level crises, and in doing so destabilized the international
arena, as Waltz and other supporters of nuclear proliferation contend.
Another area of the literature has focused on the implications of nuclear weapons in
the probability of conventional wars. A recent study by Rauchhaus (2009) explored whether
the possession of nuclear weapons reduced the probability of war in conflicting dyads. The
study concluded that the existence of nuclear asymmetry tends to increase the propensity
for escalation in militarized disputes and interstate wars, in contrast to nuclear symmetry,
where the propensity for war dropped significantly. Rauchhaus’ findings were consistent
with Geller’s in that the deterrence effect of nuclear weapons was more evident in
symmetric power balances than in asymmetric ones (1990, p. 300). In contrast, Rauchhaus
finds that the probability of crisis initiation and limited use of force to be much higher with
nuclear symmetry, as opposed to nuclear asymmetry (p. 269-271). The assumption about
nuclear symmetry drawn by Rauchhaus supports the stability-instability paradox developed
by Snyder (1965). The stability-instability paradox contends that nuclear weapons
simultaneously promote stability and instability between nuclear states: stability is
established through the reduction of major wars between nuclear states, and instability is
established through the increase of low-level conflicts among nuclear states, such as lowlevel escalation in proxy wars or militarized disputes (Snyder, 1965). The stability-
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instability paradox was first developed to explain the lack of major wars between the
United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War; in addition, many have applied
the paradox to the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, where major wars occurred more
frequently during earlier periods of nuclear asymmetry than in periods of nuclear
symmetry, where limited use of force was more evident. Rauchhaus concludes that
additional research is needed to examine a vital area that is genuinely overlooked in the
literature, specifically the conflict relationships between nuclear states and non-nuclear
states.14 The theoretical logic that would explain why non-nuclear states should be
aggressive in confrontation with nuclear states can be attributed to the tradition or non-use
and nuclear taboo, which was discussed in previous sections of the chapter.

Waltz vs. Sagan: More or Less Better
The question of nuclear proliferation and its impact on war and peace have dominated
traditional international security studies, where many have theorized and debated about the
implications of nuclear weapons on conflict. A debate emerged between Waltz and Sagan
about nuclear proliferation.15 Waltz (1995) argued that nuclear proliferation would act as a
stabilizing agent in international relations: for example, Waltz asserts that the Long Peace
between the United States and the Soviet Union was mainly due to nuclear weapons.16 The

14

Rauchhaus (2009) notes that the treatment of nuclear asymmetry in the literature has
strictly relied on 2X2 games, and so Rauchhaus suggests that additional models are needed
to address this weakness in the literature. In Rauchhaus’ statistical model, the nuclear
asymmetry approach performs badly in terms of significance of the coefficients.
15
Bueno de Mesquita and Riker (1982) have also argued in favor of nuclear proliferation,
contending that a world with universal membership in the nuclear club will less likely be
associated with nuclear war than a world with limited membership in the nuclear club.
16
Waltz (1979, 1990) and Mearsheimer (1990) employ a structural realist argument to the
Long Peace between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, arguing
that the peace was a result of bipolarity and nuclear deterrence. The neorealist explanation
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notion of a “Long Peace,” supported by Waltz and other proponents of nuclear deterrence,
insists that the “probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches
zero” (Waltz, p. 740).17 According to Waltz, the cost of nuclear war is exceedingly high and
the smallest risk of nuclear war thus deters a state from acting aggressively. Waltz raised
the issue about nuclear weapons, weak states, and the conventional weapons balance, where
he argued that the mere possession of nuclear weapons by weak states makes disparities in
conventional weapons capabilities meaningless. Nuclear weapons, Waltz argued, compel
states to behave rationally and take cautionary actions in crisis situations in order to prevent
a crisis from escalating to a full-scale war. In a conventional world, states cannot be
persuaded to act rationally because conventional weapons do not hold the same destructive
power as nuclear weapons, and so states take on more aggressive and risky behavior (Waltz,
1995). The logic underpinning Waltz’s argument for nuclear proliferation is that “new
nuclear states will feel the constraints that present nuclear states have experienced. New
nuclear states will be more concerned for their safety and more mindful of dangers than the
old ones have been” (1995, p. 45). Waltz (2012) has applied his “more is better” idea to

for the Long Peace contrasts with other scholars’ explanations of the Long Peace. Building
on early liberals, such as Kant in Perpetual Peace (1795), modern liberals have asserted
that the Long Peace was a result of democracy, trade regimes, and institutionalism
(Keohane & Nye, 1977; Keohane, 1984, 1989; Keohane & Martine, 1995; Maoz & Russett,
1993).
17
In order for nuclear deterrence to succeed, Waltz (1981 and 1994) argued that the ability
to punish has to be severe. From that viewpoint, Waltz insists that nuclear proliferation will
make nuclear deterrence efficient because state actors will recognize that the high cost of
nuclear war and therefore nuclear deterrence is more robust than conventional deterrence
(2003). Thus, as nuclear deterrence and defensive capabilities increase through nuclear
proliferation, the likelihood of war will profoundly decrease, because nuclear weapons
increase the cost of war and make winning wars more difficult for states. Thus, the logic of
nuclear deterrence asserts that a state will not use nuclear weapons because of fear of
retaliation by another nuclear state. Thus, proponents of nuclear proliferation apply this
logic to their arguments in support of nuclear proliferation.
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Iran's nuclear weapons development program by arguing that nuclear weapons will make
the country feel more secure and in turn, Iran will act less aggressive in the region. Waltz
has further argued that the United States and Israel's nuclear weapons will act as a deterrent
on Iranian aggression, and thereby Iran will become less aggressive once it acquires nuclear
weapons.
Van Creveld (1991) further supports Waltz by suggesting that interstate wars, especially
among enduring rivalries, have declined significantly once states acquire nuclear
capabilities—for example, India and Pakistan. Bueno de Mesquita and Riker (1982)
endorse Waltz and other proponents of nuclear proliferation by arguing that nuclear
proliferation will reduce the likelihood of conventional conflicts and, more importantly,
reduce the likelihood of conventional conflicts becoming nuclear. In other words, Bueno
de Mesquita and Riker encourage nuclear proliferation in areas where non-nuclear states
are facing nuclear adversaries because nuclear deterrence will prevent the outbreak of
conflict.
Alternatively, Sagan (1994) has argued that nuclear proliferation would instead act as
a destabilizing agent in international relations by increasing the likelihood of conventional
war and, more importantly, nuclear war; thus, Sagan rejects the claim of deterrence through
nuclear weapons. Sagan further rejected the claim made by Waltz that nuclear weapons are
responsible for the Long Peace between the United States and the Soviet Union. In that
light, Sagan argued in opposition to Waltz, as he suggests that new nuclear states have more
difficulty maintaining stable nuclear deterrence than their old nuclear counterparts. From
that viewpoint, Sagan (1995) argued that new nuclear states and potential nuclear states
lack tight civilian control on nuclear arsenals, and that the majority of these states have
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authoritarian or military governments, which makes nuclear acquisition more dangerous.
Given all this, the organizational behavior of the military in new nuclear nations will lead
to the failure of nuclear deterrence, and in turn instability. Additionally, Sagan counters
Waltz’s sanguine claim for nuclear proliferation by arguing that new nuclear states lack
“stable civil-military relations, historical learning experience or extensive command and
control mechanisms” (1995, p. 49). Decision makers, according to Sagan, are not as
rational as Waltz and other nuclear optimists contend; rather, Sagan writes that nuclear
weapons in these states are controlled by imperfect military organizations. Likewise, Aron
(1965) maintains that new nuclear states pose a danger to international security because
they will not be as rational as their older nuclear counterparts. Sagan and others argue that
new nuclear states are more likely to take risky postures in crisis situations as a means to
justify the cost spent developing nuclear weapons; this is especially troubling in unstable
and autocratic regimes (Aron, 1965; Sagan, 1995; Blair, 1993; Feaver, 1992). A final
counterargument by Sagan deals with Waltz’s claim about stable nuclear deterrence.18
Sagan contends that proponents of nuclear proliferation are too optimistic in their claims
that stable nuclear deterrence will hold with new nuclear states, and that new nuclear states
will automatically be deterred from using nuclear weapons against their adversaries. The
assumptions put forth by nuclear optimists that new nuclear states will be deterred are
problematic. Sagan utilizes India and Pakistan as a case to make his point, arguing that if
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Waltz argued that several operational requirements are needed. First, during the period
of transition from conventional status to nuclear status, the first state must not undertake a
preventive war against an opponent so as to avoid a greater war when the second state
achieves nuclear status. Second, a nuclear state must develop second-strike capabilities in
order to impose a sufficient level of unacceptable damage to another state. Third, accidental
use of nuclear weapons must not be possible (Sagan 1995).
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Pakistan had become nuclearized before India, then the military government in Pakistan
would have preferred a preventive war with India.19 In supporting his argument about
preventive war with Pakistan, Sagan uses the case of India, illustrating that India’s military
considered a preventive war against Pakistan’s Kahuta nuclear facility in the early 1980s
(2001, p. 1069). The next section will discuss the gap in the literature on nuclear weapons.

1.4 Gap in the literature
Over the last decade, scholars have devoted renewed attention to nuclear weapons,
which were central to scholarship in the Cold War. Despite this extensive research, a limited
number of studies have examined the role played by nuclear weapons development
programs on state behavior (Horowitz, 2012; Fuhrman & Kreps, 2010).20 Sobek, Foster,
and Robison (2012) examined "...the relationship between nuclear proliferation process and
the frequency with which proliferators are targeted in conventional militarized conflicts"
(p. 149). Although, Sobek, Foster, and Robison (2012) and other studies have examined the
implication of nuclear weapons development program on militarized disputes as well as
state behavior, these studies have overlooked the behavior of states attempting to develop
nuclear weapons. Thus, this study will examine the behavior of states that are attempting
to developing nuclear weapons in dyadic relationships. This study will help to fill the gap
in the literature.

19

Sagan pointed out the problems with preventive war during the transition period as a
means to counter the claim made by Waltz concerning preventive war between states.
20
For the purpose of the study, nuclear weapons development program status is classified
in the following way: a state that moves from having a nuclear program for peaceful means
to one that is used to develop nuclear weapons.
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Much has been written about the behavior of states with nuclear weapons; however,
little information exists about the behavior of states with nuclear weapons development
programs. Understanding the behavior of states with such development programs is
essential because since the mid-1960s, it has been countries in the developing world
attempting to proliferate. Clear examples of this are Iran, Libya, Iraq, Pakistan, and North
Korea. These cases are a cause for concern because these states exist in fragile positions,
prone to conflict and political instability, and for these reasons understanding their behavior
in terms of hostility and cooperation in dyadic relationships is vital for future international
stability. The timeline to obtain the bomb for these countries is much longer than their
nuclear predecessors, where the average for nuclear acquisition for the latter group has
been seven years and for the former group seventeen years (Hymans, 2012).21 This situation
leaves an extensive void of information about the behavior of states at this stage of the
nuclear game because the timeline to nuclear acquisition has increased. In addition, many
states operate in a much different security environment than then previous states with
nuclear weapons development programs, as the latter group were major players in Cold
War politics, whereas the former group have been more engaged in regional conflicts. In
summary, the study seeks to answer this question about the behavior of states with nuclear
weapons: How does a state's behavior vary as it advances in its nuclear weapons ambitions?
Understanding the behavior of states with nuclear weapons development programs will
better equip the international community to deal with proliferation. The direction of this
change in behavior and the logic for state behavior is discussed in more detail in chapter 2.
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With the exception of Iran, Libya, and Iraq.
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1.5 Dissertation Plan
This dissertation consists of six chapters. In Chapter 2, I characterize the theoretical
argument about nuclear status and state behavior, which will be tested in the quantitative
and qualitative chapters of the dissertation. In Chapter 3, I present the statistical approach
applied in the dissertation as well as the data used. Chapter 4, I test the implications of
nuclear status on state patterns of behavior.
Recognizing the inherent limitation of quantitative analysis in international conflict
studies, Chapter 5 conducts a detailed case study analysis of North Korea in an effort to
examine whether changing nuclear status has influenced a change in the country’s behavior
in its dyadic relationships. Finally, Chapter 6 provides an overall summary of the study and
future research to be completed on nuclear status and state behavior. In addition, Chapter
6 provides a discussion and analysis about Iran's behavior as its nuclear status changes. A
discussion of Iran's behavior provides a good test of external validity, in that the results
found in Chapters 4 and 5 can be generalized to Iran.
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CHAPTER 2: Nuclear Weapons Development Programs and Patterns of
State Behavior
2.1 Introduction: The purpose of this study
What is the implication of changing nuclear status on a state's pattern of behavior in
the international system? Can nuclear status bolster or deter hostility behavior of states in
dyadic relationships? What role does nuclear status play on state cooperative behavior in
the international system? These questions are central to the dissertation's theoretical
framework about nuclear weapons development programs and patterns of state behavior.
This dissertation attempts to test the effect of nuclear weapons development programs on
states’ hostile and cooperative behavior. It is important to note that the behavior of states
with nuclear weapons development programs is examined in dyadic relationships. In order
to estimate the effect of nuclear status on the behavior of states, two interacting factors
must be accounted for in the overall argument of the study: first, security problems; and
second, security commitments from a nuclear patron. These two factors provide insight
into the hostile and cooperative behavior of states with nuclear weapons development
program and will be discussed in detail in the Chapter.
Over the last decade scholars have devoted renewed attention to the effect of nuclear
weapons—often employing quantitative analysis (Horowitz, 2009; Kroenig, 2013; Narang,
2013; Bell & Miller, 2013; Sechger & Fuhrmann, 2013); however, the literature lacks
attention to the time period when states are in the process of developing nuclear weapons
capabilities. Therefore, there is relatively little work done to examine whether nuclear
weapons development programs change the behavior of states in the international system.
This is clearly a gap in the literature that needs to be examined, because the time to acquire
nuclear weapons has increased. For example, the United States and the Soviet Union, first-
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generation states, only took three (Manhattan Project 1942-1945) and six years,
respectively, to acquire nuclear weapons; on the other hand, North Korea (1980-2006) took
twenty-five years to become nuclearized. Since the time frame for procurement of nuclear
weapons for states is prolonged, there is a time period in the nuclear literature that is never
examined.22 Thus, the literature lacks an understanding about state behavior during this
time period, which is critical in understanding the future behavior of states once they
acquire nuclear weapons. For this reason, the study of nuclear status in terms of nuclear
weapons development programs is essential. This study will help fill the gap of information
and theoretical argument regarding nuclear weapons development programs and state
behavior.
This chapter proceeds in two parts. First, I will discuss the theoretical argument about
nuclear status and patterns of behavior in the international system. In the second part of
this chapter, I will present the hypotheses to be tested in the quantitative section of the
dissertation (Chapter 4) and the qualitative section of the dissertation (Chapters 5 and 6).

2.2 Theoretical argument about nuclear status and patterns of state behavior
Current Literature
Much of the literature on nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapons has focused on
the determinants of nuclear acquisition and nuclear deterrence. Existing nuclear
proliferation scholarship maintains that national security concerns are the driving force
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There are several factors that determine the length of time it takes for a state to acquire
nuclear weapons, but the main factors are international pressure to remain non-nuclear,
financial burden of carrying out the program, domestic policy of proliferating states, and
access to nuclear technology and materials. For example, both India and Iran's nuclear
program was shut down due to a change in domestic policy regarding nuclear weapons.
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behind why states go nuclear (Dunn & Kahn, 1976; Jo & Gartzke, 2007). Jo and Gartzke
(2007) further argue that in addition to security concerns, states move towards establishing
nuclear weapons programs when they have the technological capabilities to do so. In
several cases, states, despite having the capability to proliferate, will refrain from doing so
because they do not face an existential security threat. States that proliferate tend to do so
when they face an existential security threat and they believe that acquiring nuclear
weapons will give them sufficient bargaining leverage as their deterrence capability is
enhanced with nuclear weapons.
The literature on nuclear weapons and international conflict contends that nuclear
weapons are likely to reduce the probability of conventional wars, since the possible
introduction of nuclear weapons to the battlefield could significantly increase the cost of
war (Schelling, 1960; Morgan, 1983; Powell, 1990; Sagan, 2003). From that viewpoint, the
possession of nuclear weapons has a deterrent effect in disputes between nuclear states as
well as non-nuclear states through classical deterrence and extended deterrence,
respectively (De Mesquita & Riker, 1982; Betts, 1977; Russett, 1989; Huth & Russett,
1993; Mearsheimer, 1984/1985). Waltz (1981) notes that nuclear weapons deter states from
initiating a conventional attack on a nuclear state because of the fear that the conflict might
escalate to a nuclear level. Organski and Kugler (1980), on the other hand, found that
deterrence does not work in a crisis where only one state has nuclear weapons, and instead
crises between nuclear states and non-nuclear states were more likely to escalate to war
than crises between nuclear weapons states.
Even the new literature on nuclear weapons (Kroenig, 2013; Narang, 2009; Horowitz,
2009; Beardsley & Asal, 2009) lacks a clear understanding of state behavior as they move
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from not having a nuclear weapons development program to having one. In one study,
Horowitz (2013) finds that states with nuclear weapons development programs are more
likely to initiate militarized disputes. Despite this study, there is limited research about the
behavior of states with nuclear weapons development, who have yet to join the nuclear
club. In addition, several quantitative studies have found that states with nuclear weapons
development programs and nuclear weapons are either less or more likely to initiate
militarized disputes (Beardsley and Asal 2013; Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010; Geller 1990;
Kroenig 2013; Horowitz 2009). Looking closely at these studies, it seems that researchers
have assumed “a one size fits all” idea; however, this is a limitation in the literature. Thus,
in order to move beyond this one-dimensional understanding of states with nuclear
weapons development programs and nuclear weapons, this study casts the issue of nuclear
status in the context of a state’s security environment. It is important to note that “security
environment” for the purpose of this dissertation refers to a state experiencing a security
problem and a security commitment from a nuclear patron.23

23

For the purpose of this dissertation security problem and security commitment from a
nuclear patron are classified as follows: First, security problem is exclusively defined in
military terms. A security problem is present only when the state developing nuclear
weapons is trapped in an interstate rivalry and/or there is a potential conventional military
threat from another state(s). For interstate rivalry the study applied the same definition as
Bennett (1996):
"an interstate rivalry is a dyad in which two states disagree over the resolution of
some issue(s) between them for an extended period of time, leading them to commit
substantial resources (military, economic, or diplomatic) toward opposing each
other, and in which relatively frequent diplomatic or military challenges to the
disputed status quo are made by one or both of the states. The specific issues at
stake in rivalries could include control over territory, external political policies
(such as promotion of a religion or ideology), or internal political policies with
international effects (such as the treatment of ethnic minorities or the presence of a
particular leader)" (p. 160).
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In summary, the study examines the effect of nuclear weapons development programs
on state patterns of behavior. The theoretical argument put forward in this dissertation
asserts that a state's behavior in terms of hostility and cooperation24 is likely to change as
the state's nuclear status changes. The direction of state behavior will be discussed in more

North Korea (1980-2006), for example, would be classified as a state with a nuclear
weapons development program that is experiencing a security problem as evident with the
potential conventional military threat from South Korea and the United States. In addition,
Iran would be viewed as a state developing nuclear weapons experiencing a security
problem because of the interstate rivalry with Iraq, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. It should be
noted that the Iranian-Saudi rivalry become more intense following the 1979 Islamic
Revolution, which is due to the division within Islam, notably between Sunni (Saudi
Arabia) and Shi'a (Iran) sects.
Second, commitment from a nuclear patron is broadly defined to include military
alliance or political support in the international system. It should be noted that not all states
with nuclear weapons development programs had a security commitment from a nuclear
patron. Also, several states had nuclear patrons, but once they decided to establish a nuclear
weapons development program this relationship was either weakened or ended. A clear
example of this is in 2010, where Iran refused to halt its nuclear weapons program and in
response the international community imposed sanctions on Iran. As a result of this
situation, Iranian and Russian security commitment was slightly weakened.
24

A few notes should be made about the indicators for hostility and cooperation. First,
states developing nuclear weapons can exhibit both hostile and cooperative behavior in
their dyadic interactions. This is due to the operationalization of the indicators, where
hostility and cooperative behavior are assumed in the study not to be mutually exclusive.
Along these lines, hostility and cooperation can both increase or decrease concurrently.
Refer to Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of hostile and cooperative scores. Hostile
behavior is measured based on the level of hostility in militarized disputes between states
attempting to develop nuclear weapons and other states. Cooperative behavior
encompasses diplomatic representation/exchange, joint-IGO membership, and formal
agreements between states attempting to develop nuclear weapons and other states.
Therefore, hostility can increase in terms of militarized disputes, but cooperation can also
increase as states participate in IGOs or form agreements. For example, in the Iran-Iraq
dyad, despite becoming very hostile during the 1980s Iran-Iraq war, they continued to
cooperate in OPEC. Second, for the purpose of the study, a decrease in cooperation means
nonparticipation and indifference in formal agreements or IGOs by states attempting to
develop nuclear weapons in given dyads. It should be noted that a decrease in cooperation
does not indicate more violence committed by states attempting to develop nuclear
weapons. Third, a decrease in hostility does not mean states attempting to develop nuclear
weapons become more cooperative.
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detail in the following paragraphs. For the purpose of the dissertation, changing nuclear
status refers to a state moving from not having a nuclear weapons development program to
having one. For example, France's nuclear status changed in 1954 to a nuclear weapons
development program because that was the year it began to pursue nuclear weapons as part
of its foreign policy. The basic argument is straightforward: nuclear status interacting with
a security problem and a security commitment will determine state behavior. Thus, the
study will first discuss the role security problems play on the relationship between nuclear
status and patterns of state behavior, and then includes a discussion of the role of security
commitments.

Argument about nuclear status and state behavior:
The study examines the movement towards nuclearization through nuclear weapons
development program status and the effects it has on the behavior of states (hostile and
cooperative behavior) with weapon programs.25 Thus, the study is interested in only the
behavior of states developing nuclear weapons in dyadic relationships; Chapter 3 will
discuss in detail how this behavior is isolated in the dyadic relationship and tested26. In
order to understand the behavior of states developing nuclear weapons, first a discussion
of international reaction to nuclear development is necessary. Beardsley and Asal (2013)
found that states with nuclear weapons development programs tend to engender violence
from other states in the international system more than nuclear weapons states because
nuclear weapons development programs tend to create “vulnerability and opportunity for

25

That's before joining the nuclear club.
The study also examines the behavior of non-proliferating states in order to fully
understand the implication of nuclear status on state behavior.
26
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aggression from other states in the system” (p. 83). In accordance with these authors, this
fear does not stem from the existential threat of nuclear use but rather the fear of losing
political leverage in international politics, as the bargaining power of states increases as
they acquire nuclear capabilities. Fuhrmann and Kreps (2010) assert that opponents to
states with nuclear weapons development programs are likely to take preemptive action
(military attack or international sanctions) towards developing states27 in order to prevent
the shift in bargaining power in the international system. Additionally, Sobek, Foster, and
Robison (2012) found that as developing states moved closer to acquire nuclear weapons
this had increased the likelihood they would be attacked by other states. The authors noted
that other states do not attack, sanction, or threaten developing states for the sole purpose
of preventing nuclear weapons acquisition, but rather they do so in order to prevent the
developing state from possessing nuclear weapons, and eventually altering the bargaining
position of states. In 2007, the international community imposed sanctions on Iran for its
nuclear weapons development program in the hopes that it would prevent the country from
becoming nuclear.
Since this is understood about the behavior of other states towards states developing
nuclear weapons, the study also will seek to explain the behavior of the latter group. The
study draws on security problems and alliance partnerships to explain the behavior of states
as their nuclear status changes. Consequently, other states understand that once nuclear
acquisition occurs by proliferating states, this shifts the power balance in the dyadic
relationship in two ways. First, if both states have nuclear weapons, the bargaining leverage

27

Developing states refers to states with nuclear weapons development program, who are
attempting to acquire nuclear weapons.
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the older nuclear weapons state had is now reduced, and second, if only one state has
nuclear weapons, then the balance in the dyadic relationship is tilted towards the newly
nuclearized state. This situation is even more precarious when states in the dyad are rivals;
a rival state would be eager to carry out preventive attacks against the state with a nuclear
weapons development program. This was clearly seen with the case of Operation Babylon
in 1981. In 1981, Israeli airstrikes destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor near Baghdad city,
the 70-megawatts uranium powered reactor was near completion (Vandenbroucke, 1984).
Israel's preemptive attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor was based on fear that a nuclear Iraq
would use the weapons to attack Israel.
For this reason, a state developing nuclear weapons will likely exhibit a change in its
hostile behavior towards another state in a given dyad in order to avert potential preemptive
attacks and international sanctions from its adversaries.28Applying the logic from
Fuhrmann and Kreps (2010) as well as Beardsley and Asal (2013), the present study argues
that a state developing nuclear weapons will take on a less hostile posture in response to
potential or actual threats of retaliation from its adversaries if it's experiencing a security
problem. This reduction in hostile behavior is due to the fact that a developing state wants
to avoid becoming embroiled in an international conflict, which could disrupt its nuclear
ambition as resources will have to be diverted away from the program and towards the
conflict. The economic cost of conflict will be the greatest when the developing state
becomes involved in a protracted war. Additionally, nuclear facilities might be damaged in
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In terms of hostility, this includes the threat, display, and use of force as well as
engagement in interstate war. Hostility also refers to proliferating state's challenging
aggressive actions by another state in a given dyad as well as initiating a crisis. Chapter 3
will offer a more detailed discussion and operationalization of hostile behavior applied in
the study.
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potential conflicts, which could setback a state's nuclear ambition. This was clearly seen
with the case of Iraq with the first Gulf War. Thus, acting less hostile states with a nuclear
weapons development program can continue to develop their nuclear weapons capabilities,
and they will eventually be able to acquire nuclear weapons and the benefited associated
with the weapons. Besides a military advantage, nuclear weapons also provide states with
non-tangible benefits. The literature on state motives for nuclear development asserts that
in international politics nuclear weapons become a source of pride for states as well as a
means to enhance their status in the international system (Prosser 2008). This situation was
clearly evident with North Korea's desire to become nuclear so as to become a major player
in the region, in addition to protecting and ensuring the longevity of its regime from US
preemption attacks. Moreover, nuclear weapons offer states a major power status or great
power status in the international system; this was clearly evident with China shortly after
it tested its first nuclear bomb. Thus, the case of China, gives second-tier states a greater
incentive to pursue nuclear weapons because they perceive nuclearization as an important
move towards "regional paramountcy" (Dunn and Kahn, 1976). In addition to improving a
state's status in the system, nuclear weapons can also improve a state's influence and
deterrent credibility because the weapons create a reputation for power and resolve for the
state (Jervis 1989). Furthermore, nuclear weapons purportedly offer states greater
bargaining power and political leverage over international politics; and to a lesser extent
nuclear weapons give reasons to invite the states developing nuclear weapons to the
bargaining table. The effect of a security problem interacting with nuclear status on patterns
of behavior implies the following hypotheses with respect to hostility:29

29

A change in nuclear status refers to a state moving from not having a nuclear weapons
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Hypothesis 1(a): changing nuclear status will increase proliferating states hostile
behavior in dyadic relationships.
Hypothesis 1(b): changing nuclear status will decrease proliferating states hostile
behavior in dyadic relationships when a security problem is present.

The following section will discuss the role of a security commitment from a nuclear
patron [security commitment, hereafter] to the overall theoretical argument of the study.
Since nuclear proliferation changes the distribution of power among states, particularly in
an asymmetric dyad where only one state has nuclear weapons, this situation might lead to
preemptive military actions by other states in order to uphold the status quo. How does
security commitment affect the behavior of a state developing nuclear weapons? A state’s
attempts to proliferate will likely draw the attention of other states in the international
system, and these states might make preemptive military attacks on a state developing
nuclear weapons or establish sanctions against the developing state in order to prevent it
from acquiring nuclear weapons. This argument about the behavior of other states towards
a state developing nuclear program is consistent with the findings of Beardsley and Asal
(2013) and Fuhrmann and Kreps (2010) that other states will likely view nuclear
proliferation as threat to their security and thus will move to prevent their adversaries from
acquiring nuclear weapons.
Turning to security commitment, the interaction between nuclear status and security
commitment provides two different perspectives on the behavior of the developing state
within a dyadic relationship.30 Security commitment includes formal military alliance with

development program to having one. In addition, a change in nuclear status also refers to a
shift in developing state's nuclear policy from peaceful purpose to weapons development.
30
The first perspective is the effect of having a security commitment on the behavior of
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nuclear weapons states, such at the Rio Pact between the United States and Argentina, and
neutrality agreement with nuclear weapons states. It should be noted that in the context of
security commitment, this commitment goes beyond a nuclear umbrella, and that just
having an agreement with a nuclear patron will influence the behavior of states developing
nuclear program, even if there is no complete guarantee that the nuclear ally would come
to the aid of the state developing nuclear weapons in an preemptive attack by other states.
The first implication security commitment has on the behavior of developing states
is consistent with the literature on alliance partnerships and state behavior, where the
literature finds that military alliance partnerships can either provoke and expand an existing
conflict or deter and prevent war (Morgenthau, 1967; Waltz, 1979; Siverson & Starr, 1991;
Leeds, 2003; Vasquez, 1993). Applying this logic to the nuclear status thesis presented in
the study, a developing state's partnership with a nuclear ally will likely deter
preemptive attacks by other states that oppose its nuclear ambitions.31 Along these lines, a
state developing nuclear weapons that is closely aligned with a nuclear weapons state is
protected by its ally's extended deterrence, and thus is able to continue with its program
without the threat of preemptive military attacks.32 For that reason, the state developing

proliferating states and the second perspective is the effect of not having a security
commitment on the behavior of proliferating states.
31
It should be noted that in several cases a nuclear ally has either pressured or offered
inducement to its proliferating ally to halt its nuclear program; however, since the study is
examining the effect of nuclear programs on a developing state behavior and not
proliferation itself, the study assumed that the merely having alliance with a nuclear state
gives the proliferating state assurance and confidence against potential threats towards its
nuclear ambitions.
32
It could be argued that the logic of extended deterrence can work against the proliferating
state’s need to get its own nuclear weapons. However, as stated above, nuclear weapons
offer states intangible benefits, such as political leverage and bargaining power. In addition,
alliance partnership can fall apart as regimes change and so extended deterrence itself is
not always guaranteed. This was clearly evident with Iran, where it lost its extended
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nuclear weapons does not need to be cautious in its dyadic interaction, and when faced with
a possible threat or involved in a dispute with another state, the state developing nuclear
weapons will be inclined to take on a more aggressive posture because it has the patronage
of a powerful nuclear state. This situation illustrates a security commitment where the
alliance with a nuclear ally represents a nuclear umbrella for states developing nuclear
weapons. An example of this was the 1961 Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation
Friendship Treaty, which represented a nuclear umbrella for North Korea.33
Moreover, even if the nuclear ally does not intervene in a crisis involving its
developing ally, the mere partnership it has with the state developing nuclear weapons and
the shadow of nuclear weapons can still have a vital effect on the developing state's
behavior. Again, the state developing nuclear weapons could take on more bold and
aggressive behavior in its dyadic interactions because it understands that its adversaries
will be greatly influenced by its alliance with a nuclear state. Thus, the shadow of an ally's
nuclear weapons allow a state developing nuclear weapons to act more hostile because of
the safety net its nuclear alliance grants.
Beyond the idea of nuclear umbrella, just having an agreement with a nuclear state
can influence the behavior of states developing nuclear weapons in dyadic relationships. In
accordance to Leeds (2003), non-defense agreements can "...increase the confidence of a
challenger in his ability to succeed through aggression" (p. 437). Thus, the study assumes
that non-aggression and neutrality agreements with nuclear states can alter the behavior of
states developing nuclear weapons by giving them more confidence to increase their level

deterrence from the United States once they were no longer allied after the fall of the Shah's
regime in 1979.
33
After 1964, the treaty represented a nuclear umbrella for North Korea.
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of hostility in dyadic relationships; this is especially evident when developing states are
challenged by other states in militarized conflicts. A clear example of this is the IndoPakistani war in 1971.34 During this conflict, India displayed more aggressive posture
against Pakistan than in previous interactions, despite having a nuclear weapons
development program at the time. India's hostile behavior could have sparked a preemptive
military attack from its adversaries against its nuclear facilities; however, this situation did
not transpire. India's alliance with the Soviet Union35 in the 1970s may have been sufficient
to deter military strikes from its adversaries, particularly China and the United States,
which were allied with Pakistan, and perhaps most importantly China had an existing
dispute with India. In 1971, India deviated from its non-aligned foreign policy stance and
signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation, which sought to
promote peace and security between the two states.36 India signed the treaty with the Soviet
Union several months prior to the 1971 conflict with Pakistan. The treaty had offered India
credible assurance that the Soviet Union would assist in an event of war. This was clearly

34

The Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 occurred after India and the Soviet Union signed an
alliance in August 1971.
35
The 1971 treaty was a deviation from India's non-aligned stance during the Cold War and
was a response to the increasing ties between the United States and Pakistan. Many have
argued that India has had a non-aligned foreign policy during the Cold War, however,
following China's invasion in 1962, Prime Minister Nehru had first approached the United
States to establish a treaty of cooperation (Chaudhry & Vanduzer-Snow, 2011).
36
Article IX of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation treaty stated
that:
"Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance
to any third country that engages in armed conflict with the other Party. In the event
of either being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting
Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such
threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security
of their countries" (1971).
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evident in Article IX of the treaty. In summary, the treaty implied that a strategic
relationship existed between India and the Soviet Union, which in turn played a vital role
in determining India's behavior in the 1971. The effect of security commitment interacting
with nuclear status on states hostile behavior implies the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1(c): changing nuclear status will increase proliferating states level of
hostility in dyadic relationships when they have a security commitment from a
nuclear patron.

Moreover, the cooperative behavior of a state with nuclear weapons development
program will likely change when a security problem is present. For the purpose of this
study cooperative behavior refers to a state's level of participation in diplomatic
representation/exchange, joint-IGO membership, and formal agreements with other states.
For example, in the Iran-Iraq dyad, despite becoming very hostile during the 1980s IranIraq war, they continued to cooperate in OPEC. Again applying the security problem
component of the study, two possible outcomes can occur. First, if a state is experiencing a
security problem and it is attempting to proliferate, it will likely be more cooperative in its
dyadic relationships. The rise in cooperative behavior occurs because the presence of a
security problem will likely heighten the probability of preemptive military attacks or
international sanctions against the developing state; therefore, making that state more likely
to want to cooperate in dyadic relationships. In addition, states attempting to become
nuclear will be more engaged in diplomatic exchange/representations, regional as well as
global IGOs, diplomacy, and agreements with other states, while they bide their time and
continue to develop their nuclear capabilities. In that respect a strategy of cooperation is
carried out in order to avoid possible international disruption to their program. It could be
argued that this was the strategy by North Korea with the various agreement and diplomacy
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with the United States, South Korea, China, the IAEA, and the United Nations between
1993 and 2003. During this period, North Korea exhibited cooperative behavior in its
dyadic relationships with the United States, South Korea, and China. Also, this was clearly
evident in the case of Iran, where it signed the Paris Agreement in 2004 with EU-3 in order
to avoid additional sanctions. Chapter 6 will discuss this issue in greater detail about the
cooperative behavior of Iran. Second, a developing states can become less cooperative
when a security problem is absent. This decline in cooperative behavior occurs in response
to scrutiny and pressure for non-proliferation by the international community, and the lack
of threatening environment (security problem is absent). Given the potential loss in
bargaining power (it is well known that nuclear weapons acquisition increases a state's
bargaining power) as well as the financial loss associated with current nuclear weapons
program, a developing state would be less inclined to cooperate about possible
nonproliferation. In that light, developing states might begin to withdraw from international
treaties, organizations, and break diplomatic relations when international pressure increases
due to their nuclear program. As was evident with North Korea and its withdrawal from the
NPT, and its eventual noncooperation with the nuclear freeze agreement. Chapter 5 will
discuss these various issue in greater detail. The effect of a security problem interacting
with nuclear status on patterns of behavior implies the following hypotheses with respect
to cooperation:
Hypothesis 2(a): changing nuclear status will decrease proliferating states
cooperative behavior in dyadic relationships.
Hypothesis 2(b): changing nuclear status will increase proliferating states
cooperative behavior in dyadic relationships when a security problem is present.

In contrast to the hypothesized effect of security commitment on the hostile behavior
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of proliferating states, the study argues that having a security commitment will make
proliferating more cooperative. The effect of security commitment on cooperative behavior
is dependent (cooperation due to nuclear proliferation) on nuclear procurement.

The

implication of security commitment on cooperative behavior of states with nuclear
weapons development program is linked to the proliferating state's ally response to its
nuclear ambition. Reiter (2014) argued that having a security commitment discourages
states from proliferating, as evident with Norway and West Germany's entry into the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization in lieu of acquiring nuclear weapons. Thus, in-line with
Reiter's (2014) argument, security agreements can make proliferating states more
cooperative because a nuclear ally will attempt to prevent this nuclear acquisition in order
to maintain the existing power balance in alliance partnership. This was clearly evident
with China's attempt to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons, where China
was actively involved in the Six-Party Talks (2003-2006) to prevent North Korea's nuclear
acquisition. It should be noted that once a state becomes a nuclear power its power position
and leverage in an alliance with a nuclear state shifts in its favor. Thus, the study argues
that the motive behind a nuclear ally's behavior towards its proliferating partner is strictly
based on the need to maintain existing power relationship in the alliance. To be more
specific, a nuclear ally will want to continue to have a power advantage over its ally partner
in an alliance, and is not in favor of power equality in this partnership. Given this situation
a proliferating state will become more cooperative as it engages in various nuclear talks.
The effect of security commitment interacting with nuclear status on states cooperative
behavior implies the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2(c): changing nuclear status will increase proliferating states level of
cooperative in dyadic relationships when they have a security commitment from a
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nuclear patron.
2.3 Conclusion
The theoretical argument presented in this dissertation addresses how state behavior
changes in dyadic relationships as nuclear status changes—that is, as a state moves from
not having a nuclear weapons development program to having one. Much of the research
has looked at the implications of nuclear weapons, whereas a limited number of studies
(Horowitz, 2013; Fuhrmann & Kreps, 2010) have examined the implications of nuclear
weapons development programs. Thus, this study fills a void of information about the
behavior of states with nuclear weapons development programs. The subsequent chapter
(Chapter 3) will discuss the research method and data to be applied in Chapter 4
(quantitative analysis) and Chapters 5 and 6 (North Korea and Iran case studies) to
understand state behavior as nuclear status changes.
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CHAPTER 3: Research Method and Data
3.1

Introduction
The preceding chapter illustrated the theoretical argument made in the dissertation;

the following chapter will discuss the mechanism for testing the proposed theory about
state behavior and nuclear status. The main aim of the dissertation is to answer the
following question about symmetric and asymmetric nuclear dyads: Does a state's pattern
of behavior for hostility or cooperation in interstate interactions change as its nuclear status
shifts? This research will give insight into the proliferation debate by testing the effects of
nuclear weapons development programs on state behavior.
3.2

Research Method
The study applied a Tweedie Generalized linear models [Tweedie GLM, hereafter]

with a log link because the variables violate one of the four linear regressions assumption.37
The assumption about normality is violated by the hostile and cooperation dependent
variables because both variables are skewed, and thus this can distort the causal relationship
and significance tests.38 Figure A3.1 in appendix A illustrates the distribution of the hostile
and cooperative dependent variables. And so Tweedie GLM approach deals with this
normality issue found in the data. Tweedie GLM is made up of three components: random,
systematic, and link function. First, the random component is the dependent variables (y)

37

The four linear regression assumptions are as follows:
1) Variables are normally distributed
2) Little to no multicollineartiy
3) No autocorrelation
4) Homoscedasticity
38
Hostile behavior is positively skewed because it militarized interstate disputes and war
are rarer events between states, and so in the data there are a lot of 0 present for the measure
of hostility.
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in the study. Second, the systematic component is the linear independent variables (x) in
the study. Third, the link function is the key that connects the random and systematic
components of the regression, and specifies the relationship between the components
(McCullagh and Nelder, 1989).39 The Tweedie GLM equation applied in this study is as
follows:40
Conflict / Cooperative Behavior t-1
=
β0
+ β1 Nuclear Status
+ β2 Security Problem
+ β3 Security Commitment From Nuclear Patron
+ β4 Nuclear Status *Security Problem
+ β5 Nuclear Status *Security Commitment
+ β6 Controls

Possible problems facing the study
There are two main possible problems facing the statistical results in the study: (1)
spurious relationship and (2) reverse causality. First, in order to avoid a spurious
relationship between changing nuclear status and developing state behavior (hostile and
cooperative behavior), the study includes a control group of states of similar size and power
characteristics as states developing nuclear weapons. The control group is included to

39

There are several possible links that could be selected and selection is based on the
response variable for the study.
40
Β6 Controls includes the following variables measures separately: contiguity, major
power status, relative capability ratio, ln distance capital, global s-score, regional s-score,
and Democratic Peace Effect. The control variable will be discussed in greater detail in the
following paragraphs of this chapter.
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ensure that argument and causal direction proposed about changing nuclear status and the
behavior of developing state in the study is valid and not based on coincidence.41 For the
purpose of the study, the control group of non-proliferating states includes states that have
not established a nuclear program for the purpose of developing weapons. Latent nuclear
capability is used as the independent variable for this group of non-proliferating states.42
According to Sagan (2010), nuclear latency is defined as how quickly a state could develop
nuclear weapons if it decided to do so from the existing state of its technology. Thus, the
study assumes that the non-proliferating state, despite having limited or full capability to
build a bomb based on their latency measures, have decided to remain non-nuclear and
follow the NPT regime. On the other hand, the study assumes that the developing states,
having reached a certain nuclear latency level, have decided to shift their nuclear policy
towards weapons development. For example, in 1974 and 1985 Iran's nuclear latency level
was 7, which is the highest level of latency (Jo & Gartzke, 2006), and at this time Iran
shifted its nuclear policy from peaceful means (research and energy) to weapons
development. In 1974 and 1985 that Iran's foreign policy shifted towards developing a
nuclear bomb.43 Refer to table A3.2 in appendix A for the categorization of the Index of
Latent Nuclear Weapons Production Capabilities by Jo and Gartzke.
In addition, the control group is tested separately using the same indicators for hostile
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The affect of security problem is complex, since security problems can affect states MIDs
propensity (hostility) as well as developing nuclear weapons; therefore, making the causal
mechanism between having a nuclear weapons development program and hostile behavior
spurious. Thus, Chapter 4, will discusses whether security problem influences both nuclear
status and hostility.
42
The study will use Jo and Gartzke (2007) measure of nuclear latency.
43
Refer to Chapter 1 discussion for the underlying shift in state policies towards states
developing nuclear weapons.
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and cooperative behavior as the one for the main states developing nuclear weapons in the
study.44 Refer to table A3.1 in the appendix for a complete list of states used in the control
group. The selection of non-proliferating states in the control group is based on three
criteria: military power (Composite Index of National Capability), economic power (GDP
per capita), and demographic (population size). The results for the control group of nonproliferating states are reported and discussed in Chapter 4 of the dissertation.45
The second possible problem facing the study is the issue of causality and whether it
is nuclear status that leads to more or less hostility and cooperation, or whether it is more
hostility and less cooperation that leads to change in nuclear status. In order to deal with
this identification issue, the study applies an estimation of simultaneous equations to test
for reversed causality. The study applied a Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS, hereafter)
regression because it is the most common technique for estimating the coefficient of a
simultaneous equation. 2SLS regression analysis is carried out in two stages, where state
behavior (hostility or cooperation behavior) is the dependent variable and nuclear status is
the independent variable in the first stage, and nuclear status is the dependent variable in
the second stage.46 By running a 2SLS regression analysis, this will determine whether

44

Nuclear Latency is used as a predictor variable for the control group because the
categorical measure (first independent variable used in the study), which is applied for the
states developing nuclear weapons is not applicable for states not developing nuclear
weapons. For the developing and non-developing states, nuclear latency is used a predictor
variable to compare and trace the behavioral patterns of both groups. A discussion of
nuclear latency is presented below in the chapter.
45
The same control variables as well as interaction variables (security problem and security
commitment) were also applied in the non-proliferating states control group.
46 Nuclear weapons development program is used as a measure for nuclear status in the
2SLS regression analysis. A more detailed discussion is carried out in the following
paragraphs of Chapter 3.
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reverse causality exists between nuclear status and state behavior.47 The results are reported
and discussed in Chapter 4 of the dissertation.

3.3 Data
Dependent Variables
The first dependent variable captures the hostile pattern of behavior of a state with a
nuclear weapons development program. The hostility dependent variable measures
behavior of states developing nuclear weapons starting in 1930 and ending either in 2001
or when they test their first nuclear bomb.48 Refer to appendix A section 3.1, for a complete
discussion of the Dynamic Interstate Interaction Crescenzi and Enterline (2001) used in
the construction of the hostility score.
In constructing the hostility dependent variable, dyads from the MIDs data were
selected if developing states were engaged in a crisis for a given year.49 The years that the
dyad was not engaged in a crisis were coded as 0 and the years that the dyad were engaged
in conflict were coded occurring to its hostility level. The levels of hostility from the CoW
project are used to construct the hostility dependent variable, where threat to use force is
the lowest level of hostility and interstate war is the highest level of hostility observed for
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The ivreg command is used in STATA to run the 2SLS regression analysis. ivreg
command combines the 2SLS regression equations into a single command.
48
It should be noted that not all states start year is 1930. Israel, for example, hostile IIS
measures its behavior from 1948 to 1972 and Libya's hostile IIS measures its behavior from
1951 to 2001. 1948 was selected as the start year for Israel because this was the year the
country declared independence and 1951 was selected as the start year for Libya because
it was the year the country was released from British and French oversight.
49
The study only used dyadic interstate interaction to determine the behavior of a
developing state since hostility is two-way, but then the study isolated the behavior of the
other state in the dyad. The hostile behavior of the other state is not used in constructing
the hostile IIS.
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a state developing nuclear weapons. For this measure the study focuses on military forms
of hostility and excluding non-military forms of hostility because the cooperation portion
of the study includes diplomatic relations, particularly, whether states maintain or break
relations. This will be discussed in detail below. Table 3.1 presents the coding for the raw
data for constructing the hostility dependent variable.

Table 3.1: Correlate of War hostility levels used to construct the hostile dependent
variable
Hostility Level
Description
Threat to use force

State in a dispute will threaten the following: use force, blockade,
occupy territory, declare war, and use nuclear weapons.

Display of force

State will go on alert, mobilize inactive military forces, show
troops, ships, and planes, fortify borders, go on nuclear alert, and
carry out border violation (includes crossing land, sea and air of
adversary for less than a 24 hour period).

Use of force

State will carry out a blockade, occupy territory of adversary, seize
material or military personnel from another state, clash with armed
forces, declare war, and use CBR weapons against adversary.

Interstate war

Military combat battle related deaths >1000 [Small and Singer
(1982), criteria] †

Source: Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996), p. 171-173.
† This dissertation will employ the Small and Singer criteria for war, which asserts that
“militarized interstate disputes evolve or escalate to the point where military combat is
sufficiently sustained that it will result in a minimum of 1000 total battle deaths” (1982, p.
171). At that point, MIDs become interstate war

In some cases, the dyad may be engaged in more than one dispute per year [n>1];
in those instances, the dissertation applies the same logic as Crescenzi and Enterline
(2001)50. Thus, for multiple MIDs in a given year, the level of hostility for the developing

50

The Dynamic Model of Interstate Interaction was applied to test reputation and interstate
conflict (Crescenzi, 2007), the role of history and war (Crescenzi, Long, & Kathman,
2007), and alliance formation (Crescenzi, Kathman, Kleinberg, and Wood, 2012). Others
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state in a dyad is aggregated across all disputes in a given year.51 For example, the IndianChinese dyad in 1958 was engaged in 2 militarized interstate disputes, where the level of
hostility for India in each MID was 4 and 3 respectively; thus for that given year India's
hostility level was 7 for that selected dyad.52 The hostile measure for India for the IndianChinese dyad is generated using the frequency of interaction and the level of hostility in
each crisis. The hostile dependent variable is lagged by one year this is done for theoretical
and methodological reasons. First, the hostile dependent variable is lagged for 1 year
because the current level of hostility is greatly determined by its previous levels. Second,
hostile dependent variable is lagged in order to reduce autocorrelation.
The second dependent variable captures the cooperative behavior in the dyadic
relationship. Crescenzi, Enterline, and Long (2008) applied a cooperation dimension to the
original Dynamic Model of Interstate Interaction developed by Crescenzi and Enterline
(2001) in order to understand interstate relationships.53 In developing the cooperative
dependent variable, the authors used only joint membership in Intergovernmental
Organization [joint-IGO membership, hereafter] to explain cooperative behavior among

have also used the model to test international conflicts (Kalbhenn, 2012)
51
This hostility measure includes both crisis initiations and challenges by states developing
nuclear weapons.
52
It should be noted that the study only examines the behavior of states developing nuclear
weapons within dyads, and isolates the hostile behavior of other states within those dyads.
The study assumes that hostility is two-way, and that the development of nuclear weapons
program may attract the hostility of others towards states developing nuclear weapons.
Also, the hostile behavior of other states towards developing states might be may be due to
existing rivalry or dispute. However, since the study is strictly interested in the behavior of
developing states within given dyads, than only the hostile behavior of developing states
are used to create the hostility score. The hostility of other states are only used a means to
determine whether states developing nuclear weapons become more or less hostile.
53
The dyads in the hostility sample were used for the cooperative dyads.
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states. Crescenzi, Enterline, and Long (2008) studied how cooperation and conflictual
behavior influences state involvement in disputes.
Several empirical studies have found that institutions play a critical role in
increasing cooperation among states: for example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
[NATO, hereafter] has enhanced cooperation among member states (Duffield, 1992). In
addition, Wallender (1999) found that the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in
Europe [OSCE, hereafter] has improved cooperation between Russia and Germany. Many
scholars have claimed that institutions tend to improve cooperation among states because
institutions increase concern for mutual concerns, and so allow states to interact in a
friendlier environment, improving communication among member states. In that light,
joint-IGO membership is an important variable to include in the construction of the
cooperative dependent variable for the study.
However, despite Crescenzi, Enterline, and Long's attempt to statistically explain
cooperation through joint-IGO membership, the cooperative measure performed poorly,54
especially when compared to the conflict measure; therefore, it is evident that additional
factors are needed in calculating states’ cooperative behavior in interstate relationships.
Thus, the dissertation goes beyond Joint-IGO membership to measure the level of
cooperation in dyadic relationships by examining additional factors such as diplomatic
exchanges and alliance patterns. In constructing the cooperative dependent variable,
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The cooperative measure was found to be statistically significant in the politically
relevant dyads (p≥0.05) and not significant when tested against all dyads in the system. On
the other hand, the hostility measure was found to be statistically significant in both the
politically relevant dyads and all dyads (p≥0.001) (Crescenzi, Enterline, & Long, 2008, p.
276). See Crescenzi, Enterline, and Long (2008) for additional information about the
statistical results.
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regional joint-IGOs, global joint-IGOs, formal agreements, and diplomatic exchanges or
representations were applied. For the purpose of the dissertation, an IGO is defined
according to Wallace and Singer (1970, p. 2):
(1) An IGO must consist of at least two members of the COW-defined state
system; (2) An IGO must hold regular plenary sessions at least once every
ten years; (3) An IGO must possess a permanent secretariat and
corresponding headquarters.
Table 3.2 presents the coding for the raw data applied in the construction of the cooperative
dependent variable.
Table 3.2: Cooperation levels used to construct the cooperative behavior dependent
variable
Type of
Level of
Source
Cooperation
Cooperation
Formal Agreement55
Joint-IGO Membership
(regional)
Joint-IGO Membership
(global)
Diplomatic Representation
/ Exchange

4

3
2

1

The Correlates of War Data Set
The Correlates of War Intergovernmental
Organization Data Set (V2.3)
The Correlates of War
Intergovernmental Organization Data Set
(V2.3)
The Correlates of War Diplomatic Exchange
Data Set (Version 2006.1)

In coding the joint-IGO part of the cooperative dependent variable, the decision of
both states in the dyad to join the same organization is coded as a cooperative action in the
dataset. Crescenzi, Enterline, and Long (2008) distinguished between “co-joining into
larger IGOs (such as the United Nations) versus more localized (and we assume more
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It should be noted that formal agreements used for the construction of cooperative
behavior is different from the one used in measuring security commitment. For the
cooperative dependent variable, formal agreements are between states developing nuclear
weapons and other states in selected dyads. Whereas, for security commitment, formal
agreements includes all agreements developing states have with nuclear weapons states.
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intensely cooperative) settings (such as ASEAN)” (p. 272). Thus, the study will follow this
approach by assuming that localized IGOs allow for greater and denser interactions among
states than larger global IGOs; thus, cooperation is more intense in the former. For this
reason, regional IGOs are given greater value than global IGOs. In 1965, the United States
and Mexico both became members of the IAEA (global organization), so the year 1965 is
coded as 1 and the following years are coded as 0.5. Then this value is multiplied by the
global cooperation level of 3, and so the final value for this IAEA membership from 1965
to 2001 is 37.
In addition to joint-IGO membership as a measure of cooperation, formal
agreements (The Correlates of War Project, alliance dataset) are also included in the
construction of the cooperative dependent variable. Thus, any formal agreements within a
dyadic relationship are coded as cooperative shock and terminations of formal agreements
are coded as cooperative decay. The date for establishing a formal agreement was coded as
the highest level of cooperation.
The diplomatic representation component of the cooperative dependent variable
included any type of diplomatic representation between a nuclear weapons program
development state or nuclear weapons state and any other state in the international system.
Diplomatic representation included chargé d'affaires, Minister, Ambassador, and other.
Since the data set was collected for every five years (1920-1940 and 1950-2005), the
missing values for the interval years were weighed less in the data set. Every diplomatic
representation within a dyadic relationship was coded as a cooperative shock, where the
highest level of cooperation (peak in cooperation) was the initial interaction between
government officials. The absence of diplomatic representation causes the cooperation
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score to decay over time and move back to neutrality (0). Thus, the decay function increases
as the number of diplomatic representation events occur over time, and on the other hand,
the decay function decreases as the number of diplomatic representation events slow down
over time. The cooperative dependent variable is lagged by one year this is done for
theoretical and methodological reasons.56 Table 3.3 illustrates the dependent variables
applied in the dissertation.
Table 3.3: Dependent Variables Operationalization
Variable Name
Hostile
Behavior

Cooperative
Behavior

Operationalization
-1 = hostile interstate
interaction
0 = neutral
interaction
+1 = cooperative
interstate interaction
0 =neutral
interaction

Ranges

Mean

S.D

-.994 - 0

-.232

.365

0 - .964

.210

.273

Independent Variables
For the purpose of this study, nuclear status will be the main independent variable
of interest. The independent variable is a categorical variable of 16 states developing
nuclear weapons.57 The inclusion criteria for the developing states is and the logic for the
selected cases are discussed in Chapter 1. The coding for the nuclear status independent
variable is as follows: when a state does not have a nuclear weapons development program,
it is coded as 0, and when a state has a program, it is coded as 1. For example, China is

56

The same logic applied for hostile dependent variable is also applied for the cooperative
dependent variable.
57
In order to avoid a spurious causal inference about nuclear weapons development
program and the behavior of states developing nuclear weapons the study examines the
behavior of states before and after they establish a program. The operationalization of the
first independent variable deals with this issue.
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coded as not having a program from 1930-1954 and as having a program from 1955-1963.
Additional independent variables capture the interaction approaches applied in the
study. First, the security problem variable is coded as a dichotomous variable, where 1
indicates that the state developing nuclear weapons is experiencing a security problem and
0 indicates otherwise. Again as stated in Chapter 2, security problem includes interstate
rivalries, threats from insurgent groups, and terrorist groups. The Bennett Rivalry Dataset
and Terrorism, Insurgencies, and Guerrillas in Education and Research (TIGER) Suicide
Attacks Worldwide Dataset, were used to construct the security problem variable.58 In
constructing the security problem dataset, the study looked at two factors: (1) whether a
developing state was engaged in an interstate rivalry; (2) whether a developing state faced
a potential conventional military threat from other state(s).
Second, the security commitment from nuclear patron independent variable is
coded as 1 if the state developing nuclear weapons has a security commitment from at least
one weapons nuclear patron and 0 if the developing state lacks a security commitment. The
security commitment from nuclear patron independent variable is measured as a defense
alliance and agreements between the state of interest and at least one nuclear weapons state.
Both of these variables are used to create the two-way interaction effect with the nuclear
status variable
Control Variables:
The study includes several control variables in order to evaluate and test alternative
theories about state patterns of behavior as nuclear status changes. In order to determine
whether a control variable is theoretically relevant, the Most and Starr (1989) classification
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A more detailed discussion of security problem is found in Chapter 2
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of willingness and opportunity to engage in conflict is applied in determining the inclusion
and exclusion of control variables. For the purpose of this dissertation, the willingness and
opportunity aspects of the Most and Starr (1989) classification are applied to determine
whether a state develops conflictual or cooperative patterns of behavior in the international
system. For example, what factors give a state the opportunity to be more conflictual than
cooperative? This opportunity to be more conflictual is then translated into a state's
behavior in the international system. Table 3.5 presents the control variables in order to test
for alternative explanations for the dependent variable.
Table 3.4: Control Variables Operationalization
Variable Name:

Operationalization

Contiguity

1 = Common land
borders or separation
by less than 150
miles of water
0 =No contiguity

Land/Water
Contiguity

1 = Water contiguity
2 = Land contiguity
0 = No contiguity

Distance

Natural log of the
distance between
capital cities

Major Power

1= One state in dyad
is a major power
0 = Neither state in
dyad is a major
power

Mean

S.D

Source

.418

COW Project
Direct Contiguity
Data (V.3.1)

.495

COW Project
Direct Contiguity
Data (V.3.1)

1.049

COW Project
Direct Contiguity
Data (V.3.1)

.399

.490

COW Project State
Membership List
Data

.226

.429

7.266

Democratic Peace
Effect
(Weak Leak Approach
Applied)

10 = Full democracy
0 = Full autocracy

1.894

2.472

S-Score

1 = Policy similarity
-1 = Policy

.
546

.373

Polity IV Project:
Political Regimes
Characteristics and
Transition 18002010
Signorino and
Ritter (1999)
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Dissimilarity
Relative Capability
Ratio

CINC of stronger
state/CINC of weaker
state

1.643

1.745

COW Composite
Indicator for
National
Capabilities Index

In terms of the classification of opportunity, the dissertation includes three control
variables: contiguity, capital distance, and major power status. First, the contiguous control
variable measures the level of contiguity within a selected dyad of interest in a given year.
Contiguity between states includes five categories: one for land contiguity and four for
water contiguity. More specifically, land contiguity is defined as the intersection of territory
between two states through land boundaries (Stinnett, Tir, Schafer, Diehl, & Gochman,
2002). Water contiguity is defined as the intersection of water between two states, which is
further divided into four categories based on separation by water of 12, 24, 150, and 400
miles. The contiguous variable is categorized as a dichotomous variable, where 1 is any
common land or water separation of less than 150 miles within a selected dyad, and 0
represents no contiguity within the dyad. Moreover, the contiguous variable is further
categorized into an additional control variable. The second categorization distinguishes
whether contiguity is based on land or water, where 1 represents water contiguity, 2
represents land contiguity, and 0 represents no contiguity. Second, the distance control
variable measures the natural log of the distance between capital cities in a given dyad. The
natural log was taken because the distance variable is skewed. The literature on contiguity
has found that geographic proximity contributed to a higher likelihood that states will
engage in conflict (Geller & Singer, 1998; Bremer, 1992; Diehl, 1985). Diehl (1985) further
found that land contiguity between disputing states increased the likelihood for conflict
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escalation. Thus, in order to rule out alternative explanations for the dependent variable,
contiguity and distance were controlled for in the dissertation.
Third, the major power status control variable measures whether one of the states
in the dyad is a global power. The major power status variable utilizes the COW project's
State Membership List (2011). Small and Singer’s (1982) operationalization of major
power is based on scholarly consensus on what constitutes a major power in the
international system. The major power list developed by Small and Singer has achieved a
degree of reliability based on inter-coder agreements. Thus, Small and Singer (1982)
identify several states as major powers in the international system; the list is presented in
table 3.6.
Table 3.5: COW Project Major Power List

Major Power List

Years

USA

1898-2011

United Kingdom

1816-2011

France

1816-1940
1945-2011

Germany

1816-1918
1925-1945
1991-2011

Austria-Hungary

1816-1918

Italy

1860-1943

Russia
USSR
Russia

1816-1917
1922-1991
1992-2011

China

1950-2011
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Japan

1895-1945

1991-2011
Note: Post-Cold War Germany and Japan were included in the list because they had
achieved significant economic growth since 1965.
Major power variable was controlled for in the dissertation. The major power control
variable is categorized as a dichotomous variable, where the variable is coded as 1 when at
least one state in the dyad is a major power and 0 when neither state in the dyad is a major
power. The dissertation uses the list of major powers categorized by the COW Project's
state membership list to code these two variables.
For the willingness classification, the dissertation includes three control variables:
democratic peace effect, S-Score, and relative capability ratio. First, the democratic peace
effect control variable measures the level of democracy among the dyad of interest for a
given year. In constructing the democratic peace effect control variable, the Polity IV
Project’s DEMOC and AUTCO variables were used. The DEMOC and AUTOC variables
measure competitiveness of political participation, openness and competitiveness of
executive recruitment, as well as constraints on the chief executive (Marshall, Jaggers, &
Gurr, 2010). In order to construct the democratic peace effect control variable, the
following equation was used:59
(DEMOC-AUTOC)+10
2

59

In 1959, for example, the Soviet Union's DEMO score was 0 and AUTOC was 7;
therefore, applying the above equation the democracy effect score for the Soviet Union for
that year was 1.5.
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Thus, the democratic peace effect control variable for each state in the dyad ranged from 0
to 10, where 0 indicated full autocracy and 10 indicates full democracy. The study applies
the “weak link” approach by O’Neal and Russett (1997), where only the lowest polity score
for a given dyad year is reported. The weak link approach assumes that in a dyadic
relationship, the degree of democracy in the less democratic partner would more likely
influence the relations between the states. It is important to note that the democratic peace
effect is included in the study because of the overwhelming effect democracy has on the
impact of conflict and particularly conflict onset (see Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999;
Russett & O’Neal, 2001). Thus, the democratic peace effect control variable can also
impact a state's behavior in the international system. For example, in more democratic
states, disputes would be dealt with through diplomatic channels (cooperation) as opposed
through military means (conflictual); thus the imperative to control for the democratic
peace effect in order to rule out alternative explanations to the dependent variables.
Second, the S-Score control variable measures the similarity in policy preferences
in a given dyad. The Similarity Score [S-Score, hereafter] captures the level of foreign
policy similarity and dissimilarity in a given dyad. The dissertation applies the Signorino
and Ritter (1999) S-Score. According to Signorino and Ritter (1999), the S-Score is an
improvement on the Kendall's Tau-b score of similarity because the S-Score includes a
measurement of foreign policy similarity based on alliances, trade, UN voting, diplomatic
missions, and other types of data on state interactions, whereas the Tau-b score measures
the similarity through alliance commitments. EUGene was used to generate the SSimilarity Score (Signorino & Ritter, 1999) for the relevant cases examined in the
dissertation. For the purpose of the dissertation, the regional S-Score and global S-Score
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are used. The S-Scores ranges from -1 to 1, where -1 indicates foreign policy dissimilarity
and 1 indicates foreign policy similarity between the proxy state and the observing state.
For example, the S-Score for the United States and Syria dyad in 1975 is -.020, which
indicates that the dyad does not have complete dissimilarity; on other hand, in the FinlandIraq dyad in 1953, the S-Score is 0.39, which indicates that the dyad is moderately similar.
The S-Score as a control variable ensures that policy similarity or dissimilarity does not
influence the state’s hostile and cooperative behavior as its nuclear status changes. To be
more specific, if two states in a dyad have similar policy preferences, then they may be less
likely to demonstrate hostile behavior and more likely to demonstrate cooperative behavior.
And for this reason the study will control for this variable in order to determine more clearly
whether nuclear status influences the hostile and cooperative behavior of states.
Another control variable is the relative capability ratio within a dyad. This control
variable is included in the study because capabilities can lead a state to behave in a certain
way in a dyad. The Composite Indicator for National Capabilities [CINC, hereafter] index
includes six measures to assess a state's capability: military personnel, military expenditure,
total population, urban population, iron and steel consumption, and energy consumption
(Singer, 1987). The dissertation examines the level of power similarity between states in a
dyadic format by calculating an average between the two states. In order to calculate that
average, the log of the ratio of the CINC scores for the dyad is applied, where the larger
CINC score was the numerator and the lower CINC score was the denominator.

log

LrgCINC
SmlCINC
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This approach measures the dyadic power balance between states, where it equals the
natural log of the ratio of the stronger state’s CINC to that of the weaker state’s CINC. The
remainder of the chapter will discuss the method applied in the case study analysis.

3.4

Methods: Case Study Analysis
This section discusses the process tracing tests for causal inference applied in the case

study portion of the dissertation. George and Bennett (2005: 206) defined process tracing
as the “method [that] attempts to identify the intervening causal process - the causal chain
and causal mechanism - between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome
of the dependent variable.” To be more specific the study will apply theory-testing process
tracing method, which is a deductive research method. Through this theory-testing
approach a theory is first developed and predicated patterns are outlined; next data is
collected and analyzed to determine whether the predicated patterns are present or absent,
in order to validate or reject the hypotheses.
In addition, there are several tests for causal inference in the process tracing
approach, which were first formulated by Van Evera (1997) and later adapted by Bennett
(2010) and Collier (2011). The present study will apply the Collier (2011) understanding
of process tracing, where the author defined it as “the systematic examination of diagnostic
evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the
investigator” (p. 823). The Collier approach is the most comprehensive approach to
applying process tracing to the selected cases in the present study because, as Collier noted
himself, many studies have frequently failed to adequately or rigorously apply process
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tracing to their case study analysis and the causal inference tests suggested by Collier offer
a much better approach to hypothesis testing.
There are four process tracing tests for causal inference applied by researchers to test
a hypothesis and determine whether to accept or reject their proposed hypothesis; the four
test are as follows: “straw-in-the-wind,” “smoking-gun,” “hoop,” and finally “doubly
decisive.” Table 3.7 presents Collier’s understanding of the four tests for causal
interference in process tracing approaches
Table 3.6: Process Tracing Tests

Source: Collier (2011), p. 825.
For the purpose of this study, the “smoking-gun” test for causal inference will be
applied to test the causal mechanism between nuclear status and the behavior of
proliferating states in dyadic relationships. The “smoking-gun” test was preferred over the
other three tests because when the evidence fails to support the hypothesis, this does not
require elimination of the hypothesis altogether. In that light, for the “smoking-gun”
approach passing the test is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the validity of a
given hypothesis (Collier, 2011; Bennett, 2010; Van Evera, 1997). Based on this criteria,
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the “smoking-gun” test is best for the present study because nuclear weapons development
programs operate at times in a veil of secrecy, as in the case of Israel. Therefore, it is
difficult to determine with the highest level of confidence when a state has established a
nuclear weapons development program, and perhaps more importantly, when it has
advanced in its nuclear production; this lack of certainty will affect the support of the
hypothesis. For example, with North Korea it is not clear when the state decided to start its
nuclear program, and so many have argued that North Korea started its program in 1980,
whereas others have declared 1982. Thus, this disagreement in start time may lead to a type
I error (rejection of a true hypothesis), and so applying the “smoking-gun” test ensures that
a possible true hypothesis is not completely eliminated but rather weakened.
In addition, the study relies on diverse primary and secondary sources, such as
official government documents, historical narratives and data, and declassified documents
(letters, reports, minutes of various government sessions, CIA reports) to test the proposed
hypotheses about changing nuclear status and the behavior of states in dyadic relationships.
It is important to note that process tracing does not merely rely on qualitative information,
but that it also sometimes relies on quantitative information; this study will apply both in
analyzing the behavior of North Korea (Chapter 5). The temporal scope of analysis for
North Korea is from 1952 to 2006.

3.5 Conclusion
Chapter 3 presented the quantitative and qualitative research method approach as well
as data applied in the study. The remaining Chapters of the study will report the results
about the behavior of states developing nuclear weapons. Chapter 4 , will present the
statistical results for the study. In addition, Chapter 5 presents a case analysis of North
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Korea's behavior since 1952 and Chapter 6 provides concluding remarks about the study
as well as a brief discussion about Iran's behavior.
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CHAPTER 4: Empirical Results for Nuclear Weapons Development
Program States

4.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the empirical results that test the effect of changing nuclear
status on state behavior. This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I will discuss the
empirical results for the regression model, which tests hypotheses 1(a-c) and 2(a-c) of the
study. This model will be applied to hypothesis 1(a-c) and 2 (a-c) in order to confirm the
results and rule out alternative explanations to state behavior in dyadic relationships. The
final part of this chapter discusses the various tests undertaken to verify the robustness of
the empirical results of the study. For the purpose of this chapter, descriptive statistics and
the correlation matrix are found at the end of the dissertation in appendix table A4.1 and
A4.2, respectively.

4.2 Empirical Results and Discussion
In this section, the chapter presents and analyzes the empirical findings of the study.
To test the argument about nuclear status and the behavior of states, the study examined the
hostile and cooperative behavior of proliferating states in dyadic relationships. In addition,
the chapter will compare the behavior of states developing nuclear weapons to the control
group of non-proliferating states. The statistical results for the control group of nonproliferating states are found in table 4.3.
Before discussing the results, the following paragraph provides a brief overview of the
statistical method and the main variables in table 4.1.The study applied a Generalized
Linear Model, Tweedie with log link approach because of the skewed distribution of the
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dependent variable. A more detailed discussion of this statistical approach is presented in
Chapter 3.
The two dependent variables are the hostile and cooperative behavior of states with
nuclear weapons development programs. The hostile dependent variable measured the level
of hostility of developing states in interstate interactions. For the hostile dependent
variable, the CoW levels of hostility in MIDs are used to construct the variable. The hostile
dependent variable ranges from 0 - .999, where .999 indicates the highest level of hostility
from developing states and 0 indicates neutral relations between states . Figure A4.1 in
appendix B presents the hostility trends for states with nuclear weapons development
programs between 1930 and 2001.
On the other hand, the cooperation dependent variable measured the level of
cooperation of developing states in interstate interactions. Four components were used to
construct the cooperation dependent variable: formal agreements, regional joint-IGO
membership, global joint-IGO membership, and diplomatic representation/exchange. The
cooperation dependent variable ranges from 0 to .998, where 0 indicates neutral
interactions and .998 indicates the highest level of cooperation from developing states.60
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A few notes should be made about the indicators for hostility and cooperation. First,
states developing nuclear weapons can exhibit both hostile and cooperative behavior in
their dyadic interactions. This is due to the operationalization of the indicators, where
hostility and cooperative behavior are assumed in the study not to be mutually exclusive.
Along these lines, hostility and cooperation can both increase or decrease concurrently.
Refer to Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of hostile and cooperative scores. Hostile
behavior is measured based on the level of hostility in militarized disputes between states
attempting to develop nuclear weapons and other states. Cooperative behavior
encompasses diplomatic representation/exchange, joint-IGO membership, and formal
agreements between states attempting to develop nuclear weapons and other states.
Therefore, hostility can increase in terms of militarized disputes, but cooperation can also
increase as states participate in IGOs or form agreements. For example, in the Iran-Iraq
dyad, despite becoming very hostile during the 1980s Iran-Iraq war, they continued to
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Figure A4.2 in appendix B presents the cooperative trends for states before and after they
establish a nuclear weapons development program between 1930 and 2001. This time
frame includes when states did not have a nuclear program and when they had a nuclear
weapons development program, this was done to show a change in their behavior in terms
of hostility and cooperation.
The independent variable of interest is nuclear status, which is measured through a
dichotomous categorical variable of 16 states, where 0 indicates they do not have a nuclear
weapons development program and 1 indicates they have a nuclear program. For the
purpose of the study, a security problem is present only when states developing nuclear
weapons are trapped in an interstate rivalry and/or there is a potential military threat from
another state(s). The security problem variable is coded as a dichotomous variable, where
1 indicates the presence of a security problem and 0 indicates otherwise. Next, security
commitment includes any form of military alliance or agreement developing states have
with nuclear states. The security commitment variable is coded as 1 if developing states
have a security commitment from at least one nuclear patron and 0 if developing states lack
a security commitment. For a more detailed discussion of the variables applied in the study,
refer to Chapter 3. Table 4.1 displays the estimates for nuclear status and hostile behavior.

cooperate in OPEC. Second, for the purpose of the study, a decrease in cooperation means
nonparticipation and indifference in formal agreements or IGOs by states attempting to
develop nuclear weapons in given dyads. It should be noted that a decrease in cooperation
does not indicate more violence committed by states attempting to develop nuclear
weapons. Third, a decrease in hostility does not mean states attempting to develop nuclear
weapons become more cooperative.
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Table 4.1: Estimate for nuclear status and state behavior (hostile behavior) 1930-2001
Generalized Linear Model (Tweedie with log link)

Nuclear status
Security Problem
Security Commitment

Model 1
β(SE)
-.889
(.060)***
-1.14
(.072)***
.057
(.073)

Nuclear status*Security Problem
Nuclear status * Security
Commitment
Contiguity (Land/Water)
Contiguity Less 150 miles
Major Power Status
Relative Capability Ratio
Ln Distance Capital
Global S-Score
Regional S-Score
Democratic Peace Effect (WeakLink)
Intercept
Maximum Likelihood Estimate
Number of Observation

-.771
(.085)***
-.307
(.080)***
-.535
(.079)***
-.062
(.018)***
-.147
(.037)***
-2.05
(.249)***
.781
(.165)***
.028
(.012)**
2.45
(.281)***
1.46
(.029)
4788

Model 2
β(SE)
-.303
(.106)***
-.815
(.088)***
.053
(.073)
-.852
(.127)***

-.796
(.084)***
-.261
(.080)***
-.529
(.079)***
-.067
(.018)***
-.145
(.037)***
-2.08
(.248)***
.825
(.166)***
.026
(.011)**
2.16
(.284)***
1.44
(.028)
4788

Model 3
β(SE)
-.449
(.113)***
-1.15
(.072)***
.267
(.087)***

-.601
(.132)***
-.791
(.084)***
-.303
(.080)***
-.551
(.079)***
-.062
(.018)***
-.150
(.037)***
-2.03
(.249)***
.783
(.167)***
.033
(.012)**
2.30
(.283)***
1.45
(.029)
4788

*ρ<0.10; **ρ<0.05;***ρ<0.01 (two-tailed test)
Notes:
(1) Once a state achieved nuclear weapons capability it was dropped from the
sample.
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(2) Standard Errors are shown in parentheses below coefficients.
(3) Dependent Variable is hostile behavior of developing states.
(4) Model 1 is the linear additive regression estimate, Model 2 is the nuclear
status and security problem interaction regression estimate, and Model 3 is the
nuclear status and security commitment interaction regression estimate.
(5) Refer to table 1.1 in Chapter 1 for a complete list of the 16 proliferating
states examined in the study.
(6) The data in the study treats all the state dyads as independent observations.

Model 1 in table 4.1 presents the results for hypothesis 1(a), which posits that the
establishment of a nuclear weapons development program will increase the hostile behavior
of proliferating states in dyadic relationships. The coefficient on the nuclear status variable
was negative and statistically significant at the ρ<0.01 level. Thus, the opposite has
occurred, where states level of hostility decreased as they moved from not having a nuclear
weapons development program to having one. In that respect, hypothesis 1(a) was not
supported by the results in the study.
This decline in hostile behavior by developing states can be associated to the cost of
militarized conflict and the economic cost of potential imposition of sanctions by other
states. First, because militarized crisis is costly (monetary and political), and the potential
for the crisis to escalation presents an even greater cost to states attempting to develop
nuclear weapons; thus, the high cost of engaging in a crisis offers an explanation to why
developing states become less hostile. And since it is a known fact that nuclear acquisition
changes the bargaining position of developing states, particularly for states with limited
conventional weapons capabilities, the potential of becoming nuclear gives them an
incentive to become less engaged in conflict, and instead devote their resources to
developing nuclear weapons as opposed to engaging in a costly militarized crisis. China,
for example, refrained from attacking the Soviet Union's border until it was able to possess
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nuclear weapons in 1969. This conflict avoidance argument could also partially explain
why Iran has not engaged in the current Syrian civil war or offer direct military support to
Hezbollah in 2006.
Second, the potential imposition of sanctions by other states can also influence the
hostile behavior of states attempting to develop nuclear weapons. For example, several
Western states have applied economic sanctions on Iran, Iraq, and North Korea for their
attempts to develop nuclear weapons. Iran agreed to the Protocol Agreement with the IAEA
and the Paris Agreement with Britain, France, and Germany in order to avoid additional
sanctions by the United Nations Security Council and the United States. Again, in this
situation, developing states would want to avoid potential sanctions, which could slow
down or even halt their nuclear ambitions. Despite not supporting the argument made in
Chapter 2 about the hostile behavior of states with nuclear weapons programs, this outcome
warrants further theoretical and empirical inquiry.

Model 2 in table 4.1 presents the interaction effect between nuclear status and security
problem in the study. The nuclear status*security problem interaction tests hypothesis 1(b),
which predicts that a change in nuclear status from not having a nuclear weapons
development program to having a program is associated with a decrease in the hostile
behavior of developing states when a security problem is present. The study interprets the
interaction according to Brambor et al (2006) suggestion to include all of the constitutive
terms when specifying a multiplicative interaction model (p. 66). Thus, the effect of nuclear
status on hostility is a combination of the coefficient estimate for the constitutive term and
the interaction term. Since hypothesis 1(b) assumes that hostility decreases when the
security problem condition is present, therefore, it is expected that β1(nuclear status) +
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β3(nuclear status*security problem) is negative. This means that the interaction coefficient
in model 2 should be negative. Examining model 2 the results indicate that nuclear status
has a strong significant at the ρ<0.01 level and negative effect on proliferating states' hostile
behavior when no security problem is present. The effect of nuclear status on hostility is
-.303 when the security problem condition is absent (β3 = 0). Additionally, the coefficient
on the nuclear status*security problem interaction is negative and statistically significant
at the ρ<0.01 level. The estimated effect of β1(nuclear status) + β3(nuclear status*security
problem) is -.303 + [-.852], therefore, when nuclear status changes to having a nuclear
weapons development program and a security problem is present proliferating states' level
of hostility decreases by β1+β3

=

-1.16, with a .00215 standard error.61 The effect of

β1(nuclear status) and β3(nuclear status*security problem) interaction term are jointly
significant at the p < .01 level. This outcome is 90% confident that proliferating states
hostile behavior results from the interaction between nuclear status and security problem,
with the limits between -1.16 + .0035.
Thus, hypothesis 1(b) was supported by the statistical results, where a change in
nuclear status was associated with a decrease in hostile behavior when developing states
were experiencing a security problem. This conclusion supports the claim made in Chapter
2, that proliferating states attempt to avoid conflict by acting less hostile while they seek to
procure nuclear weapons. An additional study is necessary to examine the hostile behavior
of states once they acquire nuclear weapons or reverse their nuclear status, such as South
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The standard error for β1 + β3 was calculated using the following equation:
var(β1 ) + var(β 3) + 2 cov(β1β 3 )
β1 = Nuclear Status
β3 = Nuclear Status * Security Problem
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Africa (1994-present) and India (1967-1971).
Model 3 in table 4.1 includes the interaction effect between nuclear status and security
commitment in the study. The nuclear status*security commitment interaction tests
hypothesis 1(c), assumes that when states nuclear status changes from non-developing to
developing nuclear weapons is associated with an increase in the hostile behavior of
developing states when they have a security commitment. Thus, the effect of nuclear status
on hostility is a combination of the coefficient estimate for the constitutive term and the
interaction term. Since hypothesis 1(c) assumes that hostility increases when the security
commitment condition is present given that nuclear status changes from not having a
program to having a program, therefore, it is expected that β1(nuclear status) + β3(nuclear
status*security commitment) is positive. This means that the interaction coefficient in
model 3 should be positive. Examining model 3 the results indicate that nuclear status has
a strong significant at the ρ<0.01 level and negative effect on proliferating states hostile
behavior when no security commitment is present. The effect of nuclear status on hostility
is -.449, when the security commitment condition is absent from the equation (β3 = 0).
Additionally, the coefficient on the nuclear status*security commitment interaction is
negative and statistically significant at the ρ<0.01 level. The estimated effect of β1(nuclear
status) + β3(nuclear status*security commitment) is -.449 + [-.601]; therefore, when nuclear
status changes to having a nuclear weapons development program and a security
commitment is present proliferating states level of hostility decreases by -1.05 [β1+β3], with
a .034 standard error.62 The effect of nuclear status and the nuclear status * security

The standard error for β1 + β3 was calculated using the following equation:
var(β1 ) + var(β 3) + 2 cov(β1β 3 )
β1 = Nuclear Status β3 = Nuclear Status * Security Commitment
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commitment interaction term are jointly significant at the p<.01 level. This outcome is 90%
confident that proliferating states hostile behavior results from the interaction between
nuclear status and security commitment, with limits between -1.05 + .056.
Thus, hypothesis 1(c) was not supported by the statistical results since proliferating
states hostility levels decreased when they had a security commitment. In order to
disentangle the linkage between nuclear weapons development program, security
commitment, and the hostile behavior of developing states, a look at alliance literature is
necessary. Within alliance literature, a consensus has been reached about the effect of
alliance partnership on the strategic calculation of states, in that states are less likely to
want to engage in conflict that has the potential to become a multilateral conflict (Leeds,
2003; Siverson & Starr, 1991; Gartner & Siverson, 1996). Additionally, even though a state
has an alliance with another state, this does not necessarily mean that an ally will act on
behalf of a partner and join the conflict; however, the mere notion of having an alliance
partnership will still influence the behavior of adversaries (Leeds, 2003). Thus,
understanding the benefits of having an alliance partnership with a powerful nuclear state,
the proliferating state has more of an incentive to act hostile.
Moving on to the cooperation section of the study, table 4.2 displays the estimates for
nuclear status and cooperative behavior.
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Table 4.2: Estimate for nuclear status and state behavior (cooperative behavior) 19302001

Generalized Linear Model (Tweedie with log link)

Nuclear status
Security Problem
Security Commitment

Model 4
β(SE)
-.568
(.031)***
-.052
(.046)
.231
(.041)***

Nuclear status*Security Problem

Model 5
β(SE)
-.555
(.078)***
-.046
(.057)
.231
(.041)***
-.015
(.084)

Nuclear status* Security Commitment
Contiguity (Land/Water)
Contiguity Less 150 miles
Major Power Status
Relative Capability Ratio
Ln Distance Capital
Global S-Score
Regional S-Score
Democratic Peace Effect (Weak-Link)
Intercept
Maximum Likelihood Estimate
Observation Number

-.026
(.045)
.058
(.047)
.373
(.041)***
-.027
(.010)***
.025
(.020)
1.28
(.148)***
-.789
(.095)***
.019
(.006)***
-1.44
(.157)***
.678
(.013)
4788

-.026
(.049)
.058
(.047)
.373
(.041)***
-.026
(.009)*
.026
(.020)
1.28
(.148)***
-.789
(.095)***
.019
(.006)**
-1.44
(.159)***
.678
(.013)
4788

Model 6
β(SE)
1.06
(.074)***
-.060
(.046)
.040
(.049)

.596
(.081)***
-.027
(.044)
.064
(.047)
.389
(.041)***
-.029
(.009)***
.033
(.020)
1.31
(.148)***
-.801
(.095)***
.016
(.006)*
-1.37
(.156)***
.671
(.012)
4788

*ρ<0.10; **ρ<0.05;***ρ<0.01 (two-tailed test)
Notes: (1) Once a state achieved nuclear weapons capability it was dropped from the
sample.
(2) Standard Errors are shown in parentheses below coefficients.
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(3) Dependent Variable is cooperative behavior of developing states.
(4) Model 4 is the linear additive regression estimate, Model 5 is the nuclear status and
security problem interaction regression estimate, and Model 6 is the nuclear status and
security commitment interaction regression estimate.
(5) Refer to table 1.1 in Chapter 1 for a complete list of the 16 proliferating states examined.
(6) The data in the study treats all the state dyads as independent observations.

Model 4 for table 4.5, reports a negative and strong statistically [ρ<0.01] significant
coefficient on nuclear status, this means that as proliferating states establish a nuclear
program their cooperative behavior decreases in dyadic relationships. Thus, the statistical
results lend support to hypothesis 2(a). It is common knowledge that nuclear proliferation
is frowned upon in the international community, when states establish a nuclear weapons
development program this tends to generate international outcry and condemnation. And
since nuclear weapons programs are costly in terms of finances and political reputation,
states undergoing nuclearization do so with the clear intention of becoming a nuclear power
and gaining the benefits bestowed on nuclear states. Thus, when faced with pressure to halt
their nuclear weapons program, states will likely become less cooperative by withdrawing
from international treaties, organizations, and breaking diplomatic relations. This situation
is clearly evident with Iran in 2014 and North Korea in 2009.
Model 5 in table 4.2 presents the interaction effect between nuclear status and security
problem for cooperative behavior in the study. The nuclear status*security problem
interaction tests hypothesis 2(b), which predicates a change in nuclear status is associated
with a decrease in cooperative behavior of proliferating states when they have a security
problem. The coefficient on the nuclear status*security problem interaction was not found
to be statistically significant, therefore, no support is found for hypothesis 2(b).
Finally, model 6 in table 4.2 includes the interaction effect between nuclear status and

81

security commitment in the study. The nuclear status*security commitment interaction tests
hypothesis 2(c) that a change in nuclear status from not having a program to having one
will increase their level of cooperation when a security commitment is present. The effect
of nuclear status on cooperation is a combination of the coefficient estimate for the
constitutive term and the interaction term. Since hypothesis 2(c) assumes that cooperation
increases when the security commitment condition is present, therefore, it's expected that
β1(nuclear status) + β3(nuclear status*security commitment) is positive. This means that
the interaction coefficient in model 6 should be positive. Examining model 6 the results
indicate that nuclear status has a strong significant at the ρ<0.01 level and positive effect
on proliferating states cooperative behavior when no security commitment is present. The
effect of nuclear status on cooperation is 1.06 when the security commitment condition is
absent (β3 = 0). Additionally, the coefficient on the nuclear status*security commitment
interaction is positive and statistically significant at ρ<0.01. The estimated effect of
β1(nuclear status) + β3(nuclear status*security commitment) is 1.06 + .596, therefore, when
nuclear status changes to having a nuclear weapons development program and a security
commitment is present proliferating states level of cooperation increases by 1.66 [β1+β3],
with a .001 standard error.63 The effect of β1(nuclear status) and β3(nuclear status*security
commitment) are jointly significant at the p<.01 level. This outcome is 90% confident that
proliferating states cooperative behavior results from the interaction between nuclear status
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The standard error for β1 + β3 was calculated using the following equation:
var(β1 ) + var(β 3) + 2 cov(β1β 3 )
β1 = Nuclear Status
β3 = Nuclear Status * Security Commitment
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and security commitment, with the limits between 1.66+ .002.
Thus, hypothesis 2(c) was supported by the statistical results since proliferating states
cooperative levels increased when they had a security commitment. This cooperative
behavior can be linked to nuclear ally's response to nuclear procurement by states, where a
diplomacy track is used to prevent possible proliferation.64 Reiter (2014) argued that
security commitments discourage states from nuclear proliferation, where both Norway
and West Germany had "accepted third party security commitments in lieu of pursuing
nuclear weapons" (p. 73). For example, Norway and West Germany's entry into NATO
provided them with the security they needed from Soviet aggression. In line with this
argument, alliance ties can make proliferating states more cooperative because a nuclear
ally will attempt to prevent this nuclear acquisition. This was clearly evident with China's
attempt to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons, where China was actively
involved in the Six-Party Talks (2003-2006) to prevent North Korea's nuclear acquisition.
Additionally, North Korea was engaged in various meetings and negotiations with the
international community, which eventually lead to establishment of the 1994 Agreed
Framework, the 1991 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,
and the 1992 Safeguard Agreement with the IAEA. It could be argued that the motive
behind a nuclear ally's behavior towards its proliferating partner is strictly based on the
need to maintain existing power relationship in the alliance. To be more specific, a nuclear
ally will want to continue to have a power advantage over its ally partner in an alliance,
and is not in favor of power equality in this partnership. The results here warrant further
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As noted in Chapter 3, proliferating states has security commitment in terms of military
alliance, neutrality agreement, and cooperation agreement with a nuclear weapons state(s).
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research into the role of security commitment has on the cooperative behavior of
proliferating states.

4.3 Alternative Explanations to State Behavior
Moving on to rival explanations to the hostile and cooperative behavior of proliferating
states in dyadic relationships. As shown in table 4.1, several of the control variables were
found to be statistically significant. The results for several control variables had comparable
effects on the hostility and cooperation samples. The regional S-Score control variables in
the hostility and cooperation sample, for example, were found to be statistically significant
with positive coefficients. This outcome means that the greater the degree of foreign policy
similarity in a given dyadic relationship, the more hostile the nuclear developing state in
the hostility sample will become, and the more cooperative it will become in the
cooperation sample. On the contrary, the major power control variable had contrasting
effects on the hostility and cooperation samples. In the hostility sample, the major power
control variable was found to be statistically significant with a negative sign, meaning that
when one state in the dyadic relationship is a major power, the state of interest’s level of
hostility declined. In the cooperation sample, the result was statistically significant with a
positive sign, meaning that when one state in the dyadic relationship is a major power, the
state of interest was more cooperative.

4.4 Robustness Check
This section will discuss the robustness tests applied in order to investigate the
performance of the statistical estimates under various conditions. The first set of robustness
tests examine the general results of the study as various changes are made to the sample of
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proliferating states. The first measure applied is the removal of certain control variables in
the model. After removing several control variables as well as including additional control
variables, the effects of nuclear weapons development program, latent nuclear production
capabilities, and the interaction terms on hostile as well as cooperative behavior were still
found to be statistically significant. For example, the global S-Score for foreign policy
similarity was replaced with the regional S-Score for foreign policy similarity, and the
major power status variable was replaced with a major/minor power status variable; the
effect of nuclear weapons development program and latent nuclear production capabilities
on proliferating state behavior were still found to be statistically significant. Thus, the
statistical findings in this chapter passed this robustness check.
The second measure to test the robustness of the results is the examination of outliers
in the sample. When dyadic relationships in the hostility and cooperation models were
examined for possible outliers in the data, no outlier problem was found in either model.
Refer to figure A4.3 in the appendix for hostility and cooperation boxplots.
Third, the measure of hostility and cooperation in the Dynamic Interstate Interaction
were originally lagged for year because the effects of state interaction are not always
immediate on state behavior and interactions can have lingering effects on dyadic
relationships. In order to test the robustness of the statistical results, the lagged dependent
variables for hostility and cooperation were omitted, and another model was recalculated
with un-lagged dependent variables (hostility and cooperative behavior). Again, the results
with the omitted lagged dependent variables remain consistent with the original models in
section 4.2 of the chapter, where they were found to be statistically significant with the
same signs for the coefficients.
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Finally, several goodness-of-fit statistics were calculated to assess the goodness of fit
for the GLM applied in the study. The criteria for assessing goodness-of-fit included the
following tests: deviance, scaled deviance, Pearson Chi Squared, Scaled Pearson Chi
Squared, Log Likelihood, Akaike's Information Criterion, Finite Sample corrected AIC,
Bayesian Information Criterion, and Consistent AIC. This outcome was evident for the
nuclear weapons development program variable and latent nuclear production capabilities
variable. Refer to appendix at the end of the dissertation for goodness-of-fit values in table
A4.11 and A4.14. In summary, the results reported in section 4.2 of the study are robust
when changes are made to the model specification.

4.5 Control Group of Non-Proliferating states:
The following section will discuss the results for the non-proliferating states control
group. Table 4.3 presents the statistical results for this group of states, which was tested
separately from the states attempting to develop nuclear weapons in tables 4.1 and 4.2.
Recall, that latent nuclear production capabilities variable measures states technological
and nuclear expertise, and how quickly they can acquire nuclear weapons only if they
decided to do so. For this group of states, the study assumes that they have decided not to
establish a program for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons. Rather, their nuclear
policy is directed towards nuclear energy and research. For a more detailed discussion of
the non-proliferation control group refer to Chapter 3. For the non-proliferating states
control group, nuclear status is measured through latent nuclear production capabilities and
the decision by these states not to establish a program for the purpose of obtaining nuclear
weapons.
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Table 4.3: Estimate for nuclear status and state behavior (hostility and cooperation),
1965-2001
Generalized Linear Model Tweedie with log link
Model 7
Model 8
Model 9
Hostility
Hostility
Cooperatio
Dependent Variables:
n

Nuclear Status
Security Problem
Security Commitment

β(SE)
-.016
(.038)
-1.59
(.154)
-.965
(.150)****

β(SE)
-.067
(.003)***
.103
(.018)***
-.107
(.015)***

-3.12
(.266)***

β(SE)
-.150
(.254)
.194
(.444)
-2.87
(1.57)
-.322
(.075)***
.300
(.249)
-.183
(.152)***

-2.05
(.026)***

β(SE)
-.456
(.026)***
.636
(.041)***
-3.08
(.160)***
-.112
(.007)***
.473
(.025)
.566
(.162)***

7.34
(.216)
33 062

7.727
(.214)
33 062

.268
(.002)***
33 062

.265
(.002)
33 062

Nuclear Status * Security
Problem
Nuclear Status * Security
Commitment
Intercept
Maximum Likelihood
Estimate
Observation Number

Model 10
Cooperatio
n

*ρ<0.10; **ρ<0.05;***ρ<0.01 (two-tailed test)
Notes: Standard Errors are shown in parentheses below coefficients. Nuclear status for nonproliferating states is measured through Latent Nuclear Production Capabilities. For a
detailed discussion of this variable refer to Chapter 3.
Refer to table A3.1 in appendix A for a complete list of states examined in the nonproliferation group sample

Model 7 presents the effect of latent nuclear capabilities on hostile behavior of nonproliferating states, which was found to be nonsignificant. Comparing the results between
the non-proliferating control group and proliferating group, the latter found that nuclear
weapons development program had a negative effect on the hostile behavior of proliferating
states.
Turning to the interaction effects in model 8, only the nuclear status*security problem
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interaction was found to be statistically significant at the ρ<0.01 level. The estimated effect
of β1(nuclear status) + β3(nuclear status*security problem) is -.150 + [-.322], therefore,
when latent nuclear capabilities increase and non-proliferating states choose to follow the
NPT regime despite a security problem their level of hostility decreases by β1+β3 = -.472.
Again examining the predicated outcome, the results suggest that as nuclear latency
increases, while nuclear policy remains directed towards nuclear energy and research,
hostility decreases with the presences of a security problem. Comparing this to the
estimates for the proliferating states sample, the results for both non-proliferating and
proliferating states were the same; thereby indicating that another variable determines the
hostile behavior of states. This outcome calls for further research into the role of nuclear
status, and possibly taking into account the political and security context of state when its
nuclear status changes. In that respect, other factors interacting with changing nuclear
status might better explain state behavior.
On the other hand, the nuclear status*security commitment interaction for the nonproliferating states was not found to be statistically significant. Comparing this to the
proliferating states sample, which was negative and statistically, each interaction effect
presents a different picture about the hostile behavior of states with respect to security
commitment. For the proliferating states, the result indicated that the presences of a security
commitment contributed to a decrease in the hostile behavior of states. Despite, failing to
achieve statistical significant, the coefficient for the nuclear status*security commitment
interaction is positive for the non-proliferating states, which indicates that the presences of
a security commitment and an increase in latent nuclear production capabilities made this
group of states more cooperative. But since the coefficient failed to achieve statistical
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significance, one cannot make this claim about the hostile behavior of non-proliferating
states.
In addition, model 9 presents the results for the cooperative behavior of nonproliferating states. The coefficient on the nuclear status variable was negative and
statistically significant at the p<.01 level. Thus, the results indicate that as non-proliferating
states latent nuclear production capabilities increase and they continue abide the NPT
regime, their cooperation level decreases. The estimates for the non-proliferating states is
similar to the one found for the proliferating states, where the latter groups level of
cooperation also decreased when nuclear status changed.
In model 10, the results indicate that nuclear status has a strong significant at the
ρ<0.01 level and negative effect on non-proliferating states cooperative behavior when no
security commitment is present. The effect of nuclear status on cooperation is -.456 when
the security commitment condition is absent (β3 = 0). Additionally, the coefficient on the
nuclear status*security commitment interaction is negative and statistically significant at
the ρ<0.01 level. The estimated effect of β1(nuclear status) + β3(nuclear status*security
commitment) is -.456 + [-.112], therefore, when latent nuclear capabilities increases and
non-proliferating states continue to abide by the NPT regime their level of cooperation
decreases by β1+β3 = -.568. The effect of β1(nuclear status) and β3(nuclear status*security
commitment) interaction term are jointly significant at the p < .01 level. It should be noted
that when non-proliferating states nuclear latency increases this does not mean that the
program is being used to develop weapons, but rather for nuclear energy or other nonmilitary means.
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4.6 Dealing with reverse causation: Two Stage Least Square
In addition, in order to determine whether an issue of reverse causality is present in the
theory proposed in the study about state behavior (hostility and cooperation) and nuclear
status, the study conducted a 2SLS regression analysis. As noted in Chapter 3, the problem
of reverse causality is whether it is nuclear status that leads to more or less hostility and
cooperation, or whether more hostility and less cooperation leads to change in nuclear
status. Thus, a 2SLS regression analysis was estimated in order to determine whether
reversed causality is present in the theory. The results for the 2SLS regression analysis are
presented in table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Estimation of simultaneous equations to test for reversed causality
Two-Stage Least Square

Hostility

Model 11
β(SE)
.015
(.038)

Cooperation

Model 12
β(SE)

1.53
(.012)***
.0045

-.013
(.360)
1.54
(.186)***
.000

F

0.16

0.00

N

4635

4664

Constant
Adjusted R-Square

*ρ<0.10; **ρ<0.05;***ρ<0.01 (two-tailed test)
Robust Standard Errors are shown in parentheses below coefficients
Model 11: Instruments is security problem and instrumented: is hostility.
Model 12: Instruments is security problem and instrumented: is cooperation.

Model 11 reports the results for the 2SLS regression analysis between hostility and
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nuclear status.65 The coefficient on hostility is found to be nonsignificant; thereby,
indicating that no causation exists between nuclear status and state behavior. This outcome
gives indication that nuclear proliferation is not driven by increase hostility, and perhaps
more importantly, shows that reverse causality in not present in the data. This is clearly
evident with the case of India and Pakistan and Israel. Pakistan, for example, developed its
nuclear weapons development program to balance against India's conventional military and
nuclear status.
Next, model 12 reports the results for the 2SLS regression analysis between
cooperation and nuclear status, in order to determine whether increasing/decreasing
cooperative behavior lead to nuclear proliferation or whether nuclear status lead to
increasing/decreasing cooperative behavior.66 Again, like the previous model, the
coefficient on cooperative behavior was found to be nonsignificant, thereby indicating that
cooperation had no effect on the proliferation attempts by states in the study. In summary
this outcome shows that reverse causality is not present between nuclear status and
cooperation.
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As previously stated in Chapter 3, the dependent variable in the first stage is hostility,
which was regressed against security problem (instrumental variable). Security problem
was used as the instrument variable since it had a strong influence on the hostile behavior
of states in the study, as evident from the GLM models in table 4.1. In the first stage hostility
is an endogenous variable meaning that it is determined within the model. Then the
dependent variable in the second stage is nuclear status, which was regressed against the
predicated value of hostility.
66
The dependent variable in the first stage is cooperation, which was regressed against
security problem (instrumental variable). Security problem was used as the instrument
variable. Then the dependent variable in the second stage is nuclear status, which was
regressed against the predicated value of cooperation.
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4.7 Conclusion
The statistical results above are a starting point for understanding the behavior of states
as their nuclear status changes. Arguably, the statistical results provided mixed support for
the theoretical arguments made in the dissertation. With respect to hostility, only hypothesis
1(b) was supported by the statistical results, while hypotheses 1(a) and 1(c) the opposite
effect was found. Hypothesis 1(b) indicated that the presences of a security problem
decreased proliferating states level of hostility when nuclear status changed. On the other
hand, the statistical results for model 1, which tested hypothesis 1(a), confirmed that
hostility decreased when nuclear status changed. The statistical estimates indicate that
hostility tends to have a downward effect when states moves to establish a nuclear program
for the purpose of developing weapons, however, in the case studies (North Korea and
Iran), the results indicated that hostility tended to increase as states program progressed.
This differing outcome between Chapters 4, 5 and 6, was attributed to the fact that the
statistical results only captured state behavior up to 200167 because of data limitation,
whereas the case studies temporal scope went beyond 2001. Thus, if additional data were
available to capture the militarized behavior of North Korea (2002-2006), Iran (20022015), Iraq (2002), and Libya (2002-2003), the statistical estimates would probably
confirm similar results as the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6.
In terms of cooperation, only hypothesis 2(b), which tested the interaction between
nuclear status and security problem was not supported by the statistical, where hypotheses
2(a) and 2(c), where both supported by the statistical results. Although, model 5, which
tested hypothesis 2(b), was not found to be statistically significant, the negative coefficient
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The CoW MIDs measure of hostility for dyadic interaction ends at 2001.
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indicated that when nuclear status changed and a security problem was present,
proliferating states were less cooperative. However, since it was not found to be statistically
significant, this outcome cannot be fully supported. Finally, model 4, which tested,
hypothesis 2(a), showed that proliferating states' level of cooperation decreased when
nuclear status changed, where model 6, which tested hypothesis 2(c), showed that
proliferating states' level of cooperation increased when a security commitment was
present, and nuclear status changed.
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CHAPTER 5: Case Study: North Korea's Nuclear Behavior
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter presented the quantitative analysis of the dissertation regarding
nuclear status and behavior of states. This chapter engages further with the argument about
state behavior and nuclear status in a more detailed case study analysis of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea [North Korea, hereafter]. In order to analyze the behavior of
North Korea from non-nuclear weapons development program status to nuclear weapons
development program status, the study will apply a process tracing approach. Through
historical evidence and quantitative data, the study will make inferences about the causal
explanations for North Korea’s behavior in its dyadic relationships as it attempts to develop
nuclear weapons. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the
geopolitical environment in the peninsula following the Korean War in 1950s. Section two
presents a discussion of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development program. Finally,
section three reports the historical narrative about the hostile and cooperative behavior of
North Korea from 1954 until 2006 and tests the various hypotheses made about North
Korea’s behavior as its nuclear status changes.68
5.2 Historical Background to the Korean peninsula in the post-Korean War
In July 1951, the Korean War reached a stalemate. Originally a civil war between the
North and South, the Korean War was eventually internationalized when the United
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It should be noted that in the context of changing nuclear status this change can have
several meanings, such as moving from not having a nuclear weapons development
program to having one, and then reverting back to not having a program. This was clearly
seen with South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina. For the purpose of the North Korean case in
this chapter, a change in nuclear status refers to North Korea moving from not having a
nuclear weapons development program to having one.
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Nations, China, and the Soviet Union took part in the conflict.69 It should be noted that
Soviet involvement in the war was limited to supplying China with military equipment and
air support because of fear of a direct confrontation with the United States (Jian, 2013).
The stalemate lasted two years until an armistice agreement was signed on July 27, 1953
between North Korea, China, and the United Nations, where they agreed to a demarcation
line near the 38th parallel between the North and South (Adas, Stearns, & Schwartz,
1994).70 It was further agreed in the armistice that both North Korea and South Korea would
maintain and patrol the Korean demilitarized zone [DMZ, hereafter], which would later
prove to be much more difficult in reality and a reason for future clashes between the
adversaries. The Korean DMZ has remained “the most heavily fortified conflict zone in the
post-Cold War world, where more than 1.8 million military personnel confront each other,
armed to the teeth with the latest weapons system” (Kim, 2002, p. 5). When the armistice
agreement came into effect, it was only a ceasefire agreement between the North and South
and their respective allies, rather than a peace treaty agreement to end the conflict.
Consequently, both parties failed to achieve their goal of unifying the country under their
preferred political system and instead the Korean peninsula was divided into two separate
entities.
Subsequently, the Korean peninsula followed a dual pattern of development, where the
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The United Nations forces under the leadership of the United States included military
personnel and support from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France,
Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa,
Thailand, Turkey, and the United States.
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South Korea abstained and refused to sign the armistice agreement, and therefore, the
agreement was never replaced with a formal comprehensive peace agreement. In that
respect, North Korea, South Korea, and the United States are technically still at war with
each other.
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totalitarian communist regime was isolated from the rest of the world and the command
economy failed to develop. On the other hand, South Korea, initially an authoritarian
regime, through massive financial as well as military assistance developed economically
and politically. For example, North Korea had negative economic growth, while South
Korea had a positive growth of 8% in the 1990s (Cha, 2002). During the Cold War, North
Korea had aligned with the Soviet Union/Russia as well as China, and perhaps more
importantly, North Korea played on the Soviet-Chinese rivalry to elicit military and
economic assistance from both allies (Nanto & Manyin, 2010). Nonetheless, North Korea’s
diplomatic relations with Russia and to a lesser extent with China in the post-Cold War
changed considerably. Russia had grown wary of the North Korean regime in the 1990s,
and this was evident in Russia's desire to improve its diplomatic relations with South Korea
and the West (Kim, 2002). For example, Russia moved to recognize the South Korean
government. According to Yahuda (1996):
with the end of bipolarity there was no longer any compelling strategic or political
logic for the Soviet Union to continue to lend costly support to an ally whose leader
and regime it disliked, especially as North Korea had the capacity to drag the Soviet
Union into conflicts that were highly damaging to the new Soviet interests.
Moreover, the Soviet Union had every reason to develop cooperative relations with
the South in the hope of attracting much-needed investment and managerial knowhow and as part of demonstrating to the United States and the West in general that
the Soviet Union had genuinely put the Cold War behind it (p. 264).
In a similar manner, China, concerned about the security of its northeast border region
and the potential encroachment of the US or its allies, sought to reduce but not completely
eliminate its diplomatic relations with North Korea, in part due to China’s desire to ensure
the survival of a common communist regime and stability in the region (Yahuda, 1996).
Thus, Beijing continued to maintain its military alliance with and economic assistance to
North Korea. Despite continued and yet at times strained relations with North Korea, China
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in the 1980s also moved to improve its diplomatic and economic relations with South
Korea. In the 1990s, China pledged not to veto South Korea’s UN membership application
and later recognized the South Korean government. Thus, this normalization of relations
between China, Russia and South Korea put an end to one of the Cold War alliances in the
region. Besides attempting to improve geopolitical relations, China created several
economic agreements with South Korea (Yahuda, 1996), all of which might have caused
some unease in North Korea.

5.3 North Korea's nuclear weapons development program
Nuclear doctrine:
North Korea’s nuclear doctrine can be traced back to its political goals and national
strategy since the regime was created in 1948, which are state survival, the protection of
national sovereignty, and unification with the South (Cha, 2002).71 North Korea’s nuclear
aspirations were influenced by its opponents, such as the United States, South Korea, and
Japan. This influence is entwined with North Korea’s primary goal of state and regime
survival. During the Korean War in the 1950s, the United States with its nuclear monopoly
had threatened on several occasions to use nuclear weapons to end the conflict in its favor
(Norris & Kristensen, 2006). Following the war and the re-establishment of the 38th north
parallel which divides North and South Korea, the United States continued its political and
military support of the South as well as Japan. For example, starting in 1958 and by 1967,
the United States deployed 950 nuclear warheads in Southern Korea (Norris & Kristensen,
p. 64). This situation created a security dilemma for North Korea, and in response to this
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Unification with the South was known as songong t'ongil (Cha, 2002).
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situation, Kim Il Sung became determined in the late 1970s to acquire nuclear weapons in
order to balance the threat posed by the United States (Cha, 2002). Additionally, North
Korea’s nuclear program was and still is driven by an existential threat posed to its survival
by South Korea’s economic growth and military partnership with the United States. More
importantly, in the post-Cold War era, North Korea's economic growth was dismal
compared to South Korea. Moreover, South Korea had developed its own nuclear weapons
program in 1970; this situation posed an existential threat to North Korea’s survival due to
their close proximity.

The Soviet Union and China:
North Korea's nuclear program developed without significant assistance from the
Soviet Union and China, as they only aided North Korea in its nuclear research program,
to be used for strictly peaceful means. According to Szalontai (2006), the Soviet Union
provided North Korea with the initial help to establish its nuclear research program for
peaceful purpose, such as energy, in the 1950s. The Soviet Union's nuclear assistance to
North Korea can only be understood in the context of the Cold War, when "both
superpowers found it politically useful to give nuclear technology to their Third World
allies in order to demonstrate their technological superiority and political generosity"
(Szalontai, p. 7). In 1959, the Soviet Union and North Korea signed an agreement in which
the Soviets agreed to provide technical assistance to North Korea in order to help them
establish a nuclear research center to be used for peaceful means—the production of
nuclear energy in the Northern Pyongyang province of the country (Che, 1994). Thus, the
Soviet Union provided North Korea with technical assistance, and later it provided support
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with the installation of a Soviet nuclear research reactor.72 However, Soviet and North
Korean political relations became strained as the Soviet Union began to mistrust North
Korea’s true intentions for having a nuclear research center, and as a result the Soviet Union
began to have major reservations about assisting in North Korea’s nuclear research
(Radchenko, 2006).73
As relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea became more strained in the
1960s, North Korea turned towards China for help in its nuclear research program. In the
next two decades, China provided North Korea with various kinds of nuclear support.
Following China's first nuclear test in 1964, North Korea asked China to share its nuclear
weapons technology; however, China refused to do so (Bermudez, 1999). Thus, the Soviet
Union and China only provided North Korea with assistance in developing its nuclear
research program because of their competition with the West—particularly, the United
States—but in reality, they had no intention of helping North Korea build its nuclear
weapons program. Therefore, despite having initial assistance for its nuclear research
program from the Soviet Union and China, North Korea's nuclear program for weapons
development can largely be credited to Abdul Qadeer Khan (Norris & Kristensen, 2005).
Since the 1970s, Pakistan and North Korea have had economic and diplomatic ties. It
should be noted that Pakistan along with the Soviet Union/Russia and China are the few
states that have relations with North Korea. In 1980, for example, Pakistan and North Korea
signed a commercial agreement, which included the export of cotton, textile products,
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The following section will discuss the USSR and China's formal alliance and security
commitment to North Korea.
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Political relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea were also strained as a
result of North Korea moving closer to China in 1962-1963 and openly criticizing Soviet
revisionism (Radchenko, p. 25-26).
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crude oil, and petrochemicals to North Korea ( MOL, XIX-J-1-j Pakistan, 1982).
The move from peaceful use to weapons development:
In the 1970s, North Korea began to acquire plutonium reprocessing technology for the
purpose of establishing nuclear weapons, and by early 1975, North Korea had successfully
separated plutonium in hot cells (Nikitin, 2013, p. 5). By 1985, however, North Korea was
under pressure by the Soviet Union to join the NPT. Eventually, North Korea signed the
NPT (on December 12, 1985); however, despite signing the treaty, North Korea continued
developing nuclear weapons (Nikitin, 2013) and despite their membership in the NPT,
North Korea did not accept the safeguards and inspection regime set by the IAEA. Thus,
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and eventual nuclear weapons acquisition were
developed under a veil of secrecy from the international community.
In the 1980s, North Korea established a large plutonium separation facility at the
Yongbgon Nuclear Research Center, which was not declared to the IAEA but was detected
by US satellites (Wampler, 2003; CIA Report, 1982). In the 1990s, Pakistan's chief nuclear
scientist Abdal Qadeer Khan "transferred nearly two dozen P-1 and P-2 centrifuges to
North Korea. He also provided North Korea with a flow meter, some special oils for
centrifuges, and coaching on centrifuge technology, including visits to top-secret centrifuge
plants” (Musharraf, 2006: p. 296). Additionally, Pakistan assisted in North Korea's nuclear
weapons development program, where in early 2000s "...Pakistan was the likely source of
North Korea gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program" (Kampari, 2002: p. 108).

A move towards diplomacy 1991-2003:
This section will discuss the diplomacy that led to the three key agreements about
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nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula: (1) the 1991 Joint Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula between North Korea and South Korea; (2) the
1992 Safeguard Agreement with the IAEA; and the 1994 Agreed Framework between the
North Korea and the United States.
First, the Joint Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was a result of the post-Cold
War environment, where relations between South Korea, Soviet Union, and China were
normalized. For example, South Korea in the 1990s established diplomatic relations with
the Soviet Union and China. Additionally, in 1991, both North Korea and South Korea
became members of the United Nation's General Assembly. In 1991, the United States
withdrew its nuclear weapons abroad, which included 100 nuclear weapons in South Korea,
and in turn, the Soviet Union reciprocated (Norris & Kristensen, 2005). Following this
change in relations, both North Korea and South Korea signed the Joint Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on December 31st 1991, wherein "North Korea
and South Korea pledged not to possess nuclear weapons, not to possess plutonium
reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities, and to negotiate a mutual nuclear inspection
system" (Niksch, 2005: p. 10). Despite reaching this agreement, at the end of 1992, North
Korea broke off discussion with South Korea about bilateral inspection as agreed upon in
the declaration on denuclearization.
North Korea ratified the comprehensive Safeguard Agreement on January 30th 1992
with the IAEA, which permitted the IAEA to conduct a wide range of inspections of North
Korea's nuclear facilities. It should be noted that North Korea had completed the Safeguard
Agreement six years after signing the NPT. As a result of the Safeguard Agreement, the
IAEA carried out six inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities between June 1992 and
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February 1993, which confirmed that North Korea had reprocessed more plutonium than
the amount it had disclosed to the IAEA (Albright & Brannan, 2010). Due to discrepancies
in North Korea's report to the IAEA on its nuclear program, in February 1993, the IAEA
"invoked a provision in the safeguards agreement and called for a ‘special inspection’ of
two concealed but apparent nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon" (Niksch, p. 10). The IAEA's
decision was based on the belief that North Korea has been cheating on its commitment
under the NPT about reprocessing plutonium, and that this special inspection would
determine the amount of plutonium North Korea had been producing since 1989. In
response to the IAEA's demand for special inspection, North Korea refused the IAEA
request for special inspection, and in turn threatened to withdraw from the NPT in March
1993. Thus, North Korea's threat to withdraw from the NPT led to diplomatic talks between
North Korea and the United States, and eventually led to the Agreed Framework between
the United States and North Korea.
The Agreed Framework, which was signed October 21, 1994, sought to freeze North
Korea's nuclear weapons development program and prevent further proliferation. A bit of
background is needed about North Korea's uranium and plutonium programs. Since the
early 1960s, North Korea had maintained a small research reactor for the purpose of
plutonium production. In 1975, North Korea was able to separate a small quantities of
plutonium, but this amount was insignificant to produce weapons-grade plutonium.
Subsequently, in the 1980s, North Korea began construction on a secret nuclear reactor at
Yongbyon capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium (Department of State Briefing
Paper, ca. January 5, 1985). Throughout the mid-1980s and until 1994, North Korea had
separated a significant amount of plutonium from the point of view of weapons. On the

102

other hand, in the 1950s with Soviet assistance, North Korea began mapping uranium ore
deposits, which North Korea would later mine in small quantities (Radchenko, 2006).
Subsequently, in the late 1970s, North Korea approached Czechoslovak for assistance in
acquiring uranium-mining equipment, in order to increase its uranium ore extraction
needed for weapons development. Figure 5.1 illustrates an excerpt from a telegram from
the Hungarian embassy in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, February 17
1979.

Figure 5.1: Telegram from Hungarian embassy in North Korea in 1979.

Source: XIX-J-I-j Korea, 1979, 81. doboz, 81-5, 001583/1979. Obtained and translated for
CWIHP by Balazs Szalontai.

By the late 1980s and early 1990s, North Korea's uranium program developed significantly.
North Korea, for example, had increased its uranium ore extraction at the Pyongsan mine
and constructed a uranium milling facilities, in order to enrich uranium beyond the 3 - 5%
enrichment threshold.
The bilateral talks were sparked by North Korea's refusal to abide by the IAEA's
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special inspection and regular inspections under the safeguard agreement of its nuclear
facilities. In response, the United States established a negotiations team in order to deal
with North Korea's proliferation. In June 1993, North Korea suspended its withdrawal from
the NPT and agreed to high-level meetings in Geneva with the Clinton Administration
(Niksch, 1994; Pritchard, 2005).74 Following several rounds of negotiations between the
United States and North Korea, the Agreed Framework was adopted. The Agreed
Framework called for the "move toward full normalization of political and economic
relations" (as cited by Carline & Lewis, 2008: p. 5) between the United States and North
Korea. The agreement included three obligations for the United States and North Korea to
meet (Niksch, 2005; Carline and Lewis, 2008): first, that barriers to trade and investment
would be reduced within three months of signing the agreement; second, that both the
United States and North Korea would open a liaison office in each other's capital city; third,
that bilateral relations between the United States and North Korea would be enhanced to
the ambassadorial level.75 Additionally, the agreement also included separate obligations
for the United States and North Korea. The framework also stipulated that the United States
would commit to providing North Korea with economic and diplomatic benefits, such as
alternative energy, food supplies, light-water reactors, and assurance that they would not
make threats or use nuclear weapons against North Korea.76 In return, North Korea was
obligated to remain party to the NPT, allow IAEA inspections, implement the joint
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According to Niksch (2005), "the Pentagon also developed a contingency plan to bomb
the Yongbyon nuclear facilities if North Korea began to reprocess the 8,000 fuel rods into
weapons-grade plutonium" (p. 10).
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It should be noted that only the first requirement was met, and the others were never
achieved.
76
The Agreement was only between the United States and North Korea.
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declaration of denuclearization, and perhaps more importantly, freeze and eventually
dismantle its nuclear facilities.77

Breakdown in Agreements and a move towards nuclearization:
In 2003, North Korea announced that it would withdraw from the NPT; it was the first
country to do so.78 It should be noted that Article X of the NPT provides member states the
right to withdraw from the treat:
"Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw
from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter
of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give
notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United
Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice
shall include a
statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized
its
supreme interests" (Article X.1, the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons).
Despite continued negotiations between the United States and North Korea, political
tensions between the two states also continued to deteriorate their relations, and so in
January 2003 "...Kim Il Jong decided that they were not producing enough value for North
Korea to stay within the NPT. So it withdrew..."(Bunn and Rhinlander, 2005). And so,
North Korea's withdraw from the NPT led to the breakdown of the 1992 Joint Declaration
on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula between North Korea and South Korea,
the 1992 Safeguard Agreement with the IAEA, as well as the 1994 Agreed Framework
between the North Korea and the United States.
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North Korea's plutonium program was froze between 1997 and 2002 and unfrozen
between 2002 and 2007 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015).
78
North Korea was pressured into signing the NPT in 1985 by the Soviet Union, and
perhaps more importantly, it was a necessary condition to get nuclear research assistance
from the Soviet' Union.
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It was revealed in 2004 that "[i]n the second half of the 1990s, Abdul Qadeer Khan,
scientist and ‘father’ of Pakistan's nuclear program, supplied uranium enrichment
equipment and perhaps even warhead designs to North Korea" (Norris & Kristensen, p.
64).79 In February 2005, North Korea announced internationally that it had acquired nuclear
weapons capabilities and intended to manufacture multiple bombs (Nikitin, 2013). North
Korea has stated that its nuclear weapons capabilities are to “[d]eter a U.S. invasion and
hostile policy against it, such as U.S. sanctions and joint military exercises with South
Korea. Pyongyang believes the United States desires regime change” (Kim, 2013).80
Since 2006, North Korea has conducted three underground nuclear tests; however, its
nuclear weapons are very limited. According to the Center for Arms Control and NonProliferation, North Korea possesses four to eight nuclear weapons; despite this nuclear
possession, North Korea has only been able to test short-range and medium-range missiles,
and it so far lacks long-range missile capabilities (2013). According to Secretary of State
Powell, the United States “now believe[s] [the North Koreans] have a couple of nuclear
weapons and have had them for years” (Nikitin, p. 4). The following section will analyze
the link between nuclear status and the behavior of states with respect to North Korea.

5.4 North Korea Analysis
Through a process tracing approach, this chapter attempts to unravel North Korea’s
hostile and cooperative behavior. It should be noted that the study examines North Korea's
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Abdul Qadeer Khan is “the father of Pakistan's nuclear program” (Norris & Krisensen,
p. 64).
80
In 2003, the United States had intervened in Iraq with the pretense that Iraq had possessed
nuclear weapons.
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hostility levels towards other states in order to see how this level of hostility varies pre and
post nuclear weapons development program. The following section presents four
propositions made about North Korea's behavior as its nuclear status changes over the years
as well as reports the historical narrative about its behavior from 1954 until 2006. The study
applies in-depth case analysis to test four main objectives about North Korea's behavior as
its nuclear status changes:
Proposition 1:81 North Korea's changing nuclear status resulted in a decline in its
hostile behavior.
This proposition assumes that that North Korea’s hostile behavior would decline when it
moves to establish and maintain a nuclear weapons development program. The study
argues that states will reduce their level of hostility when adversaries threaten to use
sanctions or military force to prevent this proliferation attempt by North Korea, especially
a much more powerful opponent. The logic behind this proposition is that states, such as
North Korea, seek to avoid triggering preemptive attacks against their nuclear facilities and
so they will likely take on less hostile actions in their dyadic interactions. The study will
examine the following dyadic relationships: North Korea-South Korea, North KoreaUnited States, and North Korea-Japan.
Proposition 2: North Korea's security commitments (guaranteed military support or
just having the agreement) with the Soviet Union/Russia and China played a role in
determining in its hostile behavior as North Korea’s nuclear status changed since
1980.

Proposition 2 asserts that North Korea would become more hostile as its nuclear status
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Due to the militarized dispute over the Korean peninsula between the North and South,
the study assumed that a security problem was always present. Thus, proposition 1 mirrored
hypothesis 1(b).
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changes over time, given its security commitments from the Soviet Union/Russia or China.
This proposition examines the interaction between nuclear status and security commitment
in the case of North Korea. The logic for this proposition is that a security commitment
from a nuclear patron will give North Korea the confidence to take on more aggressive and
bold behavior in their dyadic interstate interactions.
Proposition 3: Changing nuclear status makes North Korea more cooperative in its
dyadic relationships.82
For the purpose of this study, three dyadic relationships are examined they are as follows:
North Korea-South Korea, North Korea-United States, and North Korea-Japan. The
assumption here is that North Korea would prefer to be more cooperative in order to prevent
any preemptive attacks and thus continue with its nuclear weapons development program.
Essentially, North Korea is cooperating in order to complete its costly nuclear program
without any disruptions through sanctions or military threats.
Proposition 4: North Korea's security commitment with the Soviet Union/Russia and
China played a role in increasing its cooperative behavior as its nuclear status
changed in 1980.83

North Korea's Hostile Behavior:
Figure 5.2 presents a historical timeline of North Korea’s main hostile interstate
interactions since 1954.
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Again, it should be noted that hostility and cooperation are not mutually exclusive, where
cooperation
measure
IGO
membership,
formal
agreement,
diplomatic
representation/exchange, but does not measure a decline in hostile behavior.
83
The logic for the four propositions are driven from the theoretical argument presented in
chapter 2 about the behavior of states.
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Figure 5.2 North Korea's hostility timeline

* In response to previous aggression directed towards North Korea.
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* In response to previous aggression directed towards North Korea.
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Sources: Wilson Center, Digital Archives, International History Declassified (2013);
Correlates of War Project, Dispute Narrative (2004); Fischer, Hannah (2007) North Korean
Provocative Actions 1950-2007, CRS Report of Congress.
Note: * In response to previous aggression directed towards North Korea.

The above historical timeline, which illustrates North Korea's conflictual behavior
since the end of the Cold War, shows that North Korea has mainly had conflictual
interactions with South Korea, the United States, and Japan. It should be noted that North
Korea's hostile behavior often occurs as a result of US-South Korea joint military exercises.
The study takes this into account and analyzes North Korea's hostile behavior in response
to this military exercises pre and post nuclear weapons development program. Thus, this
section will focus specifically on these dyadic relationships to understand North Korea's
hostile behavior as it moves to establish its nuclear weapons development program in 1980.
In the case of North Korea-South Korea dyadic interaction and the North Korea-US
dyadic interaction, it appears that following the Korean War, the level of hostility between
North Korea and South Korea leveled out but began to steadily escalate in the 1960s. On
January 11, 1968, Pyongyang radio issued an unyielding warning to the United States,
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stating that “as long as US troops conduct reconnaissance by sending spy boats, our naval
ships will continue to take determined counter measures” (Wilson Center Digital). This
threat was made against the U.S.S. Pueblo, which was an electronic submarine intelligence
ship stationed 14 miles off the cost of North Korea. Following this stern warning from
North Korea, on January 23, 1968, North Korea captured the Pueblo and forced it to enter
the Wonsan harbor (Telegrams from Pyongyang, Eliza Gheorghe). The crisis led to several
minor clashes between North Korea, South Korea, and the United States.
North Korea took another hostile action in 1969 when it shot down EC-121 a US
Navy reconnaissance plane over the East Sea south of Cheongjin in North Korea. In the
early 1950s the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program [PARPRO, hereafter] was
established in order to provide "...intelligence on the Soviet Union and its Communist
neighbors" (National Security Agency Report, 1989: p. 4). The EC-121 was part of
PARPRO, which North Korea asserted had violated its airspace. In a letter from UN
Commissioner for the Unification of Korea Zouheir Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet
Narasimhan, Zouheir commented that:
"prior to that plane incident, the North Korea army has been put under a state of
complete combat readiness thus giving the impression that the North Koreans were
expecting, before shooting the plane, an immediate retaliatory action from the U.S.
Government". (April 19, 1969)
The North Korean military provocation increased tension between North Korea and the
United States. This hostile incident by North Korea was followed by several other crises at
the end of the 1960s—for example, the Blue House raid and violation of South Korean
territory. A glance at the first panel in figure 5.3, the North Korea-US dyad, reveals that the
spike in North Korea’s hostility can be attributed to the U.S.S. Pueblo crisis and events that
followed that engulfed the Korean peninsula. The hostility scores are based on the
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Crescenzi and Enterline (2001) Dynamic Interstate Interaction model discussed in Chapter
3. The North Korea-South Korea dyad exhibited increased North Korean hostility in 1965
and onward, as opposed to the North Korea-US dyad, where in several periods, there was
a decline in North Korean hostility towards the United States.
Figure 5.3: North Korea's hostility levels for selected dyads and total hostility levels
a. North Korea and United States dyad

b. North Korea and South Korea dyad

c. North Korea and Japan dyad
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d. North Korea's hostility

Notes: This measures North Korea’s hostility level in various dyadic relationships as its
nuclear status changed. The red dashed line in the x-axis is the mean hostile score. The
hostile score ranges from -1 to 0, where -1 indicates the highest level of hostility in a dyad
and 0 indicates neutrality. For example, in the North Korea-US dyad, North Korea was
least hostile in 1956 and most hostile in 1970. Panels a-c, presents North Korea's hostile
behavior in its dyadic relationships with South Korea, United States, and Japan. On the
other hand, panel d, presents North Korea's overall hostility level in all of its dyad
relationships measured on the study.
Moving on to the 1970s, North Korea’s hostile behavior seems to further escalate. A
glance at figure 5.2 reveals the various crises North Korea was involved in the 1970s.
Again, much of North Korea’s aggression was towards South Korea, the United States, and
to a lesser extent Japan. On October 23, 1973, for example, North Korean gunboats and
torpedo boats crossed the NLL; however, they fell short of violating the three nautical miles
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“contiguous” zone in the Northwest Island (Wilson Center Digital). This violation of the
NLL was repeatedly committed by North Korea that year, when it was estimated that North
Korea violated the NLL 43 times between October and December. In one instance on the
10th of December, North Korea entered South Korea’s water and was much bolder than in
previous attempts to violate the South's territory; it came close to 3.6 nautical miles to
Beak-Ryeong Island. On several occasions, North Korea attacked South Korean fishing
vessels as well as violated South Korea’s territory. It should be noted that North Korea's
hostile behavior was at times in response to aggression from other states, mainly South
Korea. On June 5th 1970, for example, North Korea's militarized action near the DMZ was
in response to earlier aggression by South Korea. On April 4th 1970, South Korean soldiers
has shot and killed 3 North Korean soldiers south of the DMZ (Fischer, 2007).
Notably, the Poplar Tree crisis in 1976 in the DMZ between North Korea and the
United States illustrated North Korea’s hostility as escalating from the previous decade.
The DMZ is a space prone to high tensions and instantaneous military flare-ups between
North Korea, South Korea, and the United States; the Poplar Tree crisis is a serious example
of these military flare-ups in the Korean peninsula. The Poplar Tree crisis developed
following the events on August 6, 1976, when South Korean construction workers and UN
guards attempted to cut down a poplar tree along the DMZ zone that was obscuring the
view of a UN observation post. Subsequently, North Korean guards at the DMZ ordered
them to withdraw from the area, and they complied without a violent incident occurring.
The situation developed into a full-scale crisis when on August 17, 1976, UN guards and
the North Korean army clashed, resulting in the death of UN guards (US soldiers) in the
joint security area of the DMZ (NKIDP, 1976). In response to this incident, the United
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States dispatched F-111s and a navy task force to South Korea. The United States’ military
actions triggered the North Korean army to be put on alert and assume a war posture. A
series of clashes occurred between them until September 6 when the United States and
North Korea signed a JSA agreement; it came into effect on September 16, ending the crisis.
During this crisis North Korea was still in the research phase, and in the early 1970s North
Korea began to acquire technology for reprocessing plutonium (Byeong-gu et al., 1999).
Throughout the 1980s, North Korea engaged in various clashes with South Korea and
the United States. Figure 5.3 for panel d, presents the overall trend in North Korea’s
hostility levels, confirming that in the 1980s and early 1990s, North Korea’s hostility levels
were fixed with only a slight increase, though hostility eventually begins to spike. In the
case of North Korea, hostility increased due to a security dilemma in which North Korea's
rivals (South Korea, Japan, and the United States) feel greater threat with its nuclear
program and so they have reacted hostilely towards North Korea.
The North Korea and South Korea dyad experienced various hostile flare-ups through
the 1990s and 2000s. Two notable crises occurred in 1996 and 2002 that warrant discussion.
The former occurred on September 18 and lasted until December 29. In 1996, both North
Korea and South Korea were enmeshed in another major military crisis: a North Korean
submarine infiltrated South Korean territory in Gangreung. The North Korean submarine
was on an espionage/reconnaissance mission. As a result of North Korea’s military
provocation, South Korea responded with a 49-day manhunt for the submarine crew in
which 12 were eventually killed in battle with South Korean troops (Fischer, 2007: p. 13).
South Korea even went as far as stating that the submarine incident was an act of war. The
crisis between North Korea and South Korea was eventually resolved through third party
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mediation efforts by the United States. Moreover, North Korea had additional clashes in
the 1990s. The clashes in the 1990s, were during the freeze in North Korea's nuclear
development under the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States. In 1997, North
Korea and China exchanged gunfire at the border (COW, 2004). Additionally, a North
Korean spy vessel violated Japanese water in 1999; Japan responded to this incident
through military means. In response to Japanese aggression, North Korea placed fighter
jets near Japanese water.

Testing Proposition 1 - 2:
The following paragraphs will present an analysis of North Korea’s hostile behavior
and apply the “smoking gun” test for causal inference. Following the end of the Korean
War and the signing of the armistice in 1953, North Korea’s hostility level gradually began
to increase and eventually became fixed from the 1960s until early 1990, where no major
spikes occurred in North Korea's hostile behavior during this time period, as evident in
figure 5.3. Analyzing North Korea's dyadic relationships with the United States, South
Korea, and Japan, it is evident that North Korea's behavior was most hostile in the late
1950s and gradually declined in the 1960s until the early 1990s. Much of the conflictual
interactions with the United States, South Korea, and to a lesser extent Japan were initiated
by North Korea. In that respect, on several occasions military clashes occurred along the
DMZ, which were due provocations by North Korea.84 This provocation by North Korea
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For the purpose of the study provocation "...is defined to include armed invasion; border
violations; infiltration of armed saboteurs and spies; hijacking; kidnapping; terrorism
(including assassination and bombing); threats/intimidation against political leaders, media
personnel, and institutions; incitement aimed at the overthrow of the South Korean
government; actions undertaken to impede progress in major negotiations; and tests of
ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Information in this report was taken from South
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can be attributed to the United States-South Korea war games, North Korea's national
unification goal, to deter possible attacks from South Korea, and finally, to bolster the
regimes power. According to Fischer (2007) "...the latter half of the 1960s,when North
Korea staged a series of limited armed actions against South Korean and U.S. security
interests" (p. 2).
Now looking at North Korea's nuclear status between 1960 and 1979, North Korea's
nuclear research program was not in the position to develop nuclear weapons given that
North Korea lacked both the equipment for uranium enrichment as well as chemical
separation plants (Norris & Kristensen, 2005). However, in the 1980s, North Korea's
nuclear status changed to nuclear procurement because during this time period North Korea
attempted to pursue gas centrifuge technology (Albright & Brannan, 2010) as well as began
building a nuclear reactor at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center (CIA Report, 1982).
Again, during 1980s North Korea's hostility levels had no major spikes; rather its hostile
behavior was fixed with minor changes (increases), as evident with its various military
actions along the DMZ.
During the 1990s, the Korean peninsula experienced a series of crises, mainly due to
North Korean provocations of South Korea, and to a lesser extent, Japan. Assuming that
North Korea established its nuclear weapons in 1980, its level of hostility was fixed
between 1980 and 1992 and there was no evidence of a major rise or decline in its hostile
behavior. Nonetheless, in 1993, North Korea’s hostility level spiked, due in part to the
nuclear crisis of 1993-1994 when tensions over North Korea's nuclear production were at

Korean and Western sources, but typically is denied by the North Korean government"
(Fischer, 2007: p. 2).
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an all-time high. In 1994, North Korea was able to achieve major advancement in its
nuclear production: it had major plutonium production and was capable of producing 4 or
5 bombs (Norris & Kristensen, 2005). This spike in North Korea’s hostile behavior can be
seen in 1993 and 1994 with the second and third nuclear crisis, respectively. This behavior
was a result of hostility directed at North Korea from its adversaries as well as hostility by
North Korea directed at South Korea and a lesser extent Japan. Following the nuclear
crises, tensions between North Korea and South Korea were heightened, mainly due to
North Korean provocation. Following these nuclear crises, North Korea signed the Agreed
Framework in 1994, which eventually led to the freeze of its nuclear development program.
This included a freeze of its plutonium program and uranium enrichment program.
Regardless of the freeze, however, North Korea continued its provocative actions, where
on several occasions North Korean troops had crossed the military demarcation line into
the joint security line of the DMZ. This encroachment along the DMZ was a result of North
Korea's assertion that "it no longer would abide by the armistice provisions concerning the
integrity of the DMZ" (Fischer, p. 13). A bit of background about the political context of
the region is needed to understand North Korea's encroachment along the DMZ. First,
during the 1990s, Russia's rapprochement with the West, and more importantly, Russia's
economic ties with South Korea was a cause of concern for North Korea. This was
particularly problematic for North Korea because had received significant aid in the past
from the Soviet Union. Second, in the 1990s an economic gap between the North and South
developed. According to Cha (2002) an "[a] nnual 8 percent growth in the ROK (before the
1997 Asian financial crisis) versus successive years of 3-8 percent negative growth in the
North between 1991 and 1998 resulted in a nearly twenty-fold gap in the gross domestic
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product of the two economies and a ratio of South to North per capital income as high as
11:1"(p. 215). In particular, this gap in growth between the North and South was a concern
for North Korea because it posed as a potential threat for the regime itself as well as national
security concerns.
Arguably, after North Korea initiated its nuclear weapons development program in
1980, its level of hostility was fixed, but it eventually began to increase in the 1990s and
was at its highest level in 1999. As evident from North Korea's behavior between 19942003 (nuclear freeze period) North Korea did not exhibit a decline its hostile behavior as
postulated by the findings in Chapter 4, where statistical estimates indicated a decline in
hostile behavior as nuclear status changed. This issue was discussed in detail in the
concluding section of Chapter 4.
Several propositions can be extrapolated from this conclusion about North Korea's
hostile behavior. First, the more North Korea advanced in its nuclear program, the more
hostile it became in its dyadic relationships; this could be due in part to its adversaries’
objections—for example, the responses of South Korea and the United States prior to the
nuclear freeze. Even after the nuclear freeze occurred between 1994 and 2003, North
Korea's hostile behavior was still increasing, and even became more hostile with its
decision to withdraw from the NPT, arguing that it was "...“most seriously threatened” by
the United States" (Fischer, p. 25).85 This suggestion that the behavior of states developing
nuclear weapons, in that they are more hostile as their nuclear status changes, due in part
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On February 5, 2003 "North Korea announced it had reactivated its 5-megawatt nuclear
reactor at Yongbyon. The reactor could produce enough material for a nuclear bomb in
about a year. North Korea, however, had apparently not restarted the nuclear fuel
reprocessing facility at Yongbyon which could generate weapons-grade plutonium more
quickly from the 8,000 fuel rods in storage" (Fischer, p. 25).
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to their adversaries’ potential or actual threat for preemptive strikes against their nuclear
facilities. Consequently, this makes evident that states developing nuclear weapons behave
in a similar fashion despite their power status in the international system.
Second, the establishment of a nuclear weapons development program does not
contribute to a change in state behavior, but rather where a state stands in its nuclear
development is a better determinant of its behavior. For North Korea, its nuclear program
did not make a major milestone until 1986, where it "began operating a newly constructed
20-megawatt thermal (MWT) reactor near the city of Yongbyon" (Norris & Kristensen, p.
64). And by 1990, North Korea began separating plutonium, and by 1994 it was producing
up to 10 kilograms of plutonium (Dreicer, 2005). Despite signing the Agreed Framework
to freeze its nuclear development, the US Department of State noted that:
"North Korea was pursuing a covert program to produce enriched uranium – in
violation of the Agreed Framework, the North-South Joint Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
and the D.P.R.K.’s Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency. In fact, we [United States] determined that North Korea had been pursuing
the program for a number of years, even as it was negotiating with senior American
officials to improve relations (Kelly, 2014)"

Thus, in the early-to-mid 1990s, it is believed that A.Q Khan and his centrifuge associates
at the Khan Research Laboratories [KRL, hereafter] had assisted North Korea in making
centrifuges. In 1995, with KRL assistance North Korea began a clandestine uranium
enrichment program. In that respect, North Korea had two significant periods, 1985 and
1995, where it achieved breakthrough in its nuclear weapons development program.
Following these breakthroughs, North Korea's level of hostility seems to have increased as
evident in the North Korea-United States dyad and North Korea-South Korea dyad. In both
of these dyads, North Korea's level of hostility was above the mean hostility level for each
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given dyad. This increased level of hostility can be attributed to several factors. First,
United States-South Korea military exercises. Second, North Korea's behavior can be
attributed to hostility directed towards it by the United States and South Korea. As
discussed above, in 1994 North Korea signed the Agreed Framework with the United
States, in turn leading to a freeze in its plutonium production between 1994 and 2003
(Nikitin, 2013).
Third, this conclusion suggests that hostile behavior has more to do with general
activities in international politics than strictly with the establishment of a nuclear weapons
development program and the move towards nuclearization. Now testing the proposition 1
regarding North Korea’s hostile behavior as its nuclear status changes, the proposition
predicted that North Korea would be less hostile as it established its nuclear weapons
development program and advanced with its nuclear production; this was not supported.
Proposition 1 was rejected because, as evident from the above narrative, North Korea’s
hostility level was fixed for rather long periods and did not exhibit increase or decrease
over the years; in the 1990s, its hostility level actually began to gradually increase.
Nevertheless, since the “smoking gun” test for causal inference was applied in the analysis,
proposition 1 is not eliminated but instead is weakened.86
Turning to the security commitment component of the study, North Korea has had two
important alliance partnerships with the Soviet Union/Russia and China.87 Both of these
alliance partnerships appeared to have had an important influence on North Korea’s hostile
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Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of the smoking gun test for causal inference.
Smoking gun test requires sufficient condition for affirming causal inference, but not
necessary condition (Collier, 2011).
87
In the case of the Soviet Union/Russia, the study will refer to the Soviet Union and Russia
separately.
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behavior as its nuclear status changed in 1980. Following the Korean War, the Soviet Union
was considered one of North Korea’s strongest allies; however, this alliance partnership
was far from perfect, and at times, the Soviet Union was in conflict with North Korea. In
late 1962, the Soviet Union and North Korean military alliance was at its all-time low
(Szalontai,2006), due in part to the North Korean and Chinese open criticism of the Soviet
Union’s revisionist policy. The gradual decline of the Soviet “empire” and its eventual
demise led to a change in the North Korean-Soviet military alliance. In the late 1980s, as
the Soviet Union sought to create detente with the West, and more importantly as part of
its perestroika policy, the Soviet Union reduced its military aid and assistance to North
Korea (French, 2007; Bauer, 2009). According to Zhang (1997):
[d]uring the 1980s, Pyongyang maintained a closer relationship with Moscow than
with Beijing. By 1989, however, an increasing rift between North Korea and the
Soviet Union had emerged, as the latter gradually distanced itself from its old
communist alliance and moved towards East-West détente. (p. 81)
The Soviet rapprochement with South Korea created further tensions between the
Soviet Union and North Korea, and in turn led the latter state to move into isolation. In the
1990s, Russia ceased its military and technical aid to North Korea as it moved to create
link with the West. According to Bauer (2009), “it is clear that Russia has no interest in
propping up the current North Korean regime and it would most certainly not support the
North militarily in the event of a war” (p. 53).
In testing proposition 2 about North Korea’s hostile behavior patterns as its nuclear
status interacts with its security commitment from the Soviet Union and China, it is
discernible that proposition 2 is not supported by the narrative of its hostile behavior and
alliance partnership with the Soviet Union. A parallel examination of North Korea’s hostile
behavior and military alliance partnership indicates that from the 1950s and until the late
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1980s, this alliance partnership played no significant role in increasing North Korea’s
hostile behavior. Rather, the opposite happened in the 1990s, when Russia no longer
supported North Korea, and in turn, the latter state's hostility level increased while its
nuclear development efforts increased as well. Even so, since the “smoking gun” test for
causal inference is used in the analysis,88 proposition 2 regarding the Soviet Union/Russia
is not eliminated but instead is weakened by the historical narrative.
Moving on to North Korea’s alliance with China, this alliance partnership cannot be
understood in a vacuum: it must be seen in the context of Cold War competition.
Principally, China’s military intervention during the Korean War to aid North Korea was
the beginning of Chinese-North Korean relations and Chinese military support of the North.
In 1961, North Korea and China signed the Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which stipulated that in the case of a military attack,
each party to the treaty agreed to intervene if the other side were attacked (Nanto & Manyin,
2010). In particular, in 1962 and 1963, North Korean-Chinese military cooperation was
perceived to be at its highest level since signing the agreement. This mutual defense
alliance would connect both countries militarily for the next 30 years; however, in the 1990s
the alliance would be weakened as China moved to improve relations with South Korea. In
1992, China established full diplomatic relations with South Korea and sought to establish
economic ties with the South as part of the latter state’s economic reforms. Despite the
increasing incompatibility between North Korea and China over the years, due in part to
North Korean isolation and Chinese economic reform policies, the North Korea-Chinese
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As noted in Chapter 3, when a hypothesis fails to find support in the data it is not
eliminated entirely but rather it is weakened.
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military alliance remains, albeit much weaker than in previous years.
When testing proposition 2, the interaction between nuclear status and military alliance
with China yielded mixed results about North Korea’s hostile behavior. While comparing
North Korea’s overall hostility level in figure 5.3, panel d, with its military alliance
partnership with China, several insights can be discovered. First, between 1955 and 1960,
North Korea’s hostility level was increasing, especially in 1958 (their hostility score was
-.380). Despite supporting the North in the Korean War, China was not yet in a formal
military alliance with North Korea, and during this period of time, North Korea’s hostility
level was much higher than the succeeding years. Second, in 1961, North Korea and China
established their formal military alliance with the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and
Mutual Assistance, which created a mutual defense alliance between the two states. Now,
comparing North Korea’s overall hostility level preceding the mutual defense alliance
agreement demonstrates that in 1961, North Korea’s hostility level had declined
significantly from previous years, and the following years it was fixed with insignificant
increases and decreases. In 1980, the year North Korea established its nuclear weapons
development program, there seems to have been no change in its hostility level, even when
it still had a strong military alliance with China. Nevertheless, in 1993 and onward, North
Korea’s hostility level began to increase significantly, but during these years its mutual
defense alliance with China was much weaker than in previous years. This weakening
alliance was due in part to North Korea’s isolation as well as China’s move towards
economic reform. When applying the “smoking gun” test for causal inference to
proposition 2, again no support was found for the proposition made above. To be more
specific, the results were mixed, because in the 1980s North Korea’s hostility level did not
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experience significant increases despite having a mutual defense alliance with China—
thus, for the 1980s, the hypothesis did not find support. On the other hand, during the 1990s
and 2000s, North Korea displayed a significant rise in its hostility level (hostile score for
1999 was -.498, the highest level). During this time period, North Korea still had a mutual
defense alliance with China, though a much weaker one due in part to domestic politics
and geopolitics in respective states; this condition supported the claim made in proposition
2 for the North Korean and Chinese alliance partnership. Thus, due to the later events, the
proposition is partially accepted.

North Korea's Cooperative Behavior:
This section of the chapter will present the historical narrative of North Korea's
cooperative behavior as well as analyze the causal mechanism between nuclear status and
North Korea's cooperative behavior in selected dyadic relationships. With the in-depth case
analysis of North Korea, this section seeks to examine two propositions about its state
behavior: first, whether changing nuclear status makes North Korea more cooperative; and
second, whether North Korea's security commitment with the Soviet Union/Russia and
China played a role in decreasing its cooperative behavior as its nuclear status changed in
1980. Figure 5.4 presents a timeline of North Korea's cooperative behavior from 1954 to
2006.
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Figure 5.4: North Korea's Cooperation Timeline
June 12 1973
3rd Red Cross coordinating
committee DPRK refuses to participate
August 25 1975
in any scheduled activities
DPRK becomes
member of NAM
December 1st 1973
DPRK rejected NLL
September 18 1985
January 28 1974
4th DPRK & ROK
DPRK reject non-aggression
economic conference
pact proposed by ROK
August 25 1972
DPRK & ROK
hotline agreement
July 11 1961
Sino-DPRK Treaty
signed

1960

July 26 1972
Red Cross talks stalled
Because DPRK demands

May 17 1974
DPRK joined the WHO

December 12 1985
DPRK signed NPT

September 20 1971
Red Cross negotiations
begin between DPRK & ROK

March 1 1972
DPRK – Japan
trade begins

UNESCO

September 22 1971

February 21 1972
1st Working level preparatory
Red Cross meeting
September 13 1972
DPRK & ROK Red Cross
committee held in Seoul

1990

2000

May 27 1991
January 19 1981
DPRK rejected ROK proposal DPRK reversed stance on UN &
applied for accession
about reciprocal visits

March 10 1972
Several talks between
DPRK & ROK

JSA hotline established

June 13 2000
Inter Korean summit

December 31 1991
DPRK & ROK signed declaration
on the denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula

September 16 &
October 17 1974
DPRK joined IAEA and

1980

1970

September 2 1999
DPRK nullified the NLL

May 28th 1985
8th Red Cross talks
January 11 1980
DPRK proposed the resumption
of the hotline operation

August 28 1973
DPRK leaves
coordinating committee
April 5 1982
DPRK proposed tripartite
talks with US & ROK

September 18 1991
DPRK joined UN
March 12 1993
DPRK withdraws
from NPT
April 4 1996
DPRK announced giving up
managing the DMZ
November 19 1996
DPRK closed the liaison
office in Panmunjeon

Source: Wilson Center, Digital Archives, International History Declassified (2013)
Since the end of the Korean War, North Korea has moved to create diplomatic ties with
several states in the international system—particularly, states with mutual interest. For
instance, in 1972, North Korea moved to establish trade relations with Japan. In a letter
from the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, it
states that the “[g]overnment and Liberal Democratic Party leaders decided Tuesday (18
January 1972) to send an LDP mission to North Korea” (“Letters between Narasimhan and
Ozbudun” January 27, 1972), and in response to this move by Japan, “North Korean
Premier Kim Il Sing is ready to send a mission to Japan if its visit is accepted by the
Japanese government” (Ibid., 1972). In summary, this North Korean responsiveness to
Japan implies cooperation on the part of North Korea to improve relations with Japan.
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Figure 5.5, panel c, illustrates that after 1975, the North Korea-Japan dyad becomes more
cooperative, with only few incidents where cooperation in the dyad dropped.
Figure 5.5: North Korea's cooperation levels for selected dyads and total
cooperation levels
a. North Korea – USA Dyad

b. North Korea – South Korea Dyad

c. North Korea – Japan Dyad
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d. North Korea's cooperation trends

Notes: This measures North Korea’s cooperation level in various dyadic relationships as
its nuclear status changed. The red dashed line in the x-axis is the mean cooperation score.
The cooperation score ranges from 1 to 0, where 1 indicates the highest level of cooperation
in a dyad and 0 indicates neutrality. Panels a-c, presents North Korea's hostile behavior in
its dyadic relationships with South Korea, United States, and Japan. On the other hand,
panel d, presents North Korea's overall cooperation level in all of its dyad relationships
measured on the study.

In 1958, North Korea and China moved to develop friendly relations. This cooperation
between North Korea and China was further evident in 1961 with the Sino-North Koran
Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty. In accordance to the treaty, China agreed
to provide military assistance to North Korea as well as support its ally in an event of an
attack, primarily from South Korea and the United States. The treaty further deepened
North Korean and Chinese cooperation.
In the decades following the Korean War, diplomatic contact between the North and
South was absent. However, in 1971, contact between North Korea and South Korea slowly
began to emerge due to the Red Cross talks between North Korean and South Korean Red
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Cross officials. The Red Cross officials attempted to initiate inter-Korean dialogue and
eventually ease tension in the Korean peninsula, hoping it would lead to a peaceful
reunification of the country. The first Red Cross talks between North Korea and South
Korea began in 1971 and dealt with the reunification of separated families (“Preliminary
Meeting between North and South Korea” November 20, 1971). Alongside the Red Cross
talks, secret high-level meetings between South Korean Vice Premier Park Sung-chul and
intelligence chief Lee Hu-rak with North Korean intelligence director Kim Yong-ju began
to take place in the early 1970s, resulting in the North-South joint communiqué on July 4,
1972 (“Note on Information provided by DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Kim
Yong-taek, on 3 July 1972 for the Ambassadors and Acting Ambassadors of Poland,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Romania, Hungary, and the GDR” July 4, 1972). The
communiqué outlined the agreement between North Korea and South Korea about the
eventual unification of Korea: that this unification was to occur through peaceful means
and without the interference of other states (mainly the United States and the Soviet Union).
Besides the issue of unification, the communiqué also established an agreement about a
direct phone line between Pyongyang and Seoul with the purpose of preventing "a military
attack and to solve all upcoming operational questions" (Ibid., July 04, 1972). In summary,
North Korea’s move to agree to deal with the unification issue through peaceful means and
their improvement in terms of transparency indicated an increase in cooperative behavior.
In Figure 5.5, panel b, cooperation spikes can be attributed to the initiation of the Red Cross
talks and secret high-level meetings between North Korean and South Korean officials
starting in the 1970s.89 Prior to the 1970s, cooperation between North Korea and South
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Prior to the deadlock in inter-Korean dialogue, North Korea and South Korea were
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Korea was simply non-existent.
Despite the numerous Red Cross talks, progress in the North-South dialogue was at
times complicated and cooperation was low. In July 1974, the Red Cross talks reached a
deadlock, a sign of future disagreement between North Korea and South Korea. The 1974
deadlock resulted from "the question of postponement of Korea deliberations at the
forthcoming session of the UNGA" (“Letters between Ahmet H. Ozbudun and C.V.
Narasimhan” August 17, 1972). In addition to these issues, there were several
disagreements about procedural matters that contributed to the deadlock in the talks. As a
result of the deadlock, the talks were suspended in August 1973. In a statement by Hu Raklee, Seoul co-chairman of the NSCC, he notes that:
Kim Yong-ju, Pyongyang co-chairman of the North-South Coordinating
Committee, at 6p.m. August 28 abruptly issued a statement declaring unilaterally
that he would not proceed any further in the coordinating committee activities
with myself, Lee Hu-Rak (as cited by Hu Rak-lee, 1973, p. 1)
He further notes that "the Seoul co-chairman of the North-South Coordinating Committee
failed to translate into action those items agreed upon in the South-North joint communiqué
and avoided taking actual steps while calling, by words only, for complete opening both
societies" (as cited by Hu Rak-lee, 1973, p. 1).
In the 1980s, inter-Korean dialogue reopened with numerous Red Cross talks and
economic council meetings. On May 28, 1985, for example, North Korea and South Korea
took part in eight Red Cross talks. In addition, North Korea proposed the resumption of the
direct phone line between Pyongyang and Seoul. Despite reopening the inter-Korean
dialogue, agreement was never reached on several issues, and later in February 1986, North

engaged in a total of three North-South Coordinating Committees and seven Red Cross
talks (this does include the various Red Cross preliminary meetings).
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Korea again withdrew from the talks in protest over the US-South Korea Team Spirit
military exercises. A glance at figure 5.5, panel b, shows a drop in cooperation in the North
Korea-South Korea dyad in the mid-1980s. The inter-Korean dialogue was reopened again
in 1988 by resuming the Red Cross talks. Additionally, bilateral trade occurred between
North Korea and South Korea. In 1988, North Korea and South Korea established the
Declaration for National Self-Esteem Unification and Prosperity, which sought to promote
diplomatic exchange and cooperation. The declaration led North Korea and South Korea
to implement the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation Non-Aggression and Exchange
Cooperation and the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In
the latter agreement, both North Korea and South Korea agree “not to test, manufacture,
provide, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons” (Wilson Center, Digital
Archives, 2013). Like previous inter-Korean dialogue, the exchange and cooperation
established in 1988 was temporarily put on hold when North Korea submitted a withdrawal
notice from the NPT in 1993. In summary, North Korean and South Korean relations
demonstrated fluctuations in North Korean cooperative behavior.
Another dyad to be examined more closely is the North Korea-US dyad. Relations
between North Korea and the United States were limited due in part to the geopolitics of
the Cold War and the US armed forces stationed in South Korea. Notably, an important
cooperative behavior on the part of North Korea was the establishment of the 1994 United
States and North Korea Agreed Framework, which deals with North Korea's nuclear
weapons production. Once negotiations began between the United States and North Korea
regarding the Agreed Frameworks, North Korea removed its earlier withdrawal notice to
the NPT, and so remained a party to the treaty. Thus, this situation demonstrated North
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Korea's cooperative behavior, and perhaps more importantly, North Korea was still subject
to the obligations by the treaty and inspections required by the IAEA.
Despite removing its withdrawal notice from the NPT in 1993, North Korea submitted
another withdrawal notice in 2003 due to mounting international pressure to halt its nuclear
weapons development program. The Security Council had failed to effectively prevent
North Korea from leaving the NPT because of "...among the P-5, notably China and the
United States. In the absence of Council action, the NPT states parties found themselves
without any mechanism or authority to act, even though the integrity of the NPT was put
at stake" (Bunn & Rhinelander, 2005). The mechanism for withdrawal from the NPT as
stated in Article X was discussed earlier in the chapter. Thus, due to North Korea's
withdrawal from the NPT, and possible threat to international peace and security from its
nuclear weapons development program (possible nuclear acquisition), the Six Party Talks
was established. The Six Party Talks included North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, the
United States, and Russia. Table 5.1 presents the various round of talks with the 6
participating states.
Table 5.1: Six Party Talks Rounds 2003 - 2005
Round

Date

1

August 27 28, 2003

Issues / Achieved
North Korean:
I.
Nominalization of relations
II. Non-aggression pact with the United States
III. Ending nuclear weapons program not possible
Outcome:
IV. United States rejected non-aggression pact
V. All participants agreed to hold additional talks
VI. Nothing achieved

2

February 25 28, 2004

North Korean:
VII. Agreed to partial reversal. North Korea will end its
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nuclear weapons program, but will keep their peaceful
nuclear activities (energy and research)
Outcome:
VIII. United States, Japan, and South Korea rejected this
partial reversal and instead wanted full reversal. They
argued that the peaceful nuclear program would be a
front for weapons development.
IX. All parties agreed to the denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula
X. All participants agreed to hold additional talks in
2004
3

June 23 - 26,
2004

North Korean:
XI. North Korea was willing to accept a nuclear freeze in
return for compensation.
Outcome:
XII. All participants agreed to hold additional talks in
2005

4†

July 26 North Korean:
August 7,
XIII. Returns to the talks in July because the United States
2005 (Phase 1)
had agreed to recognize North Korea as a sovereign
state and offered a statement that it will not invade
North Korea
Outcome:
XIV. No agreement on reached on North Korea's nuclear
program.
XV. Agree to continue the round in a few weeks

5 ††

September 13
- 19 2005
(Phase 2)

Outcome:
XVI. A joint statement was agreed between the participants,
which opened the way for the denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula.
XVII. North Korea agreed to end its nuclear weapons
program, abandon its current nuclear weapons, become
party to the NPT, and allow IAEA inspectors.
XVIII.
The United States and South Korea agreed not to
deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.
XIX. The other members to the talks agreed to provide aid
and normalize relations with North Korea.

November 9 11, 2005

Outcome:
XX. No agreement was made to agree to the next round of

134

talks.
Source: Liang (2012) Arms Control Association; BBC News (2015)
Notes:
† February 2005, North Korea stated for the first time that it has developed nuclear weapons
for the purpose of self-defense and it will not attend the Six-Party Talks (BBC News, 2015).
†† Round 6 held December 18 - 22, 2006 was dropped from the analysis because the study
only examined North Korea's behavior before acquiring nuclear weapons, and so round 6
was dropped because North Korea tested its first nuclear bomb on October 9, 2006.

In addition, North Korean cooperative behavior is also demonstrated in its engagement
in international institutions. For example, in 1974, North Korea joined the WHO, IAEA,
UNESCO, and later in the 1970s it became a member of NAM and FAO, to name a few.
Additionally, in 1991, North Korea reversed its stance about the United Nations and applied
for UN accession as a separate entity. The remainder of this section will apply a process
tracing test for the causal inference to evaluate the proposed hypotheses about the
cooperative behavior of North Korea.

Testing Proposition 3 - 4:
The remainder of this chapter will test the propositions about North Korea's
cooperative behavior as it established its nuclear weapons development program. A
historical narrative was used to pinpoint North Korea's cooperative behavior as it began to
establish its nuclear weapons production. The present study assumes that North Korea
initiated its nuclear weapons development program in 1980 when South Korean
intelligence discovered the construction of nuclear facilities weapons grade in Yongbyun
(CIA Report, 1982). Proposition 3, it predicted that North Korea would become more
cooperative as it moved to establish its nuclear weapons development program; the test
found mixed results in the historical narrative and North Korea's cooperative score above.

135

From 1960 until 1980, North Korea was more cooperative than in preceding years, and
only displayed a handful of cooperative behaviors in the 1980s and onwards. For example,
North Korea withdrew from the NPT, but at the same continued to engage in the Red Cross
talks as well as the Six Party Talks. Table 5.1 had presented the various round of talks
between North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. In
examining the talks, it’s clear that North Korea's cooperation was mixed and due to the
concessions given to them during the talks.
From the above discussion, it is difficult to clearly assert that North Korea was
completely cooperative in its behavior. However, since the “smoking gun” test for causal
inference was applied, the proposition was not eliminated but rather weakened by the
outcome. North Korea's cooperative behavior tended to fluctuate over time, unlike its
hostile behavior, which saw a period of fixed behavior patterns. Between 1955 and 1973,
North Korea's cooperative behavior was at its all-time low, due in part to the geopolitical
situation on the Korean peninsula and Cold War politics. Beginning in the early 1970s,
North Korea's cooperative behavior began to spike upwards, due in part to the onset of the
inter-Korean dialogue. The historical narrative reports that North Korea was more
cooperative than anticipated but that this cooperation tended to decline when a crisis
occurred between North Korea and its adversaries. In spite of failing to support the
hypothesis about North Korea's cooperative behavior, two comments are necessary about
this conclusion. First, hostile and cooperative behaviors are interdependent on each other,
and thus, for future research and a better understanding of state behavior as nuclear status
changes, both of these of elements should be studied jointly. Second and perhaps more
importantly, the 1993-1994 nuclear crisis brings up the issue of causality and whether North
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Korea's nuclear status has led to more hostility and less cooperation (breakdown of interKorean dialogue and North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT), or whether it is more
hostility that led North Korea to the change in its nuclear status. Again, this brings up
another issue to be studied about the hostile and cooperative behavior of North Korea.
Finally, the following section examines North Korea's cooperative behavior as its
changing nuclear status interacted with security commitments from the Soviet
Union/Russia and China since 1954. This section will first discuss the North Korean and
Soviet Union/Russian military alliance, and then discuss the North Korean and Chinese
military alliance. Again, as in the previous discussion of the North Korean and Soviet
Union military alliance, this alliance fluctuated over the years; however, despite the tension
at times between the two allies, the Soviet Union maintained its commitment to North
Korea until the mid-1980s. Now examining North Korea's cooperative behavior in figures
5.5, it indicate that North Korea was least cooperative in the 1950s and 1960s and later
became more cooperative over the years, with the highest level of cooperation in the 1970s.
As North Korea's nuclear status changed in the 1980s, its cooperative behavior did not
decline but rather increased, with only a few minor decreases in the late 1980s. Examining
North Korea's overall cooperation score in figure 5.5 above shows that its cooperative level
has increased significantly since the 1980s. Two comments can be made about North
Korea's increasing cooperative behavior. First, international knowledge about its nuclear
program led to an international outcry and the eventual establishment of the Six Party Talks
over its nuclear program. Second, North Korea's deteriorating economy and famine
necessitated greater cooperation with the West in order to generate greater financial and
humanitarian aid.
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In testing the proposition 4 for North Korea and Soviet Union/Russia security
commitment, the hypothesis was not supported by the cooperative narrative. The Soviet
Union's security commitment to North Korea was the strongest during the 1950s and the
1960s, but at this time North Korea did not possess a nuclear weapons development
program, and its cooperative behavior was at its lowest point. Thus, for this time period,
the results contradicted proposition 4, and instead North Korea behaved less cooperatively.
Looking further into the time period prior to establishment of a nuclear weapons
development program, 1970-1979, the Soviet Union continued to provide North Korea
with support—however, North Korea's cooperative behavior increased despite still not
having an active nuclear weapons development program. Finally, examining the time
period while North Korea's nuclear status changed from 1980 until 2006, the Soviet Union
and later Russia's security commitment to North Korea gradually diminished until the point
of non-existence (1991-2006), and during this time period North Korea became more
cooperative. This outcome offers further evidence against proposition 4 because North
Korea behaved more cooperatively as its nuclear status changed, despite having declined a
security commitment from the Soviet Union/Russia. Since the “smoking gun” test for
causal inference was applied, proposition 4 was not eliminated but rather weakened by this
outcome.
Finally we turn to the security commitment between North Korea and China. Unlike
the Soviet Union/Russia, China's security commitment to North Korea extended into the
post-Cold War era, albeit to a lesser degree than during the Cold War era. From the above
narrative about North Korea and China's security partnership, it is evident that this
relationship was cemented with the 1961 agreement. In testing proposition 4 for the
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Chinese security commitment to North Korea, the hypothesis was supported by the
narrative nor by the overall cooperation score for North Korea. An examination of North
Korea's overall cooperation score between 1954 and 2001 as well as the cooperation
narrative between 1950 and 2006 in figure 5.5 offers evidence about the link between
nuclear status, security commitment, and cooperation.

5.5 Concluding Remarks about North Korea's behavior:
This chapter examined North Korea’s hostile and cooperative behavior as its nuclear
status changed in 1980. With respect to hostility, the study examined North Korea's
militarized behavior with respect to its three main adversaries the United States, South
Korea, and Japan. The study applied the smoking gun for causal inference in order test
proposition 1, which posited that North Korea's hostile behavior will likely decrease as its
nuclear status changes. It should be noted that due to the militarized dispute over the Korean
peninsula between the North and South, the study assumed that a security problem was
always present. Thus, proposition 1 mirrored hypothesis 1(b). The historical narrative did
not support proposition 1 because North Korea's hostile behavior did not exhibit increase
or decrease over the years; in the 1990s, its hostility level actually began to gradually
increase. This outcome differed from the one found in the statistical findings in Chapter 4,
where the estimated results showed a decline in hostile behavior when nuclear status
changed with or without the presence of a security problem (model 1 and 2). This differing
outcome between Chapters 4 and 5, was attributed to the fact that the statistical results only
captured state behavior up to 200190 because of data limitation, whereas the case studies
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The CoW MIDs measure of hostility for dyadic interaction ends at 2001.
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temporal scope went beyond 2001. Thus, if additional data were available to capture the
militarized behavior of North Korea (2002-2006), Iran (2002-2015), Iraq (2002), and Libya
(2002-2003), the statistical estimates would probably confirm similar results as the case
studies in Chapters 5 and 6.
Next, the chapter examined the interaction between nuclear status and security
commitment in the case of North Korea. The study examined North Korea's alliance
partnerships with the Soviet Union/Russia and China between 1954 and 2014. Proposition
2 posited that North Korea would become more hostile as its nuclear status changed when
it had a security commitment from Soviet Union/Russia and China. With respect to Soviet
Union/Russia security commitment to North Korea, the historical narrative did not support
the claim made in proposition 2. This alliance partnership played no significant role in
increasing North Korea’s hostile behavior. Rather, the opposite happened in the 1990s,
when Russia no longer supported North Korea, and in turn, the latter state's hostility level
increased while its nuclear development efforts increased as well. On the other hand,
China's security commitment to North Korea, the historical narrative again showed no
support for proposition 2.
Finally, this Chapter also examined North Korea's cooperative behavior as its nuclear
status changed in 1980. Proposition 3, it predicted that North Korea would become more
cooperative as it moved to establish its nuclear weapons development program; the test
found mixed results in the historical narrative and North Korea's cooperative. Chapter 4,
indicated a positive correlation between nuclear status and cooperation, the results in
Chapter 5, despite the mixed outcome, further supported the claim made in Chapter 4 that
a change in nuclear status increases state cooperative behavior. This increased cooperative
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behavior could be due to the international community's effort to get the proliferating state
to reverse its nuclear policy, as was evident with North Korea. Finally, proposition 4, which
asserted that North Korea would become more cooperative when it has a security
commitment was only supported for the North Korea-China alliance partnership, but failed
to find support for the North Korean-Soviet Union/Russia alliance partnership. This
outcome for North Korea-China alliance partnership supported the claim estimated results
in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 6: Conclusion
6.1 Discussion
The dissertation tested the effect of nuclear status on the behavior of states developing
nuclear weapons in dyadic relationships, attempting to answer the following questions:
What are the implications of a changing nuclear status on developing state's pattern of
behavior in the international system? Does nuclear status bolster or deter hostility in dyadic
relationships? What role does nuclear status play on state cooperative behavior in the
international system? To assess these questions, several statistical estimates and case study
analyses were conducted. The statistical estimates and case studies yielded interesting
results about the behavior of proliferating states. Much of the past scholarship on nuclear
weapons has overlooked the importance of nuclear weapons development program status
and its potential effects on the behavior of proliferating states, and so this study offers a
novel approach towards the issue of nuclear weapons.
A central issue in the study was whether the security environment (security problem
and security commitment from a nuclear patron) interacting with nuclear status influenced
the behavior of proliferating states. In chapter 4, the study examined the behavior of states
with nuclear weapons development programs between 1930 and 2001. This portion of the
study posited several arguments about the behavior of developing states. First, the study
argued that changing nuclear status91 had a direct effect on the hostile and cooperative
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To recap previous discussion of changing nuclear status in Chapter 1, this refers to a state
moving from not having a nuclear weapons development program to having a program.
Changing nuclear status was measured through two variables in the study: first, it was
measured through a simple categorical variable of not having and having NWDP; second,
it was measured through latent nuclear production capabilities and the decision by a state
to acquire nuclear weapons. It should be noted that the study did not examine whether state
behavior changes when states revert back to not having a nuclear weapons development
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behavior of developing states. The statistical results in Chapter 4 indicate that changing
nuclear status did not make states more hostile—rather, the opposite occurred, where
developing states became less hostile. As discussed in Chapter 4, the decrease in hostility
can be associated to the cost of militarized conflict and the economic cost of potential
imposition of sanctions by other states. Turning to cooperative behavior, the study found
that cooperation decreased when both security problem and security commitment were
absent.
Another element the study examined was whether the presence of a security problem
interacting with changing nuclear status influences a developing state’s hostile and
cooperative behavior. The study found that this interaction decreased proliferating states
hostility when a security problem was present. The study found that security problem
interacting with nuclear status has no significant effect on the cooperative behavior of states
with nuclear weapons development programs. Next, the study examined the interaction
between security commitment and nuclear status, where it was found that the presence of
a security commitment decreased the hostile behavior of states with nuclear weapons
development program. On the other hand, the presence of a security commitment increased
the cooperative behavior of states with a nuclear weapons development program.
After completing the statistical analysis portion of the study on all proliferating states
(Chapter 4), the hypotheses varied in level of support. These particular findings open up a
new avenue for research about the implications of nuclear status on the behavior of
proliferating states, and perhaps more importantly, on the behavior of non-proliferating

program, as in the case of Romania 1981-1989 (Jones & McDough, 1988), Yugoslavia
1948-1963 and 1982-1987 (Potter et al., 2000), and South Africa.
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states and states party to the NPT.
Despite failing to support some of the theoretical arguments made in the study, the
results should not be discounted, and instead an alternate argument can be made. The
alternate argument posits that proliferating states act less hostile as they move further in
their nuclear production, especially when they are experiencing a regional security
problem; this is in order to avoid potential threats or preemptive attacks by their adversaries
against their nuclear facilities. Since nuclear weapons have a high cost for proliferating
states in terms of tangible cost (violation of the NPT agreement and defection from the
norm of non-proliferation) and intangible cost (financial and political cost of the program),
the likelihood that a potential conflict escalation might interrupt their efforts is too high,
and so it is optimal for a state to act less hostile in order to avoid potential conflict.
In order to fully understand the behavior of states with nuclear weapons
development programs, the present study implemented a major case study analysis of North
Korea. In the North Korean case, a historical narrative was used to pinpoint North Korea's
hostile and cooperative behavior before and after it established its nuclear weapons
development program. The results in the North Korean case provided mixed support for
the theoretical argument made in the dissertation, and instead of answering questions posed
in Chapter 2, it brought to light additional questions about the behavior of states as they
attempt to proliferate. Taken together, North Korea's hostile and cooperative behavior
varied immensely as its nuclear status changed, and its behavior was dependent on the
security problem on the Korean peninsula. In terms of hostile behavior, North Korea's
hostility level began to increase steadily in 1957; then, between 1959 and 1993, North
Korea displayed a fixed hostility levels in its dyadic relationship. However, in 1993, North
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Korea's hostility level spikes, due in part to the nuclear crisis of 1993-1994, during which
tensions over North Korea's nuclear production were at an all-time high. Assuming that
North Korea had established its nuclear weapons in 1980 (Central Intelligence Agency, 9
July 1982), its level of hostility was fixed during this period and there was no evidence of
a reduction in its hostile behavior. Rather, North Korea's behavior became more hostile in
the 1990s and eventually the state was at its highest level of hostility in 1999, due in part
to North Korea's provocation of South Korea along the DMZ, hostility directed towards it
by South Korea, as well as the annual war exercises between the United States and South
Korea.
Turning to cooperation, North Korea's cooperative behavior tended to fluctuate over
time, unlike its hostile behavior, which saw periods of fixed patterns and fluctuations.
Between 1955 and 1973, North Korea's cooperative behavior was at its all-time low, due
in part to the geopolitical situation on the Korean peninsula and Cold War politics.
Beginning in the early 1970s, North Korea's cooperative behavior begins to spike upwards,
due in part to the onset of the inter-Korean dialogue. The historical narrative in Chapter 6
shows that North Korea was more cooperative and that this cooperation tended to decline
when a crisis occurred between North Korea and its adversaries because it tended to engage
more in the international community during and after the crisis.
Three comments are necessary about these conclusions. First, hostile and cooperative
behaviors are interdependent, and so for a better understanding of state behavior as nuclear
status changes, these of elements should be studied jointly. Second and perhaps more
importantly, the 1993-1994 nuclear crisis brings up the issue of causality and whether North
Korea's nuclear status has led to more hostility and less cooperation (the breakdown of
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inter-Korean dialogue and North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT), or whether it is more
hostility that led North Korea to the change its nuclear status. Third, North Korea's nuclear
program has led to a greater sense of security and confidence, and so it was more willing
to negotiate as well as open lines of contact and communication with the United States and
South Korea. This was clearly evident with the Agreed Framework negotiations in 1994
and Joint Nuclear Denuclearization in 1992. Therefore, this situation explains North
Korea's behavior towards cooperation.
The North Korean case study identified the relationship between the establishment of
a nuclear weapons development program and state behavior.92 To conclude, a brief
discussion and analysis of Iran's hostile and cooperative behavior during its change of
nuclear status is undertaken.93 This brief discussion will provide a good test of external
validity, in that the results found in Chapter 5 can be generalized to Iran. The following
section will discuss Iran's hostile and cooperative behavior.

6.2 Understanding Iran's hostile and cooperative behavior:
Iran's nuclear weapons development program can best be understood in two parts: from
1974 to 1978 under the Shah and from 1984 to 2010 under the Khomeini. In the 1970s,
Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi signed several agreements with West Germany, France, and
the United States to purchase and build nuclear reactors strictly for the purpose of
producing energy. Like North Korea, Iran received initial support from the United States
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This includes the establishment as well as advancement in nuclear production.
Iran's nuclear status is interesting since it had a reversal of its nuclear position. In 1974,
Iran's nuclear status moved from not having a program to having one, but in 1978 it reverted
back to not having a nuclear program. A detailed discussion of Iran's nuclear decision is
undertaken in Chapter 1.
93
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and France for its nuclear research program to be used for peaceful means; however, in
1974, the Shah's nuclear policy shifted towards developing weapons. In June 1974, the
Shahs stated that Iran would have nuclear weapons "without a doubt and sooner than one
would think" (as cited by Cordesman & Al-Rodhan, 2006: p. 22). In 1975, the Shah asserted
that Iran had "no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons but if small states began building
them, then Iran might have to reconsider its policy" (as cited by Cordesman & Al-Rodhan,
p. 22). Though the Shah had stated that Iran had no intention of developing nuclear
weapons, the United States moved to negotiate and sign the 1978 US-Iran Nuclear Treaty
in order to restrict Iran's ability to develop nuclear weapons (Fiore, 2011). Following the
1979 Revolution, Iran's nuclear ambitions were stopped by the Khomeini. However, in
1984, evidence showed that the Khomeini had revived Iran's nuclear program for the
purpose of establishing weapons, after years of opposing nuclear technology (Cordesman
& Al-Rodhan, 2006; Cirincione, Wolfsthal & Rajkumar, 2005). It should be noted that
national security concerns were a factor leading to the re-establishment of Iran's nuclear
program. According to Levi (2011), Iran had been decisively pursuing nuclear weapons as
a possible deterrent for invasion. In 1987 and 1990, Iran signed agreements with Pakistan
and China, respectively, to establish long-term cooperation in nuclear research and
development (Cirincione et al., 2005). Many experts had long suspected that Iran was
carrying out a clandestine weapons development program since the mid-1980s, and was
using its nuclear program for energy as a cover (Spector, 2007; Bruno, 2010).94 Thus, the
United States actively sought to limit Iran's program development by pressuring China,
Russia, and other suppliers of nuclear technology not to establish cooperation agreements
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The program was discovered in 1991.
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with Iran. Additionally, like North Korea, Iran also received assistance from AQ Khan as
early as the mid-1980s where it was revealed in 2004 that AQ Khan had assisted Iran in
developing uranium enrichment capabilities as well as nuclear weapons design. However,
Iran's nuclear program did not achieve significant breakthroughs until 1989 for two
reasons. First, the death of Ruhollah Khomeini allowed for the rise of his successor, Ali
Khomeini, who had a more favorable view towards nuclear weapons. Second, the Iran-Iraq
War ended, ceasing that financial burden on Iran. Thus, since 1989, Iran moved to rebuild
its Busheher nuclear reactor with the assistance of Russia, who also provided Iran with fuel.
In addition, an Iranian opposition group in mid-2002 revealed that "Iran had pursued a
clandestine program to enable it to produce nuclear weapon material, a program that had
not been declared to the IAEA as required by the NPT" for the past 18 years (Spector,
2007). Despite becoming party to the NPT in 1970, Iran has consistently violated the nonproliferation agreement by developing a clandestine nuclear program. According to Shire
and Albright (2006), "Iran’s main NPT and safeguards violations relate to undeclared
activity dating from the mid-1980s into 2003" (p. 1). In violation of its commitment to the
NPT and Safeguard agreements, Iran carried out the following activities: importing
uranium from China in 1991, converting uranium, enriching uranium, hiding nuclear
facility sites used for uranium enrichment (Tehran Nuclear Research Center, Kalaye
Electric Company Workshop, and Lashkar Ad'ad) from IAEA inspections, and enriching
laser isotopes and conducting plutonium experiments at these undisclosed sites.
The following section will offer a brief discussion of Iran's hostile and cooperative
behavior during its changes of nuclear status, and perhaps more importantly, compare the
results found to the North Korean case in Chapter 5. The study will test the following
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propositions about Iran's behavior as it moved to establish a nuclear weapons development
program in 1974 and 1984:
Proposition 1: Iran becomes less hostile when it moves from not having a
weapons development program to having one.

nuclear

Proposition 2: Iran becomes more cooperative when it moves from not having a
nuclear weapons development program to having one.95

Next the study will discuss Iran's hostile behavior in order to test proposition 1. Figure
6.1 presents Iran's hostility trends between 1964 and 2001.

Figure 6.1: Iran's hostility trends

Notes:
(1) The red dashed line in the x-axis is the mean score for Iran's
hostility. The hostility
score ranges from -1 to 0, where -1 indicates the highest level of hostility in
a dyad
and 0 indicates neutrality. (2) For hostile behavior, it measures the level of hostility in
militarized disputes between states attempting to develop nuclear weapons and other
states. On the other hand, cooperative behavior encompasses diplomatic
representation/exchange, joint-IGO membership, and formal agreements between states
attempting to develop nuclear weapons and other states. Therefore, hostility can increase
in terms of
militarize disputes, but also cooperation can also increase as states
participate in IGOs or form agreements. For example, in the Iran-Iraq dyad, despite
becoming very hostile during the 1980s Iran-Iraq war, they continued to cooperate in
95

The logic behind these propositions is found in Chapters 2 and 6.
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OPEC. Second, for the purpose of the study a decrease in cooperation means
nonparticipation and indifference in formal agreements or IGOs by states attempting to
develop nuclear weapons in given dyads. It should be noted that a decrease in cooperation
does not indicate more violence by states attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Third, a
decrease in hostility does not mean states attempting to develop nuclear weapons become
more cooperative.

1964 - 1978: Iran's Program under the Shah
This section will examine Iran's hostile behavior between 1964 and 1978. During the
Shah's regime, the study assumes that Iran did not have a nuclear weapons development
program between 1964 and 1973, and that its nuclear status changed in 1974, where
between 1974-1978, Iran had a nuclear weapons development program. A glance at figure
6.1 reveals that Iran's hostility between 1964 and 1969 increased slightly, as evident with
the shift in the hostility score away from 0. This spike in hostility can be attributed to
several factors, but mainly to the rise of the Ba'athist party to political power in Iraq.96 The
Ba’ath regime in Iraq adhered to the perception of Arab unity, which conflicted with Iran's
ambitions of military supremacy in the Gulf (Karsh, 1990). For example, in July 1969, Iran
attempted a coup against the Ba’ath regime in Iraq (Halliday, 1979). Additionally, territorial
disputes over the Shatt-al-Arab waterway in the Gulf have contributed to various clashes
between Iran and Iraq.97 In 1959, the first Shatt-al-Arab crisis was initiated by the Shah's
comment that the status quo regarding the Shatt-al-Arab waterway and the 1937 agreement
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The Ba'athist party came into power on July 18, 1968 following a military coup.
In 1937, an international agreement was established to deal with the Shatt-al-Arab
dispute between Iran and Iraq. The 1937 agreement followed in line with previous
Ottoman-Iran agreements about the waterway "that the shatt was wholly Iraqi territory
except for a length of three miles opposite Abadan, where the frontier was to run along the
thalweg (the line of greatest depth) of the river" (Brecher, 1997, p. 301).
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are both “intolerable.”98 During this crisis, border clashes between Iran and Iraq occurred,
and in response to Iraqi violation of its territory, Iran placed its military on high alert
(Brecher, 301-302). The two conflicting countries clashed again over the Shatt-al-Arab
waterway on April 15, 1969, when Iraq demanded that Iranian ships lower their flags when
passing the waterway. In addition, Iraq stated that if its demands were not met, it would use
force and prevent ships from using the river if they were heading to an Iranian port. In
response to Iraqi demands, Iran declared the 1937 agreement to be null and void. This led
to increased hostility between the two states; for example, Iran put its navy on high alert
and fighter jets escorted its ships using the waterway.99
Between 1974 and 1978, Iran's hostility score was fixed and no major fluctuations in
hostility occurred. Thus, during the first phase of Iran's nuclear weapons development
program under the Shah, its level of hostility did not exhibit any increases or decreases.
Iran's level of hostility during its first phase of nuclear development was similar to North
Korea's hostile behavior from the 1960s until the early 1990s. Again, like North Korea,
Iran's hostile behavior between 1974 and 1978 did not support the proposition 1 prediction
that Iran's hostile behavior would decrease when it had a nuclear weapons development
program. Nevertheless, since the “smoking gun” test for causal inference was applied in
the analysis, proposition 1 is not eliminated but instead is weakened in regards to the first
nuclear weapons development program attempt by Iran.
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The first Shatt-al-Arab crisis started on November 28, 1959 and ended January 4, 1960.
In 1975, an agreement was signed between Iran and Iraq that recognized that the Shattal-Arab waterway as a common border between the two nations.
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1979-2010: Iran's nuclear program under the Khomeini
This section will analyze Iran's second phase of nuclear development. Figure 6.1 shows
that between 1978 and 1984 (Iran did not have a nuclear program), Iran's hostility level
increased significantly, with 1984 marked as the highest level of hostility for this time
period.100 This spike in hostility is evidently due to two factors: first, the 1979 Islamic
Revolution and the resulting conflicting relationship between the United States and Iran;
and second, the Iran-Iraq War.101
Turning to Iran's second attempt at developing a nuclear weapons program, from 1984
onward, Tehran showed a drastic increase in its hostile behavior from previous years. Much
of Iran's hostility was towards Iraq and the United States, and to a lesser extent Afghanistan.
Examining the period between 1984 and 1989, the spike in Iran’s hostility can be attributed
to the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq territorial dispute over the Shatt-al-Arab
waterway.102 A notable crisis was the onset of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, which lasted for
eight years. On September 17, 1980, Iraq states that the 1975 agreement between Iran and
Iraq, where they both agreed that the waterway is a common border, was now considered
void by Iraq. Instead, Iraq claimed complete sovereignty over the waterway, referring to
the 1937 agreement (Abdulghani, 1984). This incident led to major military confrontations
between Iran and Iraq, during which Iran undertook powerful counterattacks against Iraq.
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Between 1978 and 1984, Iran is coded as not having a nuclear weapons development
program, which was due to the change in policy by the Ayatollah Khomeini. Refer to
Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion of Iran's nuclear foreign policy.
101
When Iran was under the Shah, US-Iran relations were not conflictual like the post-1979
revolution period.
102
For the 1984 - 1990 time period, Iran's average hostility score was -.487 and its highest
hostility score for that period is -.984. The hostility scores are based on the Crescenzi and
Enterline (2001) Dynamic Interstate Interaction model discussed in Chapter 3.
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Despite having periods of stalemate during the war, there were several notable crises, such
as the 1984 Basra-Kharg Island crisis and the 1987 Mecca Pilgrimage crisis. First, the
Basra-Kharg Island crisis involved Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. On February 21,
1984, Iran launched several military attacks against Iraq. In response, Iraq launched a series
of airstrikes against Iranian oil installations on Kharg Island with the goal of forcing Iran
to agree to end the war (Wilson Center, 1982). The crisis was widened when Kuwait
became involved in the conflict on May 13, 1984 after two of its oil tankers were damaged
near Bahrain. Following these attacks, Kuwait "accused Iran of the hostile acts" (Brecher,
p. 308). Later, Saudi Arabia became involved in the crisis due to the “tanker war,” where
its oil tankers were attacked by Iraqi and Iranian aircrafts. Second, the Mecca Pilgrimage
crisis involved Iran and Saudi Arabia from July 31 to October 1987. During the 1987 annual
pilgrimage to Mecca, Iranian demonstrators clashed with Saudi security guards, resulting
in the guards firing at the Iranian pilgrims. This situation led to increased tension between
Saudi Arabia and Iran, and eventually international intervention was required to put an end
to this crisis.
Thus, during the 1984-1989 period, Iran displayed higher levels of hostility in its
dyadic relationships, especially more than in its previous nuclear development phase
(1974-1978). In the mid-late 1980s, Iran's nuclear program was moving forward with the
assistance of Russia and China as well as AQ Khan. The 1984-1990 period failed to support
proposition 1, which predicted that Iran's hostility would decrease when it had a nuclear
weapons development program; instead, the opposite occurred. Proposition 1 was thus
rejected, as evident from the above narrative that shows an increase in Iranian hostile
behavior. Comparing this outcome to the findings in Chapter 5, Iran's hostile behavior

153

mirrored that of North Korea.103
A look at figure 6.1 indicates that in the 1990s, Iran's hostile behavior was declining
gradually, as evident with the upward move of the red curve. However, it should be noted
that despite being less hostile, Iran's hostile behavior does not reach previous lows or 0
(neutrality). The drop in hostility is attributed to the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988.
Despite the end of the war, Iran and Iraq continued to experience various episodes of hostile
interaction over the years; however, the conflicts for this period were based on Iran's
opposition to the Mujaheeden-i-khalg group in Northern Iraq (Brecher, 1997).

For

example, in 1993, Iran fired several rockets into Northern Iraq for the purpose of weakening
the Kurds in that area (Dispute Narrative, 1993-2001, CoW Project). In addition, in the
mid-1990s, a slight increase in Iran's hostility is evident; this is due to its increased attacks
on Kurdish bases in Northern Iraq as well as various clashes with Afghanistan. Iranian
forces in 1994 violated Afghanistan's sovereignty by crossing into its border as well as
shelling Afghan forces (Dispute Narrative, 1993-2001, CoW Project). It should be noted
that Iran was cooperating with some ethnic factions in Afghanistan, such as Tajiks, Uzbeks,
and Hazaras, which will be discussed elsewhere in the chapter. Additionally, Iran was also
responsible for the 1994 bombing of the Argentina Israelite Mutual Association in Buenos
Aires. In 2006, Argentina "accused the Iranian authorities of directing Hezbollah to carry
out the attack" (BBC News, 2006)
Thus, in testing proposition 1 for the 1990-1999 timeframe, it could be argued that
mixed support was found since Iran's hostile behavior decreased during this time period.
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Again, it should be noted that nuclear development in the case of Iran is the product of
the hostility as adversaries object to Iran's nuclear ambition.
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Thus, in terms of the 1990s, proposition 1 was supported since a decline in Iran's hostility
levels was evident. The United States staunchly opposed Iran's nuclear ambitions,
particularly after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and so it took aggressive measures in order
to prevent Argentina, China, and Russia from providing Iran with nuclear technology. In
2007, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former ambassador to the United Nations, stated that
"[t]o avoid the [U.S.-led] restrictions and impediments," Zarif writes, "Iran refrained for
disclosing the details of its programs" (as cited by Bruno, 2010). Additionally, Iran
continued to insist that its nuclear program was for electricity production and not weapons.
Thus, since Iran sought to be discreet about its nuclear program in order to avoid
preemptive strikes from the United States or Israel, this could explain its decline in hostility.
Next the study examined Iran's behavior between 2000 and 2010.104 During this period
Iran did not engage in as much military interaction as it had done previously in the 1980s.
Rather, Iran supported various militias and terrorist organization abroad. For example, in
2002, a ship en route to Palestine was seized by Israel, which contained rockets, antitank
missiles, and plastic explosives from Iran. Additionally, Iran supported Hezbollah in
Lebanon, but has not engaged directly in the Hezbollah-Israel 2006 war. In 2003 and 2004,
on several occasions Iran attacked Kurdish forces in Northern Iraq as well as fortified its
border with Iraq. On March 22, 2003, Iran threatened to use military force in order to
prevent any further violations by the United States, and this was response to two US
missiles landing accidentally on Iranian territory (Dispute Narrative, 2002-2010, CoW
Project). In addition, in 2008 and 2009, Iran clashed with Afghani forces, and perhaps most
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It should be noted that figure 6.1 only presents data up to 2001 because the score relied
on the CoW Project. Thus, in order to examine Iran's behavior past 2001, the study
examined historical documents for the period of 2002-2010.
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importantly, Iran supported the Northern Alliance fighting against the Taliban government
in Afghanistan.105 The latter part will be discussed in the cooperation section of the analysis
because it explains Iran's cooperative behavior.
This brief discussion shows that Iran's hostile behavior did not increase nor decrease
significantly as it advanced in its nuclear program. Despite the 2000 Iran Non-Proliferation
Act, which "allowed the United States to sanction individuals and organizations providing
material aid to Iran's nuclear program" (Nikou, 2014: p. 3), Iran and Russia signed a nuclear
and military cooperation agreement in 2001. Following the Iranian-Russian agreement,
Iran began enriching uranium, and by 2010, Iran had "produced 20% enriched uranium, up
from 3.5%, in a move that marked a major increase in its capabilities" (Nikou, 2014: p. 9).
No support was found for proposition 1 during the time period of 2000-2010, since Iran
did not display a decrease in hostile behavior as it advanced in its nuclear program. Overall,
Iran's hostile behavior mirrored the case study presented in Chapter 5 about the hostile
behavior of North Korea. However, it could be argued that Iran's hostility levels vary for
other reasons, such as its rivalry with the United States and Israel, and that nuclear
preparations themselves may stem from rising hostilities. In the case of Iran, the Iran-Iraq
War and the hostility of the United States towards the post-1979 regime have driven Iran's
policy toward nuclearization.
Turning to Iran's cooperative behavior, the study attempts to test proposition 2
regarding whether Iran's cooperative behavior increased when it established and
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The Northern Alliance (1996-2001) was established in 1996 in response to the Taliban
regime takeover of Kabul (Rashid, 1999). The alliance was made up non-Pushtuns
minorities, such as Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazaras, to fight against the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan. Additionally, the Northern Alliance received extensive aid from Russia, Iran,
and Tajikistan.
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maintained a nuclear weapons development program.106 For the purpose of this study,
cooperative behavior includes the following: participation in IGOs, bilateral and
multilateral agreements, and diplomatic representations as well as exchanges. This section
will analyze Iran's cooperative behavior in two areas: first, Iran's participation and
engagement in various IGOs and formal agreements with other states107; and second, Iran's
nuclear diplomatic approach. Figure 6.2 presents Iran's cooperative trends between 1964
and 2001. For the time period between 2002 and 2010, the study analyzed Iran's diplomatic
history in the NPT.
Figure 6.2: Iran's cooperative trends

Notes: The red dashed line in the x-axis is the mean score for cooperation. The cooperative
score ranges from 1 to 0, where 1 indicates the highest level of cooperation in a dyad and
0 indicates neutrality.
106
107

A more detailed discussion of proposition 2 is found in Chapter 5.
This section only examines up to 2001 because of data limitation.
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Since 1964, Iran's cooperative behavior has increased significantly though not steadily,
especially with a peak in 1968. This increase in cooperative behavior might be attributed
to Iran joining several organizations, including Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries [OPEC, hereafter]. Following 1968, particularly between 1974 and 1978, Iran's
cooperative behavior began to decrease and became more fixed. During Iran's first period
of having a nuclear weapons development program, its cooperative behavior did not exhibit
an increase from its previous years. Thus, proposition 2, which theorized that cooperative
behavior would increase when a second-generation state has a nuclear weapons
development program, was not supported by the narrative above.
Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran's cooperative behavior increased
significantly108; in 1984, Iran reached the highest level of cooperative behavior in dyadic
relationships. This shift in cooperative behavior can be attributed to increased economic,
diplomatic, and military relations with other states. For example, after the 1979 Islamic
Revolution, Iranian-Syrian relations improved significantly as both states established a
strong military alliance and diplomatic cooperation.109 It should be noted Iran's increased
cooperation levels was in part an offshoot of its increasing hostility levels, particularly
during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. This was clearly evident with Syria supporting Iran
in 1980 during the Iran-Iraq war. Despite tensions between Iran and Turkey after 1979,
Iranian-Turkish economic ties expanded, and perhaps most importantly, Turkey continued
its economic ties with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war (Larrabee and Nader, 2013).
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Most notably in the Iran-Egypt and Iran-Russia dyads.
The Iranian-Syrian alliance continues to baffle many because Iran, a theocracy, is
strongly allied with Syria, a secular state.
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Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Ayatollah Khomeini had put an end to
Iran's nuclear program under the Shah; however, in 1984, due to fear of a US military
attack, Iran turned towards nuclear proliferation (Cordersman & Al-Rodhan, 2006).
Turning to figure 6.2, Iran's cooperative behavior can best be explained within two different
periods: 1984-1990 and 1991-2001. First, Iran's cooperative behavior increases in 1984 and
continues to increase until 1987. Subsequently, Iran's cooperative behavior begins to
decrease between 1988 and 1990. Several factors can explain these changes. First, Iran and
Iraq continued to have diplomatic relations and to “cooperate” in OPEC in the 1980s.
Second, between 1984 and 1990, Iran signed several nuclear cooperation agreements with
China and Russia. In the early 1990s, for example, Iran and Russia signed an agreement,
which established the joint research organization termed Persepolis. The research
organization was intended to provide Iran with technical expertise and information; Russia
also agreed to assist in building the Bushehr reactor (Friedland, 2006).
Furthermore, between 1991 and 2002 Iran's cooperation fluctuated as evident by figure
6.2. Due to pressure and threats of sanctions from the United States, both Russia and China
scaled down their nuclear cooperation with Iran, which can be attributed to the gradual
decline in Iran's cooperation score in the mid-1990s. On the other hand, the Iranian-Saudi
rapprochement in 1999 can explain Iran's increased cooperative behavior. In 1999, Iran and
Saudi Arabia engaged in several talks and agreements about oil production, maintaining
stable oil prices as well as managing Iraq (Kohl, 2002). The talks and agreements between
Iran and Saudi Arabia occurred even when distrust persisted over the Sunni-Shi's divide.
Throughout 1999 and 2000, Iran and Saudi Arabia worked jointly in the OPEC to establish
an agreement about oil production quotas. Iran's increased cooperative behavior can also
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be attributed to improved relations with Turkey in 1995 and onward. As an example, Iran
and Turkey established several bilateral economic ties dealing with the import and export
of oil and gas.110 Figure 6.3 illustrates the increased trade between Iran and Turkey.

Figure 6.3: Trade between Iran and Turkey (millions in US dollars)

Source: Habibi, 2012, p. 4.

Between 1974 and 1978, Iran's cooperative behavior was fixed with no major spikes
in either direction; also during this time period, advancements in Iran's nascent nuclear
program were limited, with no significant breakthroughs. Thus, no support was found for
proposition 2, which posited that Iran's cooperative behavior would increase during this
time period.
In addition, between 1984 and 1990, Iran's cooperative behavior increased with minor
fluctuations, which supported proposition 2 that its cooperative behavior would increase
when it had a nuclear weapons development program. The results mirrored the ones found
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Turkey's economy is heavily dependent on Iran's export of oil and gas. In 1996, Iran
and Turkey signed a $20 billion agreement for the sale of natural gas (Habibi, 2012).
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for North Korea, where both states had fluctuations in their cooperative behavior as they
attempted to establish nuclear weapons. It should be noted that around this time period,
Iran was making progress with its nuclear weapons development, particularly with
enriching uranium. On the other hand, between 1991 and 2001, Iran's cooperative behavior
fluctuated, with a steep drop in its cooperative behavior between 1993 and 1994.
Additionally, in the 1980s and early 1990s, Iran negotiated and signed various trade
agreements and nuclear cooperation agreements with Argentina; however, due to pressure
from the United States and the 1994 bombing of the Jewish Center, Argentina suspended
its cooperation with Iran. Thus, this steep drop in Iran's cooperation level can be attributed
to breakthroughs in its program and the American response to its nuclear program. On the
other hand, in the late 1990s and until 2001, Iran's cooperative behavior increased, which
could be due to its nuclear program. For example, IAEA inspections and the various nuclear
cooperative agreements Iran signed with Russia and China could explain the rise in Iran's
cooperative behavior during this period. Thus, in the 1991-2001 time period, Iran's level of
cooperation provided mixed support for proposition 2 because there were both increases
and decreases in its cooperative behavior.
The final section will discuss and analyze proposition 2 with respect to Iran's nuclear
diplomacy in the 2000s. On August 2003, the IAEA discovered that for nearly two decades,
Iran had failed to disclose its nuclear activities and was in noncompliance with its NPT and
IAEA Safeguard obligations. Thus, in order to avoid sanctions by the United Nations and
the United States, Iran began to negotiate with Britain, France, and Germany. At the end of
the negotiations, Iran agreed to temporarily freeze its uranium enrichment as well as fully
cooperate with the IAEA. Additionally, Iran signed a Protocol agreement with the IAEA to
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permit more intrusive inspections by the IAEA. In defiance of the 2003 Protocol, Iran
continued with its nuclear activities by producing centrifuge components as well as
undertaking small-scale conversion experiments (Spector, 2007). Again in order to avoid
sanctions, Iran signed the Paris Agreement in 2004 with Britain, France, and Germany. The
agreement required Iran to continue with its temporary suspension, and additionally, Iran
was required to negotiate in good faith about its nuclear program. In response to Iran's
continued noncompliance with the NPT, IAEA Safeguards, 2003 Protocol Agreement, and
2004 Paris Agreement, on June 1, 2006, the permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council proposed a comprehensive agreement to Iran. Figure 6.4 presents an
excerpt from the agreement endorsed by the Security Council.
Figure 6.4 Excerpt from the UN's Security Council Proposed Agreement to Iran

Source: Elements of a proposal to Iran, S202/06
On July 31, 2006, Iran rejected the proposed comprehensive agreement by the Security
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Council, and so Iran continued its noncompliance with the NPT and IAEA Safeguards
Agreements. On August 27, 2007, the IAEA and Iran developed a “work plan,” which
sought to address the international community's concerns about Iran's nuclear activities.
According to Crail (2007):
[the] majority of the work plan outlines a phased process for Iran to provide
clarifications on a set of outstanding issues previously identified by the IAEA.
These outstanding questions relate to a number of clandestine nuclear activities
which Iran failed to declare before the IAEA discovered them in 2003, as well as
weapons-related projects the United States has accused Iran of carrying out (p. 1).

By 2008, the IAEA's “work plan” failed to make the needed progress because Iran
continued not providing the necessary information to the IAEA about the military
component of its nuclear program. The Obama administration sought to improve
American-Iranian relations, and so it proposed the Fuel Swap Agreement on October 2009
with Iran. The 2009 agreement outlined that "Iran would receive a special form of enriched
uranium fuel for a research reactor that produces medical isotopes, if it shipped the majority
of Iran’s low enriched uranium (LEU) to a neutral third-country" (Christy & Zarate, 2014:
p. 6). In 2009, Iran tentatively accepted the agreement, but later Iran refused to accept the
agreement and eventually the agreement broke down. Finally, in 2010, both Turkey and
Brazil attempted to restart a watered-down Fuel Swap Agreement initially proposed by the
United States, but again Iran failed to cooperate.
For the time period of 2002-2010, the above brief narrative provides mixed support for
proposition 2, which predicted that Iran's cooperative behavior would increase due to its
nuclear weapons development program. During this particular time period, Iran had
advanced significantly in its program in terms of enriching uranium. In theory, it could be
argued that Iran's cooperative behavior increased as it engaged with the international
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community in various negotiations, talks, and agreements. However, in practice, Iran was
noncompliant with the NPT, IAEA Safeguards, and the various agreements signed during
this time period, and so it could be argued here that Iran was displaying noncooperative
behavior but simply acting to avoid additional sanctions. The case of Iran requires
additional research, particularly about the relationship between its cooperative behavior
and nuclear weapons development program.

6.3 Future Research
The study overall has yielded several results about the behavior of states as their
nuclear status changes over time. In terms of hostile behavior, the study found that nuclear
procurement decreased proliferating states level of hostility. It should be noted that reverse
causation may be in effect with hostility leading to nuclear programs, this is clearly argued
with the case of North Korea and Iran. On the other hand, the study found that states with
nuclear weapons development programs tended to increase proliferating states cooperative
behavior. Again, as discussed in great detail in Chapters 4 through 6, this increase in
cooperative behavior to a certain extent is due to the nature of nuclear proliferation, where
the international community responds to this proliferation attempt by increasing IAEA
inspections, negotiations, and proposed agreements. This was clearly evident in the case of
North Korea and Iran in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively.
A glance at the literature shows a lack of research about states with nuclear weapons
development programs before they achieve nuclear weapons capabilities. An examination
of state nuclear status is imperative since the timeframe of second-generation proliferating
states to acquire nuclear weapons is much lengthier than their counterparts. Two clear
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examples of this are North Korea and Iran. In that light, the behavior of states with nuclear
weapons development programs that have not achieved nuclear weapons capabilities is
understudied and requires attention in the literature.
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APPENDIX A
Figure A3.1: Histograms for hostility dependent variable
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APPENDIX A
Figure A3.2: Histograms for cooperation dependent variable

167

APPENDIX A
Section A3.1: Dynamic Interstate Interaction (2001) Discussion:
The Crescenzi and Enterline (2001) model of Dynamic Interstate Interaction captures
the role played by historical interstate interactions in informing about the patterns of state
behavior. The dynamic model captures state relationships through the repeated occurrence
of events (either cooperative or conflictual). Two core concepts are at the heart of the
Dynamic Interstate Interaction model: growth and decay functions.
The growth function represents the new information with each occurrence of an event
between two states (either a cooperative or hostile interaction). Decay refers to an absence
of events between two states, thereby leading to a lack of new information. An absence of
events in terms of militarized interstate dispute refers to a lack of crisis within a dyad, and
on the other hand, an absence of events in terms of cooperation refers to a lack of jointIGO membership, alliance agreement, and diplomatic representation within a dyad.
The growth and decay of information about the behavior of a proliferating state in a
dyad is affected by several factors. First, increased interaction between a proliferating state
and another state in a dyad offers more information about the hostile and cooperative
behavior of the former state. This interaction is the growth of information about state
behavior. For example, the frequent militarized interstate disputes between the United
States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War increased the amount of information about
the behavior of the United States and the Soviet Union, and on the other hand, the postCold War era is an example of decreased information about either state’s behavior since
militarized interstate disputes between them has decreased in frequency. On the other hand,
infrequent interaction between a proliferating state and another state in a dyad offers limited
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to no information about the hostile and cooperative behavior of the former state (decay of
information). In terms of hostile behavior, frequent militarized interstate disputes between
a proliferating state and another state in a dyad offers information about the behavior of the
proliferating state. The same could be said about frequent cooperation between a
proliferating state and another state in a dyad. Second, the time between each interaction
(hostile or cooperative) in a given dyad influences the growth and decay of information
about proliferating states behavior. In that light, if two events occur but are separated by a
35-year difference, then the two events are considered independent of each other. On the
other hand, if the time between two events is much smaller, for example a few years or
months, then this influences the growth of information about the behavior of a proliferating
state in a given dyad.
The Dynamic Interstate Interaction model is formalized as follows Crescenzi and
Enterline (2001):

The subscript i is the interstate interaction level for a given dyad, which is lagged by 1 year.
The first part of the equation is the decay element of the model, where the rate of decay is
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determined by the amount of time that has lapsed since the last interaction (cooperative or
conflictual) in the dyad. It is important to note that greater interaction in the dyad will lead
to a decrease in the decay function of the model. The second part of the equation is the
conflictual element of the model, which captures the level of hostility in the dyad
interaction. Finally, the third part of the equation is the cooperative element of the model,
which captures the degree of cooperation in the dyad interaction. It is important to note that
the conflictual and cooperative parts of the equation are weighted by the severity of the
interaction and the amount of time since the last interaction has occurred in the dyad. The
last two parts of the equation [β1 and β2] represent the information that informs about states
pattern of behavior in the international system. In equation [1] the interstate interaction
level is unbounded and so the values range from -to +. In order to have a more intuitive
range, equation [1] is transformed, where the interstate interaction value is bound from -1
to +1 (Crescenzi and Enterline, 2001). A value of -1 indicates the strongest interstate level
of interstate hostility and a value of +1 indicates the strongest interstate level of
cooperation. Also, a value of 0 indicates neutrality in the dyad. In summary, frequent
interactions between states, either hostile or cooperative, will generate greater information
about the patterns of behavior for states with nuclear weapons development programs and
nuclear weapons in the dyad. The Interstate Interaction model will represent the dependent
variable for the dissertation and will be operationalized in the data section below.
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APPENDIX A
Table A3.1: List of Control Group Countries

Countries
Italy
Canada
Poland
Egypt
Malaysia
Australia
Sweden
Bangladesh
Lebanon
Syria
Germany
Japan
Spain
Turkey
Singapore
Thailand
Macedonia
Sir Lanka
Taiwan
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APPENDIX A
Table A3.2: Jo and Gartzke's Composite Index of Latent Nuclear Weapons
Production Capability
Composite Index Includes the following:
Potential factors to developing weapons:
Whether a state has potential nuclear
explosive materials to produce nuclear
weapons.
Whether a state has metallurgical capability
to process excavated uranium ores.
Whether a state has chemical capabilities to
make nuclear munitions.
Whether a state has the capability to make
explosive materials for nuclear munitions.
Whether a state has explosive and
electronic capability.
Whether a state has nuclear engineering
capability.
Whether a state has the capabilities to
produce electricity enough to run nuclear
weapon development programs.

Indicators
Has access to uranium deposits or
produced uranium
Production of crude steel or aluminum
Production of nitric or sulfuric acid
Production of non-organic fertilizer
Produces or assembles motors and
produces television or radios
Nuclear reactor more than 3 years old

Has 200 megawatt electricity production
capacity or produces at least electricity
equivalent to 50 thousand metric tons of
oil.
Source: Jo and Gartzke (2006) code book for data set
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APPENDIX B
Table A4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Std.
N

Min

Max

Nuclear Status

4760

0

1

.51

.500

Hostility

4584

.00

.99

.231

.365

Cooperation

4613

.00

.98

.516

.369

Security Problem

4760

0

1

.15

.356

Security Commitment

4760

0

1

.23

.420

4752

0

1

.43

.495

4752

0

1

.22

.414

4752

0

1

.41

.492

4477

-.98

1.00

.35

.511

Global S-Score

4477

-.61

1.00

.54

.375

Democratic Peace Effect
(Weak-Link)

4553

.0

10.0

1.8

2.438

Ln Distance Capital

4752

3.78

9.37

7.28

1.04496

Relative Capability Ratio

4490

-5.63

7.86

1.61

1.74

Valid N (listwise)

4265

Contiguity (Land/Water)
Contiguity Less 150 miles
Major Power Status
Regional S-Score

Mean Deviation

173

APPENDIX B
Table A4.2: Correlation Matrix
NS

SC

SP

Cont.
Land/
Water

Cont
Less
150
miles

MPS

Reg.
S
score

NS

.

SC

.040

.

SP

.003

-.006

.

Cont.
Land/
Water

-.003

-.069

.266

.

Cont.
Less
150
miles
MPS

.009

-.143

.296

.601

.

-.019

.288

-.072

-.288

-.322

.

.057

-.320

.043

.412

.370

-.467

.

Glob.
S
score

DPE

Coop

Reg.
S
Score
Glob
S
Score
DPE

.099

-.378

.018

.395

.387

-.566

.943

.

.005

-.067

-.088

-.113

.055

.091

.062

-.068

.

Coop.

.425

-.205

.055

.093

.131

-.335

.205

.307

.023

.

Host.

.203

.068

.523

.255

.244

.064

-.041

-.083

.032

.044

-.028

.073

-.154

-.010

-.099

.223

-.062

-.137

.171

-.172

Hos

RCR

DC

.

-.07
.
9
-.007 .263 -.329
-.611
-.477
.373
-.467
-.477
-.013 -.130 -.22
.038
.
DC
1
Note: NS = Nuclear Status; SC = Security Commitment; SP = Security Problem; Cont. Land/Water = Contiguity
Land/Water; Cont.Less 150 miles = Contiguity Less 150 miles; MPS = Major Power Status; Reg. S-Score = Regional SScore; Glob. S-Score = Global S-Score; DEP = Democratic Peace Effect; Coop. = Cooperation Host. = Hostility RCR =
Relative Capabilities Ratio; DC = Ln Distance Capital
RCR

174

APPENDIX B
Figure A4.1: Hostility trends for states with nuclear weapons development program
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APPENDIX B
Figure A4.2: Cooperation trends for states with nuclear weapons development
programs

Note: Cooperation score ranges between .000 (neutral relationship) - .980 (highest
cooperative relationship)
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APPENDIX B
Figure A4.3: Boxplot for hostility and cooperation
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Table A4.3: Goodness of fit for Model 1
Degree of Value/Degree of
Test for Hostility
Deviance

Value

Freedom

Freedom

5100.616

4225

1.207

Scaled Deviance

3500.125

4225

Pearson Chi-Square

5547.737

4225

Scaled Pearson ChiSquare

3806.947

4225

Log Likelihood

-3149.647

Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)

1.313

6325.294

Finite Sample Corrected
6325.380
AIC (AICC)
Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC)

6407.865

Consistent AIC (CAIC)

6420.865

Note: These are the results for the linear additive regression (model 1) in Chapter 4 table
4.1 for hostile behavior.

178

APPENDIX B
Table A4.4: Goodness of fit for model 2

Degree of

Value/Degree of

Test for Hostility
Deviance

Value

Freedom

Freedom

5100.616

4225

1.207

Scaled Deviance

3500.125

4225

Pearson Chi-Square

5547.737

4225

Scaled Pearson ChiSquare

3806.947

4225

Log Likelihood

-3149.647

Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)

6325.294

Finite Sample Corrected
AIC (AICC)

6325.380

Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC)

6407.865

Consistent AIC (CAIC)

6420.865

1.313

Note: nuclear status and security problem interaction regression estimates (model 2) in
Chapter 4 table 4.1 for hostile behavior.
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APPENDIX B
Table A4.5: Goodness of fit for Model 3
Degree of

Value/Degree

Test for Hostility
Deviance

Value

Freedom

of Freedom

5070.669

4224

1.200

Scaled Deviance

3493.928

4224

Pearson Chi-Square

5578.683

4224

Scaled Pearson ChiSquare

3843.974

4224

Log Likelihood

-3139.351

Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)

6306.702

Finite Sample Corrected
AIC (AICC)

6306.801

Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC)

6395.624

Consistent AIC (CAIC)

6409.624

1.321

Note: nuclear status and security commitment interaction regression estimates (model 3)
in Chapter 4 table 4.1 for hostile behavior.
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APPENDIX B
Table A4.6: Goodness of fit for Model 4

Value

Degree of

Value/Degree of

Freedom

Freedom

Test for Cooperation
Deviance

2914.432

4252

Scaled Deviance

4298.037

4252

Pearson Chi-Square

1460.442

4252

2153.777

4252

Scaled Pearson ChiSquare
Log Likelihood
Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)

.685
.343

-3564.731
7155.462

Finite Sample Corrected
AIC (AICC)

7155.547

Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC)

7238.115

Consistent AIC (CAIC)

7251.115

Note: These are the results for the linear additive regression (model 4) in Chapter 4 table
4.2 for cooperative behavior.
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APPENDIX B
Table A4.7: Goodness of fit for Model 5
Degree of Value/Degree
Test for Cooperation
Deviance

Value

Freedom

of Freedom

5035.833

4224

1.192

Scaled Deviance

3486.689

4224

Pearson Chi-Square

6034.615

4224

4178.222

4224

Scaled Pearson ChiSquare
Log Likelihood
Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)

1.429

-3127.320
6282.640

Finite Sample Corrected
6282.740
AIC (AICC)
Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC)

6371.563

Consistent AIC (CAIC)

6385.563

Note: nuclear status and security problem interaction regression estimates (model 5) in
Chapter 4 table 4.2 for cooperative behavior.
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APPENDIX B
Table A4.8: Goodness of fit for Model 6
Degree of

Value/Degree

Test for Cooperation
Deviance

Value

Freedom

of Freedom

2878.299

4251

.677

Scaled Deviance

4286.841

4251

Pearson Chi-Square

1486.979

4251

Scaled Pearson ChiSquare

2214.655

4251

Log Likelihood

-3537.956

Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC)

7103.913

.350

Finite Sample Corrected
7104.011
AIC (AICC)
Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC)

7192.924

Consistent AIC (CAIC)

7206.924

Note: nuclear status and security commitment interaction regression estimates (model 6)
in Chapter 4 table 4.2 for cooperative behavior.
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Can a state’s nuclear status influence its behavior in dyadic relationships? The present
study examines the role played by nuclear status on the proliferating state’s level of
hostility and cooperation towards other states in dyadic relationships. The study builds on
the existing literature by looking at the behavior of states prior to becoming nuclear
weapons states by strictly examining states with nuclear weapons development programs.
This phase in the nuclear process is lacking in the current literature on nuclear weapons.
Hostile behavior is measured based on the level of hostility in militarized disputes between
states attempting to develop nuclear weapons and other states. Cooperative behavior
encompasses diplomatic representation/exchange, joint-IGO membership, and formal
agreements between states attempting to develop nuclear weapons and other states.
The dissertation contains six points of argument about the behavior of states as they
move to establish nuclear weapons development programs. The first argument deals with
nuclear status and hostility, where it argues that a change in nuclear status increases
proliferating states level of hostility in dyadic relationships. In addition, the second
argument deals with nuclear status and cooperation, where it argues that a change in nuclear
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status decreases proliferating states level of cooperation. The next four points of argument
examine the interaction effect between nuclear status, state behavior, security problem, and
security commitment from a nuclear patron. In terms of security problem, the study argues
that when nuclear status changes hostile behavior decreases a when security problem is
present. On the other hand, the study argues that when nuclear status changes cooperative
behavior increases a when security problem is present. Finally, in terms of security
commitment, the study argues that a change in nuclear status is associated with an increase
in the hostile behavior of proliferating states when they have a security commitment. With
respect to cooperative behavior, the study argues that cooperation increases when
proliferating states have a security commitment.
In attempting to test these arguments, the study applies a quantitative approach to 16
states with nuclear weapons developing program between 1930 and 2001. The study looked
at state behavior before and after establishing a nuclear program for the purpose of
developing weapons. In addition, recognizing the inherent limitation of quantitative
analysis, the study also conducts one in-depth case study analysis and one minor case study
by applying a process tracing approach, to North Korea and Iran, respectively. The results
provided mixed support for the arguments made in the study, where the study found that
hostile behavior decreased when nuclear status changes. Additionally, the study found that
hostility decreased when security problem or security commitment were present. On the
other hand, the study found that cooperation decreased when nuclear status changed. When
testing the interaction effect, the study found that cooperation increased when proliferating
states had a security commitment from a nuclear patron. The case study analysis of North
Korea and Iran, further confirmed several of the findings found in the quantitative section
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of the study.
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